Summary
declining to find harmless error where the significant reasons upon which the ALJ relied in discrediting claimant's allegations of pain were unsupported by substantial evidence
Summary of this case from Elliot v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.Opinion
Case No. 3:13cv318
03-26-2015
RICKY L. MADEWELL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. #17) IN THEIR ENTIRETY; DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO SAID JUDICIAL FILING (DOC. #18) OVERRULED; PLAINTIFF'S "OBJECTIONS" TO THE EXTENT HE REQUESTS A REMAND FOR THE PAYMENT OF BENEFITS RATHER THAN ONE FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (DOC. #19) OVERRULED; JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, REVERSING COMMISSIONER'S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, AND REMANDING THE CAPTIONED CAUSE TO THE DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; TERMINATION ENTRY
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits. On January 13, 2015, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendations (Doc. #17), recommending that the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act be found unsupported by substantial evidence and reversed, and that the captioned cause be remanded to the Defendant Commissioner, pursuant to the Fourth Sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further administrative proceedings. Based upon reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (Doc. #17), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of the entirety of this Court's file, including the Administrative Transcript (Doc. #7), and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in their entirety and, in so doing, orders the entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Commissioner, concluding that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. The Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #18) and those of the Plaintiff (Doc. #19, to the extent he seeks a remand for the payment of benefits, rather than one for further administrative proceedings) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is reversed, and the captioned cause is remanded to the Defendant Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Magistrate Judge's task is to determine if that decision is supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations, is required to make a de novo review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made. This de novo review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate Judge, to determine whether the findings of the Secretary [now Commissioner] are supported by "substantial evidence." Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Secretary of Health. Education and Welfare, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 1982). This Court's sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). citing Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401; Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). To be substantial, the evidence "must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1986), quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, supra.
In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978); Ellis, supra; Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 1981); Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1984); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the Court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility. Garner, supra. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security and proceedings on Claimant's application for social security disability benefits are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, Commissioner of Social Security, 246 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2001). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the Court as a trier of fact would have arrived at a different conclusion. Elkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1981).
In addition to the foregoing, in ruling as aforesaid, this Court makes the following, non-exclusive, observations:
1. The Administrative Law Judge's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is unsupported by substantial evidence, given the Administrative Law Judge's deficiencies in failing to properly access the weight accorded all medical opinion evidence of record, according to the Commissioner's own rules and regulations, and in failing to consider any explanations that the Plaintiff might have provided, or any other information in the record, that might serve to explain infrequent or irregular medical visits or failure to seek treatment. On remand, those deficiencies must be addressed, in order to consider anew, based upon the entirety of the record, whether Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and, accordingly, entitled to benefits.
2. Given the incompleteness of the record as indicated above, this Court cannot say that "all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes the Plaintiff's entitlement to benefits." There are divergent medical source opinions in the record. Accordingly, a remand for further proceedings is proper in order that the Defendant Commissioner can meaningfully explain the weight to be accorded all medical evidence of record, properly determine Plaintiff's credibility according to applicable regulations and rulings, and determine anew Plaintiff's disability status. Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994).
WHEREFORE, based upon the aforesaid, this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. #17) in their entirety, having concluded that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #18) and those of the Plaintiff (Doc. #19, to the extent he seeks remand for the payment of benefits, rather than one for further administrative proceedings) are overruled. Judgment will be ordered entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant Commissioner, reversing the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, and remanding the captioned cause to the Defendant Commissioner, pursuant to the Fourth Sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further administrative proceedings as detailed above.
The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton. March 26, 2015
/s/_________
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Copies to: Counsel of record