ยถ 25 The extremely dangerous nature of dairy work entitles dairy workers to the statutory protection set out in article II, section 35. See Macias v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. , 100 Wash.2d 263, 274, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983) (noting that farmworkers engage in "an extremely dangerous occupation").
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (invalidated durational residency requirement for receipt of medical care by indigents); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338-39 (invalidated one-year state residency requirement for exercise of right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (invalidated one-year state residency requirement for eligibility for welfare benefits); Jeffrey v. Colorado State Dept. of Social Servs., 198 Colo. 265, 269, 599 P.2d 874, 877 (1979) (invalidated thirty-five-year continuous residency requirement for pension benefits). The Mayos rely on the case of Macias v. Department of Labor and Industries, 668 P.2d 1278 (Wash. 1983), to support their argument that the statute and the household exclusion clause infringe upon their fundamental right to travel. In Macias, the Supreme Court of Washington considered an equal protection challenge to a statute that excluded migrant workers from workers' compensation coverage unless a worker earned at least $150 in a single calendar year from the employer in whose employ the worker suffered injury.
Generally, a law will survive that scrutiny if a distinction "rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose [Rational Relation Test]." Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60; see also Macias v. Department of Labor Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 267-68, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983). Whenever a legislative classification involves "a fundamental right", such as free speech, or creates "a suspect classification", for example, race, the so-called strict scrutiny test is, instead, applied as the standard of review.
To date, no Washington case has held that a right to intrastate travel exists under Washington state lawโto the extent Washington courts have found a right to intrastate travel, they have done so under only the United States Constitution. Potter grounds his Washington State intrastate travel claim in Eggert v. City of Seattle , 81 Wash.2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973), and Macias v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus. , 100 Wash.2d 263, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983), but we conclude that neither case answers this question. In Eggert , the Washington Supreme Court recognized a right to intrastate travel, but solely based on the United States Constitution.
Harris argues that intermediate or strict scrutiny ought to apply to the legislative classifications created by RCW 51.32.225. The case which she relies most heavily on, Macias v. Department of Labor Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983), is easily distinguishable from this case. In Macias workers alleged that a statute which required seasonal workers to earn $150 from each employer to be eligible for workers' compensation violated equal protection.
In either case, a statute that is facially neutral, but allegedly results in an unequal application of the law, does not violate the equal protection guaranties of the state or federal constitution unless the party challenging the statute shows an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Macias v. Department of Labor Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 269-70, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983); State v. Nixon, 10 Wn. App. 355, 358, 517 P.2d 212 (1973), review denied, 83 Wn.2d 1014 (1974). Roy and the amici concede that RCW 10.99.070 is facially neutral, but they contend that a broad interpretation of the immunity provision violates equal protection under the state and federal constitutions because the majority of the victims of domestic abuse are women.
However, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the right to intrastate travel is protected by both the U.S. and Washington State Constitutions. Eggert v. City of Seattle , 81 Wash. 2d 840, 845, 505 P.2d 801 (1973) (reasoning that the right to travel in the U.S. Constitutional applies within states); Macias v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. of State of Wash. , 100 Wash. 2d 263, 275, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983) (holding without further explanation that the Washington Constitution's privileges and immunities clause supports a right to travel based on equal protection of the law).In Pottinger v. City of Miami , the Southern District of Florida applied the right to travel to enjoin city ordinances that criminalized conduct essential to life as a homeless person.
This classification fails under both the strict scrutiny and rational basis standards. See Macias v. Department of Labor Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983) (statute barring coverage under Washington's Industrial Insurance Act for employees who did not earn $150 in a calendar year violates equal protection because of its disparate impact on Hispanic farm workers and its adverse effect on the fundamental right to travel; court rejected the employers' argument the exclusion of those earning $150 or less a year was necessary because of the additional administrative burden on employers).
.Macias v. Department of Labor Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 273, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983). See 2 Rotunda, Nowak Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure ยง 18.38, at 680 (1986).
It reflects the reality that these are the primary languages spoken both in this state and in the United States.Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 41-42; Macias v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 100 Wn.2d 263, 270-71, 668 P.2d 1278 (1983).