Machen v. Budd Wheel Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Co.

    409 Mich. 147 (Mich. 1980)   Cited 106 times
    Holding that Michigan law supports the broad, transactional approach to res judicata

    See Tucker v Rohrback, 13 Mich. 73, 75 (1864); Morgan, supra. As was stated in Machen v Budd Wheel Co, 265 Mich. 530, 535-536; 251 N.W. 580 (1933): "The doctrine of `res judicata' rests upon the principle that a question once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgment on the merits is forever settled so far as litigants * * * are concerned."

  2. Nordman v. Earle Equipment Co.

    89 N.W.2d 594 (Mich. 1958)   Cited 6 times

    uit plaintiff relies on the same act of defendant which was relied on in count 2 of the first suit as constituting acceptance of plaintiff's offer by defendant, namely defendant's exercise of dominion over the equipment. Defendant goes on from there to urge that plaintiff's theory in this case is inconsistent with that of count 2 in the first suit, that in bringing the first he made an election between 2 inconsistent theories and that he is thereby barred from suing now on the abandoned alternative claim, citing Mintz v. Jacob, 163 Mich. 280; and Krause v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 331 Mich. 19. Defendant further says that plaintiff could have set up the 2 inconsistent claims in the first suit (Court Rule No 17, ยง 6 [1945]) and that judgment therein is conclusive not only of all matters actually litigated, but also of those which plaintiff might have raised in that action, citing McDannel v. Black, 270 Mich. 305; Bankers Trust Company of Detroit v. Russell, 270 Mich. 568; and Machen v. Budd Wheel Co., 265 Mich. 530. To this plaintiff responds that he has never had his day in court on either of the inconsistent claims because he was not permitted in the first suit, as hereinbefore noted, to go to the jury on count 2 for the reason that, as the trial court held, plaintiff's rights therein asserted had not yet accrued at the time suit was commenced, and in the instant case his suit was dismissed without trial. For the proposition that the trial court was right in its holding of prematurity with respect to count 2 in the first suit, plaintiff properly cites Dempsey v. Langton, 266 Mich. 47; and Waubun Beach Association v. Wilson, 274 Mich. 598 (103 ALR 983). Plaintiff then cites Hart v. Lindley, 50 Mich. 20; and Kolodziejczak v. Bak, 220 Mich. 274, which hold that a verdict directed against a plaintiff because his action was prematurely brought is not res judicata as to the merits and, hence, does not bar a subsequent suit brought after the cause of action has accrued.

  3. Kubiak v. Briggs Manfg. Co.

    282 N.W. 427 (Mich. 1938)   Cited 5 times

    ' " In Machen v. Budd Wheel Co., 265 Mich. 530, we said: "The doctrine of `res judicata' rests upon the principle that a question once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgment on the merits is forever settled so far as litigants and those in privity with them are concerned."

  4. Palchi v. Robbins

    262 N.W. 381 (Mich. 1935)   Cited 6 times

    "The doctrine of ` res judicata' rests upon the principle that a question once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgment on the merits is forever settled so far as litigants and those in privity with them are concerned." Machen v. Budd Wheel Co., 265 Mich. 530, 535. It is apparent that some of the reasons assigned as ground for dismissal do not present issues affecting the merits of the case.

  5. Swindlehurst v. Amer. Fid. Ins. Co.

    139 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 4 times

    " In Machen v. Budd Wheel Co., (1933), 265 Mich. 530, 535, it is stated: "The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the principle that a question once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction by a judgment on the merits is forever settled so far as litigants and those in privity with them are concerned."