Opinion
UWYCV126013230S.
11-14-2012
MACDERMID, INCORPORATED v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO, Judge.
This matter is before the court concerning the defendants' motion to strike the counts of the plaintiff's revised amended complaint (# 107) (complaint) which seek a declaratory judgment. The court heard oral argument on November 5, 2012. After consideration, for the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
I
Background
In the forty-two-count complaint, the plaintiff, Macdermid Incorporated, alleges that, the defendants, Travelers Indemnity Company, and The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, f/k/a The Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island (collectively " Travelers"), issued general liability insurance policies to the plaintiff covering the period from 1961 through 1983 (policies). The plaintiff also alleges that The State of Connecticut (State) has claimed that the plaintiff damaged portions of the environment when contaminants escaped from the plaintiff's facilities at various times from 1961 through 1983 (releases). As a result, the plaintiff alleges that the State began a Remediation Action (see complaint, paragraph 16), and compelled the plaintiff to sign a consent order, entitled " Stewardship Permit, " which requires the plaintiff to remediate the claimed damage to the environment from the releases and provides for penalties if the plaintiff does not comply with its requirements. See complaint, paragraph 15.
The plaintiff also alleges that it has demanded that Travelers reimburse it for costs incurred in connection with the Remediation Action and defend it against the same. The plaintiff alleges that Travelers has refused and failed to provide the plaintiff with liability coverage and to pay for a defense to the Remediation Action.
In the odd-numbered counts of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. The plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that Travelers is responsible for paying for the plaintiff's defense and providing liability coverage concerning the Remediation Action, and is obligated to reimburse all expenses incurred in defense thereof. In the even-numbered counts, the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for breach of contract.
The defendants contend that the declaratory judgment claims should be stricken because they seek no substantive relief not already sought in the breach of contract claims which seek compensatory damages. In response, the plaintiff asserts that no judgment on the breach of contract counts, which seek retrospective relief only, damages for past breaches of the policies, will provide the prospective relief of a declaration that the policies obligate Travelers to provide a defense and indemnity for the remainder of the Remediation Action.
II
Standard of Review
The standard of review on a motion to strike is well established. " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ... and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Moreover ... [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition For Justice In Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010). Legal conclusions in a complaint are not deemed to be admitted. See Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Association, Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 476, 823 A.2d 1202 (2003).
III
Discussion
" An action for declaratory judgment is a special proceeding under General Statutes § 52-29, ... implemented by Practice Book §§ 17-54 and 17-55 ... It provides a valuable tool by which litigants may resolve uncertainty of legal obligations ... Our Supreme Court has frequently pointed out that the statutes and rules pertaining to declaratory judgments create an independent remedy and should be accorded a liberal construction. As stated in Sigal v. Wise, [114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 891 (1932) ], [t]he statute authorizing the Superior Court to render declaratory judgments is as broad as it well could be made ... Notwithstanding this liberal heritage, [our Supreme Court] has repeatedly stated that a declaratory judgment action is not a procedural panacea for use on all occasions but is a special statutory proceeding to be used only in accordance with the statute and rules adopted to implement the statute ... The rules of practice define the scope of declaratory judgment actions as follows: ‘ The judicial authority will, in cases not herein excepted, render declaratory judgments as to the existence or nonexistence (1) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (2) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future.’ Practice Book § 17-54." (Footnote omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 88 Conn.App. 471, 475-76, 869 A.2d 1254, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 903, 876 A.2d 11 (2005).
Section 52-29(a) provides, " The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment."
" Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and all facts provable thereunder, in deciding whether a declaratory judgment action in a given case is appropriate, we allow the trial court wide discretion to render a declaratory judgment unless another form of action clearly affords a speedy remedy as effective, convenient, appropriate and complete." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (quoting England v. Coventry, 183 Conn. 362, 365, 439 A.2d 372 (1981)).
Concerning the court's discretion, Practice Book § 17-55 provides, in relevant part, " [a] declaratory judgment action may be maintained if all of the following conditions have been met: ... [i]n the event that there is another form of proceeding that can provide the party seeking the declaratory judgment immediate redress, the court is of the opinion that such party should be allowed to proceed with the claim for declaratory judgment despite the existence of such alternate procedure." See Practice Book § 17-55(3).
Travelers contends that, since the declaratory judgment counts, if successful, would afford the plaintiff no greater relief than the breach of contract counts, they should be stricken pursuant to Practice Book § 17-55(3). In particular, Travelers argues that the declaratory relief counts are superfluous and unnecessary since, if the plaintiff succeeds in its breach of contract claims, the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata would provide all of the prospective relief that it could ask for; to the extent that it seeks declaratory relief to address some different breach, the declaratory judgment counts are unripe; and such a judgment would almost certainly create more disputes than it would resolve. For example, it questions whether such a judgment would require Travelers to pay any claim that the plaintiff chooses to tender, irrespective of the policy language. See Travelers' memorandum (# 113), page 8.
" One type of controversy to which our declaratory judgment statute often has been applied is a dispute over rights and liabilities under an insurance policy ... [T]here is no question that a declaratory judgment action is a suitable vehicle to test the rights and liabilities under an insurance policy [.]" (Citations omitted; internal punctuation and quotation marks omitted). New London County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 748-49, 36 A.3d 224 (2012) (collecting cases). See Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Zurich American Life Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV X03 01 0510268 (March 28, 2003, Peck, J.) (" [t]hat the liability may be contingent does not necessarily defeat jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Travelers' argument that the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata, applied to the outcome of the breach of contract claims, would provide all the prospective relief needed by the plaintiff is contrary to the concept that those counts offer " a speedy remedy as effective, convenient, appropriate and complete, " Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. at 308, as that afforded by declaratory relief in the same action. Use of either concept envisions some future, other action for relief and would not provide " immediate redress." See Practice Book § 17-55(3).
The claims here are not future unidentified, different claims for coverage. If the plaintiff prevails on its claim for a declaratory judgment, the court's judicious use of its authority to tailor declaratory relief as to the Remediation Action should work to obviate, rather than create, future legal disputes as to the parties' obligations under the policies. See Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 351, 977 A.2d 636 (2009) (in declaratory judgment action " the trial court carefully can tailor the relief" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Under these circumstances, Travelers has not shown that the breach of contract claims clearly afford a speedy remedy as effective, convenient, appropriate and complete as provided by the declaratory judgment counts. See Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. at 308.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion to strike is denied. It is so ordered.