However, the conflict in the present case was that the plaintiff was not found negligent in answer to question one, but his negligence was found to have caused fifty percent of the injury in question two. Appellant next cites Maddox v. Ellison, 240 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo, 1951, no writ), holding that: "In order for jury findings to conflict they must oppose each other and be such that they cannot both be true. They mutually destroy each other and amount to no finding.

We are faced with a situation in which the jury set the value of the option at $31,000 in Special Issue No. 7, and then said in Special Issue No. 20 that the value of the option was uncertain or speculative as of the same date. In order for jury findings to conflict, they must oppose each other and be such that they cannot both be true. Billingsley v. Southern Pacific Company, 400 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Fort Worth Denver Railway Co. v. Britton, 310 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Maddox v. Ellison, 240 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1951, n. w. h.). In the instant case, both of the jury findings cannot be true.

Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954); Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558 (1949); Stuckey v. Union Mortgage Investment Company, 383 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1964, ref., n.r.e.; Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97 (1939). Two findings will be considered to be in conflict only when they oppose each other in such a way that both cannot be true. Hancock v. Sammons, 267 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1954, ref., n.r.e.; Maddox v. Ellison, 240 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1951, no writ. Unless the answers are in such irreconcilable conflict so as to be mutually destructive, the verdict should not be set aside. Southwest Bitulithic Co. v. Dickey, 28 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1930, no writ. And, in making a determination of irreconciable conflict, a specific finding is generally held to control a general one. Bragg v. Hughes, 53 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1932, no writ; Cunningham v. Suggs, 340 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1960, ref., n.r.e .; Sproles v. Rosen, 126 Tex. 51, 84 S.W.2d 1001 (1935); Fort Worth Denver Railway Company v. Britton, 310 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App.) 1958, ref., n.r.e.; Speer, Law of Special Issues, p. 561, Sec. 432. It is never presumed that the jury intended to return conflicting answers and, if the same can be reconciled upon a reasonable basis, the court should sustain them. Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, supra.

It is our duty to reconcile the answers of the jury, if we can reasonably do so, and not permit the mistrial to stand, unless these answers are in such irreconcilable conflict as to destroy each other. Maddox v. Ellison, Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W.2d 398; Parker v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 246 S.W.2d 950; Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W.2d 225; Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97. It will be noted that with reference to Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5, the court used the term 'directions,' while with reference to Issues Nos. 6, 7 and 8, it used the term 'adequate information on the container,' and in reference to Issues Nos. 16 and 17, the court used the term 'all of the printed material appearing on the one gallon can.'

Graham v. Hines, Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W. 1015. If they admit of more than one reasonable construction, the court may apply that construction which it deems proper. Howard v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 473, writ refused; First Nat. Bank of Amarillo v. Rush, Tex.Com.App., 246 S.W. 349; Republic Production Co. v. Collins, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 100. Two findings will be considered to be in conflict only when they oppose each other in such way that both cannot be true. Hancock v. Sammons, Tex.Civ.App., 267 S.W.2d 252; Maddox v. Ellison, Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W.2d 398; Graham v. Dallas Ry. Terminal Co., Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 1002, writ refused; Getzwiller v. Fergeson, Tex.Civ.App., 145 S.W.2d 913; 89 C.J.S. Trial § 562, p. 323. We have determined that appellee was an invitee in a building which was under the exclusive control of appellants.