As the State correctly points out, a court cannot commit a child to the custody of the DCYS but at the same time provide conditions which control or limit the DCYS' discretion in dealing with the child. See In the Interest of R. D., 141 Ga. App. 843 ( 234 S.E.2d 680) (1977); Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639 (4) ( 188 S.E.2d 828) (1972). But that is not what happened here.

OCGA § 17-8-20. The trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance was not a manifest abuse of discretion. Mack v. State of Ga., 125 Ga. App. 639, 640 (2) ( 188 S.E.2d 828) (1972); Young, supra. 2.

Our review of the record as it relates to the grounds asserted here by appellant discloses no abuse of that discretion. See Mauldin v. State, 167 Ga. App. 789 (2) ( 307 S.E.2d 689) (1983); Mack v. State of Ga., 125 Ga. App. 639 (2) ( 188 S.E.2d 828) (1972). We also note that since appellant had been provided with copies of the subject letters in advance of trial, the trial court's failure to conduct an in camera inspection thereof was not error.

See Code Ann. § 24A-2701 (b) (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 709, 738; Ga. L. 1974, pp. 1126, 1131). This court in Mack v. State, 125 Ga. App. 639, 641 ( 188 S.E.2d 828) set forth the applicable principle: "Except as provided in § 24A-2701 (b) to extend the commitment for an additional two years the trial judge can neither terminate nor extend the disposition, and after the division has physical custody under the order he is also prevented from changing, modifying, or vacating the order on the ground that changed circumstances so require in the best interests of the child." Accord, In re: A. S., 140 Ga. App. 865 ( 232 S.E.2d 145); In the Interest of: R. D., 141 Ga. App. 843 ( 234 S.E.2d 680); In the Interest of: C.A.G., 142 Ga. App. 480 ( 236 S.E.2d 171). Having found no ground for modification or vacation of the order under Code Ann. § 24A-2801, the trial judge was without authority to set aside the order based on the finding that J.R.S. had made a "satisfactory adjustment.

Code Ann. §§ 99-203 (b) (Ga. L. 1963, pp. 81, 83), 99-204 (a) (Ga. L. 1963, pp. 81, 86), erroneously referred to in the subsequent Juvenile Court Code of Georgia (Code Ann. Title 24A) and in some cases as "Division of Children and Youth." In Mack v. State of Ga., 125 Ga. App. 639 (4) ( 188 S.E.2d 828) (1972), this court held that, the juvenile court judge having adjudicated the juvenile to be delinquent and committed him to the Division for Children and Youth, it was beyond the power of the judge at the same time to make further provision in the order dictating the disposition of the juvenile delinquent subsequent to his committal to the division. This is consistent with the entire statutory framework of the Children and Youth Act (Code Ann. Ch. 99-2; Ga. L. 1963, p. 81 et seq.) and the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia (Code Ann. Title 24A; Ga. L. 1971, p. 709 et seq.).

But should funds of the county, together with those made available by the Department of Family Children Services, be such that the delinquent child could be enrolled in the Florida institution, then this order shall remain in effect as a directory one and not mandatory requiring absolute obedience of same. Nothing herein said shall be intended to prevent the court from acting with respect to the child under properly initiated procedures as provided in the Juvenile Court Code. See in this connection Mack v. State of Ga., 125 Ga. App. 639, 642 ( 188 S.E.2d 828). But we do not here decide the question of whether or not this child may be placed in out-of-state supervision in another state as contemplated by Code Ann. § 24A-3003, supra. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Here, the party was represented by both his mother, who had custody of him, and his stepfather. As in Mack v. State of Ga., 125 Ga. App. 639, 640 ( 188 S.E.2d 828), the child was advised of "his right to remain silent, the effect of any statements, the right to have a lawyer present, and the right to have a lawyer provided, if they could not afford one." Upon being asked, the boy, his mother, and his stepfather all indicated that they understood these rights, and the 16-year-old boy, in the presence of the others, indicated his willingness to talk to the officer without a lawyer present, whereupon he signed the waiver of counsel and made the statement.

Code Ann. § 26-401 (1). 3. The juvenile court included in the probationary disposition of each of the minors a $50 fine. There is no statutory authority authorizing a juvenile court to impose a monetary fine on a minor adjudged to be delinquent. Thus the part of each order imposing a $50 fine upon each appellant is erroneous. Mack v. State of Ga., 125 Ga. App. 639 ( 188 S.E.2d 828). The disposition in each instance is otherwise authorized by the evidence. Accordingly, the judgments below are affirmed with direction that the fine in each be deleted.

We there ruled the notice to the accused and the accused's parents must state the specific purpose of the proposed "transfer" hearing. In Mack v. State of Ga. 125 Ga. App. 639 ( 188 S.E.2d 828) this court was called upon to review a finding of delinquency at an "adjudication hearing" in which the evidence presented below included an incriminating statement by the juvenile to a detective at home in the presence of his mother after having been properly advised of his rights in the presence of his mother. The court was also required to consider the extent to which the juvenile court retains dispositional authority once a committal to the Division of Children and Youth has occurred.