' Id. The degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the charge, must amount to insanity. Crosslin v. State, 446 So.2d 675 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), appeal after remand, 489 So.2d 680 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), citing Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, [334], 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944) (other citations omitted)."
An indictment for assault with intent to murder by operation of law includes assault and battery with a weapon, assault and battery, and simple assault. McKinney v. State, 31 Ala. App. 618, 21 So.2d 116; Craven v. State, 22 Ala. App. 39, 111 So. 767; Ellis v. State, 15 Ala. App. 919, 72 So. 758; Code 1940, Tit. 15, § 323; Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 17 So.2d 283; Fleming v. State, 107 Ala. 11, 18 So. 263; Phillips v. State, 170 Ala. 5, 54 So. 111; Lewis v. State, 121 Ala. 1, 25 So. 1017. A defendant is entitled to have the court charge on the lesser offense included in the indictment where there is any reasonable theory from the evidence which would support a conviction for the lesser offense.
Under Alabama law, voluntary intoxication can negate specific intent only if it “amount[s] to ‘insanity.’ ” Crosslin v. State, 446 So.2d 675, 681–82 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (quoting Maddox v. State, 31 Ala.App. 332, 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944)). The defendant's intoxication must “render impossible” the requisite mental state.
The degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the charge, must amount to insanity. Crosslin v. State, 446 So. 2d 675 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983), appeal after remand, 489 So. 2d 680 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), citing Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 344, 17 So. 2d 283, 285 (1944)(other citations omitted).Ex parte Bankhead, 585 So. 2d 112, 120-21 (Ala. 1991) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala.1993); see also Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So. 2d 330, 340-343 (Ala. 2000).
"It is true that the degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the grade of an offense must amount to 'insanity.' Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 334, 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944). Mere drunkenness, voluntarily produced, is never a defense against a criminal charge, and can never palliate or reduce the grade of an offense, unless it is so extreme as to render impossible some mental condition which is an essential element of the criminal act.
The degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the charge, must amount to insanity. Crosslin v. State, 446 So.2d 675 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), appeal after remand, 489 So.2d 680 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), citing Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 344, 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944) (other citations omitted). Bankhead contends that the court's instruction requiring that the jury, in order to find a drunkenness defense applicable, had to find Bankhead insane due to intoxication, was prejudicial.
The degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the charge, must amount to insanity. Crosslin v. State, 446 So.2d 675 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), appeal after remand, 489 So.2d 680 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), citing Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 344, 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944) (other citations omitted). "Bankhead contends that the court's instruction requiring that the jury, in order to find a drunkenness defense applicable, had to find Bankhead insane due to intoxication, was prejudicial.
The degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the charge, must amount to insanity. Crosslin v. State, 446 So.2d 675 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), appeal after remand, 489 So.2d 680 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), citing Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 344, 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944) (other citations omitted). "Bankhead contends that the court's instruction requiring that the jury, in order to find a drunkenness defense applicable, had to find Bankhead insane due to intoxication, was prejudicial.
"It is true that the degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the grade of an offense must amount to 'insanity.' Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 334, 17 So.2d 283, 285 (1944). Mere drunkenness, voluntarily produced, is never a defense against a criminal charge, and can never palliate or reduce the grade of an offense, unless it is so extreme as to render impossible some mental condition which is an essential element of the criminal act.
" However, "[v]oluntary intoxication is no defense to a charge of assault and battery, unless the degree of intoxication amounts to insanity and renders the accused incapable of forming an intent to injure." Lister v. State, 429 So.2d 622 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983) (citing Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 334, 17 So.2d 283 (1944)); see also Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360, 364 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), aff'd, 590 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1991). Moreover, whether intoxication is substantial enough "to render intoxicated persons incapable of forming a specific intent . . . is a question for the jury [or trier of fact]."