Opinion
(8577)
Argued June 13, 1990
Decision released June 27, 1990
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London and tried to the court, Koletsky, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Edward E. Moukawsher, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Lloyd L. Langhammer, with whom, on the brief, was Jeffrey W. Hill, for the appellee (defendant).
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the trial court's financial and property award in a dissolution action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In this appeal, the plaintiff attacks the discretionary and fact finding functions of the trial court. In reaching its decision, the trial court properly considered the criteria set forth in General Statutes 46b-81 and the evidence and financial affidavits of the parties. Our review of the record, transcripts and briefs fails to disclose any abuse of discretion. The trial court's conclusions were in accordance with applicable law. "A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion . . . . dividing property as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria." Crocker v. Crocker, 13 Conn. App. 129, 131, 534 A.2d 1251 (1987). Our review of a trial court's exercise of discretion is limited in domestic relations cases to "`"whether the [trial] court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did."' Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 4, 495 A.2d 704 (1985); Russo v. Russo, 1 Conn. App. 604, 607, 474 A.2d 473 (1984)." O'Connor v. O'Connor, 20 Conn. App. 812, 812-13, 567 A.2d 1230 (1989).
We find that the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did.