Opinion
C. A. PC-2023-01193
10-20-2023
DELFINA ANTUNES MACHADO, Plaintiff, v. VERONICA ANTUNES MACHADO, Defendant.
For Plaintiff: Madeline Becker, Esq. Rui Alves, Esq. For Defendant: Gregory J. Acciardo, Esq. Steven D. Dilibero, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Madeline Becker, Esq. Rui Alves, Esq.
For Defendant: Gregory J. Acciardo, Esq. Steven D. Dilibero, Esq.
DECISION
MCHUGH, J.
This matter is before the Court for decision following a non-jury trial on Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII of the Verified Complaint filed by Plaintiff Delfina Antunes Machado (Plaintiff) against Defendant Veronica Antunes Machado (Defendant). The present case arises from a dispute over the possession of certain life insurance benefit proceeds (the proceeds) disbursed after the passing of Durval P. Machado (Mr. Machado) on January 1, 2023. See generally Verified Complaint (V. Compl.) (asserting factual background of present dispute). The parties originally sought a preliminary injunction but, by agreement, elected to proceed via a bench trial on the merits and waived the right to a jury trial. Id.; (Tr. 2:6-17, June 9, 2023).
Plaintiff voluntarily waived Counts III and IV by declining to proffer argument; accordingly, the Court will not address those Counts in this Decision. (Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum (Pl.'s Post-Trial Mem.) at 3 n.1.)
I
Facts and Travel
Plaintiff was married to Mr. Machado until their divorce on August 30, 2010, and Defendant is the daughter of Plaintiff and Mr. Machado. (Tr. 3:4-16, May 26, 2023.) At the time of his death, Mr. Machado had two active life insurance policies with Northwestern Mutual listing Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary on each. (Jt. Ex. 7 (Life Insurance Statements listing Plaintiff as beneficiary to proceeds of two life insurance policies in the total amount of $560,694.45).) Following Mr. Machado's death, Northwestern Mutual determined Plaintiff to be the sole payee of the net proceeds of both policies in the amount of $560,694.45. (Ex. C attached to V. Compl. (Notice of Payment Inheritance Tax Reports) (listing Plaintiff as the sole payee).)
Plaintiff and Defendant live together in Plaintiff's home. (Tr. 2:9-11, May 26, 2023.) Defendant helped Plaintiff submit the benefit claims to Northwestern Mutual and assisted Plaintiff with opening an account (the account) with TD Bank, N.A. (TD Bank) on January 12, 2023 to therein receive the proceeds. See Tr. at 14-16, May 26, 2023; Tr. at 3-6, May 22, 2023.
Defendant stated that, prior to January 14, 2023, she opened a joint bank account with her mother at TD Bank. Tr. at 29:2-15, May 22, 2023. On January 20, 2023, Northwestern Mutual deposited the proceeds (in addition to interest accrued since Mr. Machado's passing) into the account. (Ex. D. attached to V. Compl. (TD Bank Account Statement dated Feb. 21, 2023) (showing deposit credit in the amount of $563,318.50).) Subsequently, on January 27, 2023, Defendant made out a check to Perry McStay in the amount of $7,965.00 for Mr. Machado's funeral expenses. (Jt. Ex. 8 (TD Bank Records) at 0034.) Then, on February 17, 2023, Defendant withdrew $450,000.00 from the account. (Tr. 16:15-18, May 22, 2023.) Finally, on February 21, 2023, the remaining balance was withdrawn, and the account was closed, according to bank records. (Jt. Ex. 8 (TD Bank Records) at 0043.)
On March 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint setting forth the following counts: Count I (civil liability larceny pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2 (civil violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-41-1)), Count II (civil liability for obtaining money by false pretenses pursuant to § 9-1-2 (civil violation of § 11-41-4)), Count V (fraudulent inducement), Count VI (undue influence), and Count VII (declaratory judgment declaring Plaintiff the sole beneficiary of the policies in dispute). See generally V. Compl. ¶¶ 18-60 (enumerating Counts). Plaintiff maintains that she never intended to give any portion of the proceeds to Defendant and that Defendant drafted a check in the amount of $7,965.00 and moved $450,000.00 of the proceeds to another account without Plaintiff's permission or knowledge. (Tr. 19:10-13 and 21:20-23, May 26, 2023.) Plaintiff requests that this Court order Defendant to pay back $457,965.00 to Plaintiff in addition to interest, attorney's fees, and costs. Id. at 27:7-16; (Compl. ¶ 50). Plaintiff has also asked the Court for judgment declaring that Plaintiff is the sole beneficiary of the policies at issue in the present case and that Plaintiff alone is entitled to exclusive ownership of the proceeds. (Tr. 27:14-16, May 26, 2023; Pl.'s Post-Trial Mem. at 9.)
On March 9, 2023, this Court held an ex parte hearing on Plaintiff's request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), which was filed alongside the Verified Complaint. (Docket.) After hearing, this Court granted the TRO, enjoining Defendant from engaging in the following conduct:
"Accessing the TD Bank account to which Defendant deposited the $450,000.00 from the Account . . . on February 17, 2023, including prohibition from withdrawing, transferring, or in any way removing and/or using the funds contained within that Account." (TRO and Inj. Relief (May 4, 2023) (Cruise, J.).)
Additionally, the TRO enjoined TD Bank from the following conduct:
"Allowing access of any person to any account to which Defendant deposited the $450,000.00 from the Account . . . on February 17, 2023, including prohibition by any person from withdrawing, transferring, or in any way removing the funds Defendant withdrew from the Account." Id.
The Court reissued the TRO-striking the limitation on Defendant's use of bank accounts "in her possession, custody, or control." (TRO and Inj. Relief (April 10, 2023) (McHugh, J.) (striking the last sentence of the first numbered paragraph).) The Court converted the preliminary injunction hearing into a bench trial by stipulation of the parties, requiring Plaintiff to prove the elements of her Complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. (Hr'g Tr. at 2:6-17, June 9, 2023.) The trial was held on May 22 and 26, 2023 and on June 5, 9, 19, and 22, 2023. (Docket (bearing trial dates).) Following the trial's conclusion, rather than waive argument, the parties submitted their final memoranda in support of their positions; both Plaintiff and Defendant filed a timely memorandum with the Court on June 30, 2023. See Docket (bearing filing date of parties' final memoranda).
A
Summary of Plaintiff's Trial Testimony
Plaintiff testified that she attended school in Portugal until twelfth grade and that, after she came to the United States, she continued her education by taking English and cosmetology courses. Tr. at 9:21-10:7, May 26, 2023. She testified that, eventually, she and her then-husband, Mr. Machado, began operating a granite business. Id. at 10:11-14. Plaintiff testified that, in the course of this enterprise, an accountant was employed, who primarily spoke to her in Portuguese. Id. at 10:16-11:10. She testified that she speaks enough English "[t]o get by when [she goes] somewhere," but that she needed the accountant to explain to her in Portuguese the business letters that she did not understand and other "[i]mportant" or "legal" things. Id. at 11:11-24. Plaintiff explained that she "understand[s] some basic [English] words, but not other words" and that she needs an interpreter for court proceedings and unfamiliar or complicated financial transactions. (Tr. 3:18, 4:8-9, June 9, 2023.)
She testified that after Mr. Machado's passing, she received a letter from Northwestern Mutual, which she showed to Defendant. (Tr. at 8, May 26, 2023.) Plaintiff indicated that Defendant offered to help her fill out the paperwork to receive the proceeds, to which Plaintiff agreed. Id. at 9:8-13. She further testified that on January 12, 2023, she and Defendant went to TD Bank in Pawtucket, Rhode Island to open the account in order to deposit the proceeds therein. Id. at 14:19-15:3. Plaintiff indicated that her intention with the account "was to open the account in [her] name, but not for [Defendant] to own the money." Id. at 15:25-16:3. She also indicated that Defendant's name was on the account for convenience, not for her to have the proceeds. See id. at 27:14-21. The following exchange took place about discussions between the parties regarding Defendant's name being on the account:
"[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Did you and your daughter have a discussion about her being on [the] bank account?
"[PLAINTIFF]: She only mentioned to put her name on the account so the money would be able to get to the account.
"[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: So what you're saying is your daughter told you that in order for the insurance proceeds to be deposited into an account her name had to be on that account. Is that what you're telling us?
"[PLAINTIFF]: Yes. She said it was a good idea to have her name on the account so we could get the money.
"[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Did you believe that?
"[PLAINTIFF]: I did.
"[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Did you come to find out whether that was true or not, whether or not her name had to be on the bank account in order for you to receive the insurance proceeds that are [the] subject of this litigation?
"[PLAINTIFF]: Yes. I ended up finding out that it was not necessary for her name to be on the account.
"[PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY]: Was that before or after your daughter withdraw the $450,000 on February 17th of this year?
"[PLAINTIFF]: It was after she withdraw the money that I found out." Tr. at 36:21-37:17, June 9, 2023.
She testified that, on February 19, 2023, she discovered $450,000.00 had been withdrawn from the account and that Defendant's name was also on the account. Tr. at 19:14-25, May 26, 2023. Plaintiff indicated that she never gave Defendant permission to draft a check or withdraw $450,000.00 against the account. Id. at 21:8-23. She further testified that she never promised any of the proceeds to Defendant. Tr. at 34:22-24, June 9, 2023. Additionally, Plaintiff indicated that it was not her intent for Defendant to be an owner of the proceeds.
She testified that upon confronting Defendant about the missing funds, Defendant shouted expletives at her and yelled: "'That fucking money is not yours, and that fucking money is mine."' Tr. at 23:2-24:4, May 26, 2023. Plaintiff indicated that it was not uncommon for Defendant to address her in this manner. See id. at 24:5-7. She testified that after this confrontation, her friend and neighbor, Fanny Elizabeth Willis (Willis), came into the house because she heard screaming. Id. at 24:9-25:4. Plaintiff testified that Defendant told Willis that the proceeds belonged to Defendant and her siblings because of a trust. Id. at 30:20-31:5. She testified that no one contacted her on behalf of any trust to claim the proceeds. Id. at 31:11-14.
B
Summary of Defendant's Trial Testimony
Defendant testified that she contacted Northwestern Mutual to file a claim for the proceeds on Plaintiff's behalf as Plaintiff had requested. (Tr. at 3:15-4:3, May 22, 2023.) Defendant confirmed that she filled out the claims form with Plaintiff. Id. at 8:3-12. Defendant also confirmed that, on January 14, 2023, she and Plaintiff went in person to open a joint account at TD Bank with bank manager Dan McKenna (McKenna). See id. at 30:6-24.
Defendant testified that she believed that the proceeds belonged to an irrevocable trust to which she and several others were beneficiaries, but she did not produce any documentary evidence of such a trust. See id. at 20:3-9. Defendant also testified that she believed that the trustee of said trust was her cousin Margarite Balise. Id. at 24:20-24. She testified that she "transferred" $450,000.00 of the proceeds that she withdrew from the account into her own new account for "safekeeping." See id. at 24:17-19; 31:16-32:1. When questioned whether the proceeds check had been issued to the trust, Defendant stated: "There is no trust, sir, like account for a trust." Id. at 32:10-11. She clarified that it was her belief that she could not open a trust account as a nontrustee and that a check could not be issued to the purported trust without an open trust account. See id. at 33:5-20.
C
Summary of Fanny Willis's Trial Testimony
Plaintiff called Willis to testify. See Tr. at 38:12, June 9, 2023. Willis testified that she has lived across the street from the parties for over twenty years and that she has spent significant time seeing Plaintiff socially over the last decade. Id. at 39:1-23. Willis testified that, on February 20, 2023, she heard yelling coming from the parties' house. Id. at 40:7-8. When Plaintiff came outside, Plaintiff relayed to Willis that Plaintiff was trying to explain to Defendant the definition of a beneficiary. Id. at 40:8-10. Plaintiff sought the assistance of Willis to help her communicate this to Defendant. Id. at 40:10-13. Willis testified that Plaintiff explained that there was no trust. Id. at 42:17-19. Willis testified that it was her understanding that Defendant believed there was a trust. Id. at 43:6-9. Willis further averred that Defendant called Plaintiff a "fucking bitch" and "fucking asshole[,]" who was "money hungry." Id. at 40:19-22. She testified that Defendant stated that she had the $450,000.00 and that she showed Willis a bank statement of an account containing that amount "[o]n her phone." Id. at 44:21-45:7.
D
Summary of Dan McKenna's Trial Testimony
Defendant called McKenna to testify. See id. at 52:11. McKenna testified that he is employed as the branch manager of TD Bank in East Providence, Rhode Island, where one of his duties is to open new accounts. Id. at 52:12-53:1. McKenna testified that he opened the "joint account" for the parties. See id. at 53:9-13. McKenna explained that all of TD Bank's joint accounts (including the parties' account) are "or" accounts, meaning that either account holder may transact without limit. Id. at 53:16-21.
McKenna's testimony was clear that the parties' account was not an "and" account "which would require multiple signings." (Tr. at 53:16-24, June 9, 2023.)
McKenna testified that he explained in English to both parties that each would have access to the account and that neither party asked any questions. Id. at 55:3-19. He also testified that Plaintiff did not request a Portuguese interpreter even though the branch provides interpreter services. Id. at 55:22-23, 56:19-24. He further testified that during their discussion Plaintiff appeared to understand and did not appear intoxicated. Id. at 57:3-22. McKenna testified that the account signatures and disclosures were endorsed concurrently by both parties together in his presence on their mobile devices. Id. at 72:11-16.
On cross-examination, McKenna testified that he first met Defendant when he opened a business account for her approximately two years prior. Id. at 59:15-60:23. He further stated that she called him before the parties came in to open the account, and that he had no contact with Defendant in the interim period. Id. McKenna testified that during his exchange with Defendant, she stated that her father had passed, that there was some money coming to Defendant's mother that they did not know what to do with, that "[t]here may have been some encumbrances" on the money, and that Defendant "wanted some help with how to handle the funds." Id. at 61:4-8. To clarify what he meant by "encumbrances," McKenna stated that Defendant told him that "there was a question of whether or not something was going to be owed to [Mr. Machado's] estate." Id. at 61:9-20. McKenna further testified that Defendant asked him to "[s]et up an account so that [the parties] could deposit the check." Id. at 62:16-21. McKenna testified that, after the account was opened, Defendant was able to obtain temporary checks at a different branch, but he could not recall if he had given her the checks. Id. at 68:2-10.
II
Standard of Review
Sitting without a jury, the trial justice acts as a trier of fact and law. See Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984). In this function, the trial justice balances and considers the evidence, determines the credibility of the witnesses, and draws appropriate inferences. See id. Furthermore, this "task of determining the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly the function of the trial justice when sitting without a jury." Walton v. Baird, 433 A.2d 963, 964 (R.I. 1981); see also Rodriques v. Santos, 466 A.2d 306, 312 (R.I. 1983) ("The question of who is to be believed is one for the trier of fact."). Additionally, at a bench trial, drawing inferences from the testimony of witnesses is also within the "province of the trial justice"; and, if reasonable, such inferences are entitled to equal weight upon review as other factual determinations made by the trial justice. Walton, 433 A.2d at 964.
III
Analysis
A
Count I (Civil Liability for Larceny)
Plaintiff's Count I sets forth a claim of civil liability pursuant to § 9-1-2 for violation of § 11-41-1, which provides in pertinent part that "[e]very person who shall steal any money . . . shall be deemed guilty of larceny." Section 11-41-4; § 9-1-2 (allowing civil recovery for criminal offenses).
Black's Law Dictionary provides the following definition for steal: "[t]o take (personal property) illegally with the intent to keep it unlawfully." Black's Law Dictionary 1710 11th ed. 2019.
1
Illegal Taking of Plaintiff's Personal Property
Plaintiff credibly testified and submitted sufficient documentary evidence to prove that the proceeds lawfully belong to her. See Tr. 14:5-7, May 26, 2023 (stating she was informed she was the beneficiary on the life insurance policy); see also V. Compl. Ex. A, Ex. B (Life Insurance Statements) (bearing name of Delfina Machado as beneficiaries on the policies). Under normal circumstances, our Supreme Court has stated that "the opening of a joint bank account wherein survivorship rights are specifically provided for is conclusive evidence of the intention to transfer to the survivor an immediate in praesenti joint beneficial possessory ownership right in the balance of the account remaining after the death of the depositor, absent evidence of fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of mental capacity." Robinson v. Delfino, 710 A.2d 154, 161 (R.I. 1998). In other words, "opening an account and executing signature[s] . . . that provide for a survivorship right would be proof of the depositor's intention to transfer an immediate right of ownership to the survivor." Trust of McManus v. McManus, 18 A.3d 550, 553 (R.I. 2011) (citing Robinson, 710 A.2d at 156, 160-61).
Despite this, while Plaintiff agreed to open the bank account with Defendant, Plaintiff never authorized Defendant to transfer the money to another account. (Pl.'s Ex. D, Ex. E (Bank Statements and Canceled Check); Tr. 19:10-13, May 26, 2023.) McKenna testified that the account was an "[or] account, meaning either [Plaintiff or Defendant could] transact to whatever limit they would like, close the account, obtain the debit card . . ." (Tr. 53:16-21, June 9, 2023.) The Court heard no evidence that the bank account was a joint account; instead, the account was likely set up as an "or" account as a matter of covenience. See generally id. No evidence was presented that the account was opened with the right of survivorship in favor of Defendant. Simply put, Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with permission to receive any amount of the funds deposited to the bank account. (Tr. 19:10-13, May 26, 2023.) At all times, prior to learning of Defendant's transferring of the money, Plaintiff did not consent to Defendant being entitled to the funds. Id. at 21:20-23.
2
Intent to Keep Plaintiff's Property Unlawfully
Moreover, the Court is persuaded that Defendant possessed an intent to keep Plaintiff's property unlawfully. See Tr. 7:18-25, May 22, 2023. Defendant testified to the existence of a trust that she intended to transfer the money to; however, she provided no evidence that such a trust existed. Id. at 20:5-9. As such, the Court determines that Defendant intended to keep Plaintiff's property unlawfully under the guise of a supposed trust that she may be a beneficiary. See id.; § 11-41-4. Correspondingly, both elements of larceny have been met by a preponderance of the evidence on these facts. See § 11-41-4; § 9-1-2. Accordingly, the Court views that Plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant illegally took property entitled to Plaintiff.
B
Count II (Civil Liability for Obtaining Money by False Pretenses)
Plaintiff's Count II sets forth a claim for civil liability pursuant to § 9-1-2 for violation of § 11-41-4, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
"Every person who shall obtain from another designedly, by any false pretense or pretenses, any money, . . . with intent to cheat or defraud . . . shall be deemed guilty of larceny."
Black's Law Dictionary defines "false pretenses" as "knowingly obtaining title to another's personal property by misrepresenting a fact with the intent to defraud." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The elements of obtaining property by false pretenses are "that the accused (1) obtain property from another designedly, by any false pretense or pretenses; and (2) with the intent to cheat or defraud." State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482, 515 (R.I. 2020); see also State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 431, 358 A.2d 46, 50 (1976) (a misrepresentation of an existing fact is a false pretense).
Plaintiff credibly testified that Defendant misrepresented to her that Defendant's name had to be on the account to get the proceeds. See Tr. 16:2-3, May 26, 2023. The Court finds that Defendant's statements and actions-when she could have just as easily helped Plaintiff obtain the proceeds without placing her own name on the account-demonstrate an intent to cheat and defraud. See id. Accordingly, the Court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendant is civilly liable for obtaining Plaintiff's money under false pretenses. See § 11-41-4.
C
Count V (Fraudulent Inducement)
"Fraud in the inducement is defined as [a] 'misrepresentation as to the terms, quality or other aspects of a contractual relation, venture or other transaction that leads a person to agree to enter into the transaction with a false impression or understanding of the risks, duties or obligations she has undertaken."' Bourdon's, Inc. v. Ecin Industries, Inc., 704 A.2d 747, 753 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 661 (6th ed.1990)). To prevail on a claim of fraud in the inducement, a party must demonstrate the following elements: (1) a false representation; (2) knowledge of the statement's falsity; (3) intent to induce reliance; and (4) detrimental reliance. See Women's Development Corporation v. City of Central Falls, 764 A.2d 151, 160-61 (R.I. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff credibly testified that Defendant induced her to open a joint account by misrepresenting that it was necessary in order to obtain the proceeds. (Tr. 15:20-22, May 26, 2023.) The Court finds that, despite Defendant's testimony to the contrary, Defendant knew that the bank account was not required for Plaintiff to obtain the proceeds. (Tr. 29:6-10, May 22, 2023; Tr. 15:20-22, May 26, 2023.) Plaintiff credibly testified that Defendant intended to induce Plaintiff to rely on these statements so Defendant could gain access to the proceeds. Tr. at 18:5-24 and 19:1013, May 26, 2023. The Court finds Plaintiff detrimentally relied on Defendant's representations by placing the proceeds that Plaintiff was entitled to into an account in which Defendant also had access. See id.
Accordingly, the Court determines that, by a preponderance of evidence on Plaintiff's fraudulent inducement claim, Plaintiff has successfully established that Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to open a bank account so that Defendant could access the insurance proceeds. See Bourdon's, Inc, 704 A.2d at 753.
D
Count VI (Undue Influence)
"Undue influence long has been recognized in equity as a defense to or a means of challenging the validity of a will, deed, or contract." Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007) (citing e.g., Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 435 (R.I. 2001) (granting rescission of deed on grounds of undue influence)). "In such cases, equity provides an action for restitution or rescission to cure the dominant party's wrongful 'substitution of [his or her will] for the free will and choice [of the subservient party].'" Id. at 229 (quoting Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 630 (R.I. 2003). Although "the victim of undue influence is entitled to the same battery of restitutionary remedies as the victim of fraud or other wrongdoing," it is well established that "there is no tort of undue influence, and there is no right to damages, as distinct from restitution, because of such influence." Id. (quoting 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies, § 10.3 at 657, 658 (2d ed. 1993)).
Although undue influence has traditionally been used to rescind a contract, the doctrine can be used to rescind a transaction like an inter vivos gift. See Notarantonio v. Notarantonio, 941 A.2d 138, 148-49 (R.I. 2008). With that established, the Superior Court, to guide its inquiry into the presence vel non of undue influence in particular cases, has used the following factors:
(1) "facts and circumstances surrounding the subservient parties;"
(2) "family relations;"
(3) "the condition of health and mind of the subservient parties;"
(4) "dependency upon and subjection of the control of the person supposed to have wielded the influence;"
(5) "the opportunity and disposition of the person to wield it;" and
(6) "the acts and declarations of such person." Tinney v. Tinney, No. NC98-0116, 1999 WL 615733, at *15 (R.I. Super. June 30, 1999), aff'd, 770 A.2d 420 (R.I. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff testified that she is Defendant's mother and that the two live together under strained relations. See id. (satisfying the "family relations" factor of the undue influence analysis). Moreover, the extent of Plaintiff's English proficiency factors into the Court's undue influence inquiry. In Padula v. Machado, 416 A.2d 1184 (R.I. 1980), our Supreme Court held that an English-speaking daughter unduly influenced her limited-English-speaking mother while handling her business affairs. Here, the Court similarly finds that, given Plaintiff's somewhat limited English-speaking ability, her dependence on Defendant may be heightened at times, particularly in such novel, technical, or linguistically complex contexts. (Tr. 3:12-25, June 9, 2023.)
Additionally, Plaintiff's credible testimony about Defendant's outbursts and her handling of the bank paperwork shows that Defendant had the opportunity and disposition to wield undue influence over the Plaintiff. (Tr. 24:1-7, May 26, 2023) (Plaintiff describing a heated exchange with Defendant in which Defendant angrily informed Plaintiff the proceeds were not hers); Id. at 32:5-7 (Plaintiff stating that Defendant assaulted Plaintiff when Defendant threw a bowl of cereal in Plaintiff's face)); see also Tinney v. Tinney, 1999 WL 615733, at *15 ("the opportunity and disposition of the person to wield [control.]"). Defendant also voluntarily placed herself into an informal, yet confidential relationship with Plaintiff by consenting to act as her quasi-interpreter when opening the bank account. (Tr. 18:5-15, May 26, 2023.) Although not acting in a "fiduciary" capacity, it was not unreasonable in this situation, especially given their close familial relationship, for Plaintiff to expect an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing from Defendant in connection with Defendant's statements in her role as a quasi-interpreter and the person in charge of filling out the banking paperwork. See id. at 27:14-21. As a result, the Court finds that, to the extent Defendant acted in this capacity, she wrongfully wielded undue influence over Plaintiff to overcome Plaintiff's free will. See id. In sum, the balance of the Tinney factors lends credence to a finding that Defendant unduly influenced Plaintiff. See Tinney, 770 A.2d at 423.
As a result, the Court determines that, by a preponderance of evidence on Plaintiff's undue influence claim, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant exerted undue influence over Plaintiff. See Lavoie, 918 A.2d at 228 (citing e.g., Tinney, 770 A.2d at 435).
E
Count VII (Declaratory Judgment)
Rule 57 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9 (the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or the Act). Pursuant to the Act, the Superior Court "may prescribe, shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations ...." Section 9-30-1. "The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." Id.
Although the establishment of a joint ownership bank account gives rise to "an immediate in praesenti joint beneficial possessory ownership right in the balance of the account . . .," Robinson, 710 A.2d at 161, "during the life of both parties, a joint bank account merely 'gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of an intent to make a gift of a joint interest therein ....'" Tierney v.
Department of Human Services, 793 A.2d 210, 213 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, 756 A.2d 179, 182 (R.I. 2000)).
The Court notes that Rule 304(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Evidence provides:
"The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence in civil cases is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption."
While the creation of the account established a presumption of joint ownership, this presumption was rebutted because Defendant's name was on the account "in case something happens." See Tr. 27:20-21, May 26, 2023. Furthermore, Defendant does not advance an argument to challenge the rebuttable presumption of joint ownership "just in case something happens." See id. Based on the undisputed documentary evidence in the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff is the sole beneficiary of the policies at issue in the present case. Pl.'s Ex. 7 (Life Insurance Statement) (showing Delfina Machado listed as the sole beneficiary on the policy). Next, based on Plaintiff's unchallenged testimony that Defendant's name was on the account merely for convenience, the Court finds that Plaintiff alone is entitled to exclusive ownership of the proceeds of those policies. See Tr. 27:17-20, May 26, 2023. In light of this, the Court finds that Plaintiff has successfully proven her prima facie case for declaratory judgment that she is entitled to exclusive ownership of the proceeds of the policy. See § 9-30-1.
F
Other Relief
1
Attorney Fees
"The 'American Rule' provides that, apart from some exceptions, litigants bear their own attorneys' fees and costs absent contractual liability or statutory authority." Dauray v. Mee, 109 A.3d 832, 845 n.17 (R.I. 2015). "Generally, when such contractual, statutory or legal basis exists, 'the award of attorneys' fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice.'" Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Najarian, 911 A.2d 706, 710 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Women's Development Corp., 764 A.2d at 162).
Here, there is no contractual basis on which to grant Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees. Additionally, Plaintiff has not advanced a valid statutory or legal basis on which to grant her request for attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees.
2 Costs
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides: "In any proceeding under this chapter, the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just." Section 9-30-10. Finding that Defendant wrongfully withdrew the proceeds, the Court concludes that it is equitable and just to award costs to Plaintiff. See Tr. 19:16-19, May 26, 2023.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application for a declaratory judgment and enters judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $457,965.00, plus interest and costs. Defendant is ordered to return the money to the Plaintiff forthwith, and upon doing so, the restraining order dated May 4, 2023 is dissolved. Prevailing counsel shall submit an appropriate order for entry.