Machen v. Wolande Management Group Inc.

6 Citing cases

  1. Strong v. JWM Holdings, LLC

    800 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that counterclaim for declaratory relief was premature and sought an opinion that was advisory in nature, and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim

    The right to redeem property sold under a tax execution is conditioned upon the tender of the amount required for redemption, which must be made before the filing of the redemption action, must be continuous unless waived by declaration or conduct, and must be made to the party entitled to payment. Mark Turner Properties v. Evans , 274 Ga. 547 (3), 554 S.E.2d 492 (2001) ; Machen v. Wolande Management Group , 271 Ga. 163, 165, 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999) ; Forrester v. Lowe , 192 Ga. 469, 475-476, 15 S.E.2d 719 (1941) (tender insufficient where not made before action filed in court). See Durham v. Crawford , 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943) (tender ineffective when made during the pendency of the suit).

  2. Oconee Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Brown

    349 Ga. App. 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Involving "typical wrongful foreclosure action" requiring tender in order to obtain injunction

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Machen v. Wolande Management Group, Inc. , 271 Ga. 163, 165 (1), 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999). However, the HELOC debt matured and became due in full in May 2017, and since that time Oconee Federal has clearly demanded payment, but the Browns have made no payments to Oconee Federal.

  3. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, Llc.

    300 Ga. 91 (Ga. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    Further, even after the tax deed reverted back to Nix on May 6, 2009, the running of the prescription period could not yet begin, as the time period was tolled due to the pending litigation with CRR in Community I and Community II. See Machen v. Wolande Mgmt. Grp., 271 Ga. 163 (1), 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999) (filing of redemption action before running of the prescription period tolls running of prescription period). Thus, the prescription period would have begun for Nix, at the earliest, after this Court's decision in Community II became final in February 2011.

  4. Community Renewal & Redemption v. Nix

    288 Ga. 439 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 4 times
    Affirming trial court's dismissal of CRR's case against Nix where, although CRR tendered the redemption price to Bank of America (the security deed holder on the Property) after filing its lawsuit against Nix, CRR had failed to tender the redemption price to Bank of America before filing its action against Nix to redeem the property

    The right to redeem property sold under a tax execution is conditioned upon the tender of the amount required for redemption, which must be made before the filing of the redemption action, must be continuous unless waived by declaration or conduct, and must be made to the party entitled to payment. Mark Turner Properties v. Evans, 274 Ga. 547 (3) ( 554 SE2d 492) (2001); Machen v. Wolande Management Group, 271 Ga. 163, 165 ( 517 SE2d 58) (1999); Forrester v. Lowe, 192 Ga. 469, 475-476 ( 15 SE2d 719) (1941) (tender insufficient where not made before action filed in court). See Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381 ( 26 SE2d 778) (1943) (tender ineffective when made during the pendency of the suit).

  5. Mark Turner Properties, Inc. v. Evans

    274 Ga. 547 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 12 times
    In Mark Turner Properties, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that when a tax deed holder "refuses by her conduct to accept any amount, the refusal dispenses with the formality of making a legal tender."

    " Blizzard v. Moniz, supra at 54. Compare Machen v. Wolande Mgmt. Group, 271 Ga. 163, 164 (1) ( 517 S.E.2d 58) (1999). Payments of taxes "are insufficient to establish prescriptive title, however long continued, even though accompanied by constant assertions of title."

  6. DD&D Family Props., LLC v. Wright

    357 Ga. App. 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)

    Wright makes no contention that the payment into the court's registry was made prior to the foreclosure of the right of redemption; nor does he contend that such payment was otherwise timely under OCGA ยง 48-4-40. See generally Saffo v. Foxworthy, Inc. , 286 Ga. 284, 286 (2), 687 S.E.2d 463 (2009) ("Service of the notice of foreclosure of the right of redemption bars the filing or continuance of any action to set aside, cancel, or in any way invalidate the tax deed referred to in the notice or the title conveyed by the tax deed, unless the plaintiff first pays or tenders the full redemption amount.") (emphasis supplied); Nat. Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co. , 277 Ga. 41, 43 (2), 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003) ("The effect of expiration of the redemption period and bar of the right of redemption is to vest the purchaser with an absolute and unconditional title to the land, provided such title was owned by the original owner, and the tax sale was valid.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Machen v. Wolande Mgmt. Group , 271 Ga. 163, 166 (1), 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999) ("Appellants failed to exercise their right of redemption in a timely manner. Any tender after the time allowed by law for redemption under a tax sale is without effect.").