Opinion
No. 05-05-00694-CR
Opinion issued February 2, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 001-82763-04. Affirmed.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ranjitha Madichetty appeals her conviction for fraudulent destruction, removal, or concealment of writing. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court sentenced her to 100 days in jail, probated for 364 days, and a fine of $800. Appellant brings two issues on appeal contending the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support appellant's conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). In determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light, and we determine whether the evidence of appellant's guilt, taken alone, is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). On October 19, 2004, appellant and her mother-in-law, Shamayalle Devi Skaranala, went shopping at Foley's. They went to the jewelry section and tried on different kinds of jewelry. Skaranala took earrings and at least one ring from the display racks, removed the jewelry from the display cards, and hid it in her clothing. The display cards for the jewelry listed a stock coding number and the price. Appellant's and Skaranala's actions attracted the attention of the store's loss prevention personnel, who began surveillance of appellant and Skaranala. Steve Olson, one of Foley's loss prevention personnel, testified appellant watched for store personnel while Skaranala concealed the merchandise. Appellant and Skaranala were apprehended by Foley's loss prevention personnel as they left the store. While being escorted to the store's loss prevention office, Skaranala tried to discard some of the merchandise she had concealed on her person. The loss prevention personnel handcuffed Skaranala to prevent her from discarding any more merchandise. In the loss prevention office, Skaranala was released from the handcuffs and asked to hand over the merchandise she had taken. Skaranala removed some of the merchandise from her clothing and swallowed it. Appellant and Skaranala were arrested and taken to jail. As Skaranala was being booked into the jail, she threw a ring and a pair of earrings into a trash can. The arresting officer returned the merchandise to Foley's the next day and gave it to one of the loss prevention employees. Diana Fritsche, one of the loss prevention employees, testified the police returned some jewelry "that had been released from [Skaranala's] body." Skaranala and appellant testified Skaranala acted alone and that appellant did not know Skaranala was stealing. Fritsche testified appellant said "she was with her mother-in-law and that she was somewhat aware of what was going on. She didn't know for sure she was going to take them, but she knew there was a chance." Appellant was charged with violating Texas Penal Code section 32.47, fraudulent destruction, removal, or concealment of writing. Under that section, "A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm another, he destroys, removes, conceals, alters, substitutes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a writing, other than a governmental record." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 32.47(a) (Vernon 2003). One of the definitions of "writing" is "universal product codes, labels, price tags, or markings on goods." Id. § 32.47(b)(4). The information alleged appellant "intentionally and knowingly, with intent to defraud and harm another, namely: Steve Olson, destroyed, removed, concealed, altered, substituted and otherwise impaired the verity, legibility and availability of a writing: namely, universal product code; label; price tag; and markings on goods." Appellant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her conviction because there is no evidence that the jewelry was separated from the price tags with the intent to defraud. The statute, however, does not require proof of intent to defraud; it requires proof of "intent to defraud or harm." Id. § 32.47(a). Likewise, under the indictment, the State could convict appellant by proving either intent to defraud or intent to harm. See Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (different manner and means may be charged in conjunctive and proved in disjunctive); Campbell v. State, 139 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (State had to prove either intent to obtain a benefit or intent to defraud, but State did not have to prove both). The penal code defines "harm" as "anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury. . . ." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(25) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Appellant argues the State failed to prove the element of intent to harm because appellant and Skaranala had no contact with Olson or any other Foley's employee before their apprehension, and they never presented the jewelry for purchase. Intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Meeks v. State, 135 S.W.3d 104, 112 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd). The trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence of appellant's watching for store employees while Skaranala removed the jewelry from the display cards and concealed the jewelry in her clothing that they intended the act of removing the jewelry from the display cards to result in a loss — and thus "harm" — to the owner of the jewelry. Under these facts, presentment of the jewelry for purchase or contact with Olson or other store employees was not necessary to prove intent to harm. Appellant also asserts the evidence is factually insufficient because the State did not present at trial either the jewelry taken by Skaranala or the display cards from which the jewelry was detached. Appellant also asserts, "There is some confusion as to whether or not any of the jewelry allegedly taken was ever recovered at all." The failure to offer the jewelry and display cards into evidence does not render the evidence insufficient because they were not elements of the offense. The crime was proven by evidence of appellant's actions supporting Skaranala's removal of the jewelry from the display cards containing the price tags and labels with the intent to harm. After considering all the evidence under the legal and factual sufficiency standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.