However, "[g]enerally, an administrative agency acts in a legislative capacity when it addresses broad questions of public policy and promulgates rules for future application 'to all or some part of those subject to its power.'" Macias v. Rylander, 995 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.); accord City of Corinth v. NuRock Dev., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 360, 368 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (stating that legislation is "designed to address broad questions of public policy and to promulgate laws that those subject to government's power must follow in future conduct"). In contrast, an administrative body acts in a judicial capacity when it determines facts related to specific parties and its action "concerns only the parties immediately affected."

Thus, the Settlement Agreement involves the construction of a contract, not the interpretation of a statute. See Macias v. Rylander, 995 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) ("Generally, an administrative agency acts in a legislative capacity when it addresses broad questions of public policy and promulgates rules for future application 'to all or some part of those subject to its power.'").See Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Montemayor, 86 S.W.3d 260, 268-69 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (holding declaratory judgment action not available to insurer because series of letters and draft consent decree are not a "rule" for purposes of statute authorizing declaratory judgment action to construe agency rules); Macias, 995 S.W.2d at 833 ("In determining whether an administrative agency was acting in a legislative or judicial capacity, we ask whether the administrative action implements broad public policy or concerns only the parties immediately affected.").

When a trial court's order specifies the ground relied on for the summary judgment ruling, we only affirm the summary judgment if the theory relied on by the trial court is meritorious, otherwise we must remand the case. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993); Macias v. Rylander, 995 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no writ); Farmer Enters., Inc. v. Gulf States Ins. Co., 940 S.W.2d 103, 106-07 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no writ). Because the trial court's summary judgment order specifically stated that it granted summary judgment on Lykes, we need not address whether the "no evidence" standard for summary judgment applies.

On appeal, this Court held that the district court erred in conducting a substantial evidence review of the Comptroller's order and remanded the case to the district court for consideration by trial de novo. See Macias v. Rylander, 995 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). On remand, the Comptroller moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that (1) good cause exists to suspend Macias's customs broker's license, and (2) Macias's request for declaratory relief should be denied.