Mack v. Ohio

Full title: Guy Andrew Mack, Jr. Plaintiff, v. State of Ohio, et al., Defendants.

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Ohio

Date published: Sep 29, 2021

5:21 CV 1036 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)

Opinion

5:21 CV 1036

09-29-2021

Guy Andrew Mack, Jr. Plaintiff, v. State of Ohio, et al., Defendants.

JOHN R. ADAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN R. ADAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Background

Pro se plaintiff Guy Andrew Mack has filed a complaint in this action labeled as a “Third Party Complaint for Property Recovery” against the State of Ohio and Ohio Attorney General David Yost. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff identifies himself as a “Third Party Plaintiff” and representative of the “Stark County Government, ” the State of Ohio as a “Third Party Defendant-Plaintiff, ” and Attorney General Yost as a “Third Party Defendant.” (Id.)

Plaintiff's complaint is incomprehensible and does not contain allegations or legal claims that are intelligible to the Court. It appears plaintiff's complaint pertains in some way to civil actions pending in the District of Columbia, but the complaint consists entirely of incomprehensible legal assertions and rhetoric.

After he filed his complaint, plaintiff submitted numerous additional filings and motions in the case, which, like plaintiff's complaint, are entirely incomprehensible. See Doc. Nos. 3 (“Motion to the Court for a Ten day Adjudication from the Assigned Judge to this Case Sua Sponte”); 4 (“Notice to the Clerk Introducing the Criminal Case sent to Judge Carl J. Nichols in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia”); 6 (“Notice to the Court for True Bill and Arrest Warrant Procedures on Defendants of Related Case 1: 21 CV 1431 CJN in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia”); 9 (“Notice to the Clerk of the Court for Expedited Request for Exemplification Certifications in the Procurement of Services with the General Services Administration”); 10 (“Motion to the Court for Reverse Standing Order from Civil to Criminal to Secure Arrest Warrants Against Defendants for Liability Brought Against the State”); 11 (“Notice to the Court of an Implied Governmental Bond Trust Partnership with the Stark County Government as an Enforced Integration System of Credit”); and 12 (“Return of Certified Green Cards for Alexander Zumbar as the Stark County Treasurer, Dan Spring of NAI Spring and Frank Forchione in lieu of Arrest of Defendants”).

Standard of Review and Analysis

Although pro se pleadings generally are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6^thCir. 2011), the lenient treatment generally accorded pro se pleadings “has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed.Appx. 579, 580 (6^th Cir. 2001). Further, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to police the boundaries of their jurisdiction. A federal district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any complaint “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of [the] complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). In other words, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) where it lacks “the legal plausibility necessary to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 480. Under such circumstances, a district court need not provide a plaintiff the opportunity to amend. Id. at 479. A plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in order to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130 (6th Cir.1996).

Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff's complaint warrants dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Apple v. Glenn. Even liberally construed, the complaint does not set forth any plausible federal claim or cause of action, or any intelligible facts as to specific conduct, against any defendant. Instead, the statements, assertions, and legal rhetoric set forth in plaintiff's complaint and other pleadings are so incomprehensible, implausible, frivolous, and devoid of merit that they do not provide a basis to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over any claim in the case. See Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (a court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief).

Conclusion

Accordingly, this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Court's authority established in Apple v. Glenn. In light of this dismissal, plaintiff's motions for a “Ten day Adjudication” (Doc. No. 3) and “for Reverse Standing Order from Civil to Criminal to Secure Arrest Warrants” (Doc. No. 10) are denied as moot. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.