Opinion
No. 03-CV-5653 (JBW).
April 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM, JUDGMENT ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff was convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder in the second degree and assault. His conviction was affirmed on appeal and his habeas petition was dismissed as time-barred. He now brings suit under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code against the prosecutors responsible for this conviction; the medical examiner who performed the autopsy; the hospital where it was performed; and a doctor at the hospital. Plaintiff claims these defendants entered into a conspiracy to withhold exculpatory evidence, thereby resulting in an allegedly unconstitutional conviction. Defendants have brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
II. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff was convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder in the second degree, and first degree assault in November of 1994. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division. People v. Madden, 651 N.Y.S.2d 549 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996). Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. People v. Madden, 678 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 1997).
In June of 1998 plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed without prejudice because he had failed to exhaust his state court appeals. Madden v. Artuz, No. 98-CV-4229 (E.D.N.Y. October 16, 1998). After exhausting his state remedies, plaintiff refiled his habeas petition in September 2001. In July 2003 the petition was dismissed as time-barred. Madden v. Herbert, No. 01-CV-6188 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2003).
In February 2003, plaintiff made a Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") request for all autopsy and medical reports prepared in connection with his criminal case. His request was denied. On appeal, he request was granted in part; he was permitted access to medical records entered into evidence at his trial but was denied release of the victim's autopsy records on the ground that autopsy reports are exempt from disclosure under FOIL. He subsequently filed an Article 78 petition to compel disclosure of the autopsy records, which was denied in September 2003.
Plaintiff now brings a civil suit pro se under section 1983. He contends that the man he was convicted of murdering was killed, not as a result of the gunshots fired by plaintiff, but rather as a consequence of the subsequent removal of his organs at the hospital. In connection with his murder trial, he claims there are documents that he was not permitted to review including a copy of the autopsy report, an audio tape, the decedent's birth certificate, and police investigation reports. He argues that the defendants conspired to withhold these documents from him.
Plaintiff also claims that the medical expert who testified at his trial regarding the victim's autopsy should have been prevented from testifying since he neither performed nor witnessed the autopsy. Finally, he maintains that the victim's wife should not have been allowed to testify that her husband was in a coma because no physical examination stating as much was entered into evidence.
As a remedy plaintiff asks that the State be ordered to hold an evidentiary hearing in which the court would inspect each document in camera to decide its probative value. He argues that this is the only way to obtain the allegedly exculpatory evidence needed for his appeal.
Pro se papers are to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Based upon the statements in his complaint, plaintiff appears to be alleging that the state authorities have unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned him. In light of the Second Circuit's recent decision in Simon v. Unites States, this court will not recharacterize plaintiff's claim as a successive petition for habeas corpus. See 359 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a court may not, sua sponte, recharacterize a plaintiff's claim as a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241). The claim will be analyzed as it has been filed.
Defendants have brought a motion to dismiss on various grounds including that the plaintiff is improperly attempting to use section 1983 to attack the validity of his conviction. Because this court finds this basis for dismissal dispositive of the entire case, it need not consider defendants' other grounds for dismissal.
III. Law
A prisoner may not use section 1983 to attack the validity of his conviction. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500 (1973); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1999); Abdul-Hakeem v. Koehler, 910 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1990). "In short, Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490. "[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 500.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that to recover monetary damages for:
an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87; see also Channer v. Mitchell, 43 F.3d 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming a Heck-based dismissal of section 1983 claims, in which petitioner claimed he was unconstitutionally convicted as a result of police officers' perjury and coercion of witnesses, because petitioner had failed to establish that his conviction had been reversed); Duamutef v. Morris, 956 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing section 1983 claims of malicious prosecution and false arrest due to a failure to state a claim under Heck).
IV. Application of Law to Facts
Plaintiff argues his conviction was unconstitutional and seeks disclosure of allegedly exculpatory evidence, which he claims was withheld. He cannot, however, show his conviction has been reversed or otherwise been declared invalid. He is attempting to use section 1983 as a tool for reversal. This is improper. The claim should be dismissed as to all parties.
Even if the court were to construe plaintiff's claim as a motion to reconsider the denial of his habeas petition or as a successive petition, it would be dismissed as frivolous. For a habeas petitioner to prevail on a claim that an evidentiary error amounted to a deprivation of due process, he must show that error was so pervasive as to have denied him a fundamentally fair trial. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). The standard is whether the erroneously admitted evidence, viewed objectively in light of the entire record before the jury, was sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it. In short it must have been `crucial, critical, highly significant.'" Collins v. Scully, 755 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1982). The evidentiary rulings in the state court were appropriate. The fact and cause of death by homicide were not disputable given the overwhelming evidence. No certificate of appealability would have been granted.
V. Conclusion
The motion to dismiss is granted.
SO ORDERED.