Opinion
No. 03-0766-PHX-DGC (MS).
February 23, 2006
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Defendants' motion to dismiss, and Defendants' second motion for summary judgment. Docs. ##126, 105, 148. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' second motion for summary judgment will be granted, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied, and Defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.
The Court will deny the request for oral argument because the parties have submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court concludes that oral argument will not aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).
Background
In 1997, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in Arizona, the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC") validated him as a member of a Security Threat Group ("STG") based on ADOC's determination that Plaintiff was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. Plaintiff was transferred to SMUII, a maximum security prison designed to isolate STG members from the general prison population for security reasons. Plaintiff was transferred from SMUII to the New Jersey prison system in 1999 pursuant to Arizona's Interstate Compact Agreement with New Jersey ("ICA").Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on January 29, 2004, alleging three counts: (1) violation of due process, (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and (3) retaliation for failure to debrief and excess force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Doc. #11. On March 2, 2005, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, construed as a motion for summary judgment, on Count I of the complaint. Doc. #86. The Court also granted partial summary judgment on Counts II and III insofar as they stated time-barred claims based on Defendants' acts prior to April 23, 2001. Id. The Court denied summary judgment on Counts II and III for claims arising after April 23, 2001. Id. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied on all claims. Id. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration, which the Court denied. Docs. #87, 89, 94.
Discussion
I. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). The initial burden is on the moving party to show an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at, 325. Substantive law determines which facts are material and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. Similarly, to preclude summary judgment the dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
A. Qualified Immunity.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. #148. Qualified immunity, however, bars only a suit for damages. "Qualified immunity . . . does not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief." Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 955 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Am. Fire, Theft Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff's complaint seeks only injunctive relief. Doc. #6 at 2. Accordingly, Defendants cannot be granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment — Count II.
Count II alleges that Plaintiff's transfer to New Jersey amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because his "isolat[ion] from his family and friends" constitutes "punitive isolation" and Defendants are responsible for him being there. Doc. #11. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants transferred him to the New Jersey prison, with its "predominantly Black population," with the intent of causing Plaintiff harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Doc. #11.
Where conditions of confinement are at issue, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. "First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, "a prison official must have a `sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). "In prison-condition cases that state of mind is one of `deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303).
Plaintiff has failed to show that his transfer to New Jersey is sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Plaintiff admits that he is allowed in-person visits from family and friends, has regular phone privileges, and can correspond via mail with his mother, brother, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and friends. Doc. #142, Ex. A, MacCool Affidavit. Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendants knew of any risk to his health or safety as a result of his STG classification or his transfer to New Jersey.
Plaintiff provides the Court with a research article written by Dr. Stuart Grassian, M.D. that discusses the negative psychiatric effects of solitary confinement. Doc. #126, Ex. 7. Plaintiff, however, provides no proof that Defendants' knew about this article or its contents, or that they acted in utter disregard of his health and safety.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "it is neither unreasonable nor unusual for an inmate to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was convicted and sentenced. . . . Confinement in another State . . . is `within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.'" Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983). Because Plaintiff has not shown that his deprivation was sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, summary judgment will be granted. See Overturf v. Massie, 385 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004) (transfer of prisoners from Hawaii to Oklahoma did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first element of an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff has satisfied the second element.
C. Retaliation — Count III.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights. Although Plaintiff does not address this claim directly in his response to Defendants' motion, his memoranda and other filings make clear that the constitutional right at issue is his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination — Plaintiff claims that Defendants have retaliated against him for refusing to debrief. Doc. #11.
In October 1997, Plaintiff was validated as an Aryan Brotherhood member. Doc. #148. Once a prisoner receives an STG classification, he can escape this label only by renouncing his gang membership and successfully completing the debriefing process. Doc. #149, Ex B. Plaintiff appears to argue that in retaliation for him invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to renounce his gang membership and debrief, Defendants continue to punish him by maintaining his STG classification and keeping him in New Jersey. Doc. #11.
To establish a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and show that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because the debriefing process does not implicate Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The "privilege applies when a defendant is compelled to be a witness against himself in his own criminal prosecution or when he is called on to testify in any type of proceeding to answer questions which might serve to incriminate him in any future prosecution." United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1999 (9th Cir. 1977). Here, Plaintiff has not been compelled to act as a witness against himself. Rather, he has been afforded an opportunity to receive more lenient treatment from prison officials in exchange for information concerning his gang affiliation and gang activity in prison. The Ninth Circuit has held that a prospect of more lenient treatment in exchange for admitting fault and providing information does not violate the privilege against self incrimination. See United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1990) (acceptance of responsibility in exchange for sentencing reduction does not violate the Fifth Amendment). Other courts have applied this analysis to prison debriefing procedures, holding that offering a prisoner more lenient treatment in exchange for his renouncing prison gang affiliations and providing information about gang activities does not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Baptisto v. Ryan, 2005 WL 2416356 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2005) (discussing authorities); Galvedon v. Marshall, 1997 WL 765955 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997).
ADOC Rule 806.06 provides, "[t]he purpose of a debriefing is not to obtain incriminating criminal information or evidence against the member. The primary objective is to learn enough about the member and the STG to: [1] convince the Department that the inmate has dropped out of the STG; [2] provide additional information regarding the STG's structure, activity and membership . . .; [3] provide sufficient information to determine if the inmate may require protection from other STG members or suspects." Doc. #149, Ex. A, Attachment 1 at 10.
The Ninth Circuit has held in an unpublished opinion that prison debriefing requirements do not violate an inmate's privilege against self-incrimination. See Castro v. Terhune, 29 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, to establish a violation of the Fifth Amendment, a plaintiff must show more than a merely trifling or imaginary risk of incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968); Baptisto, 2005 WL 2416356 at 7. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that information provided by him in debriefing would be used by Defendants in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Nor does he provide examples where such incrimination has occurred to other inmates. Because Plaintiff has not established a real threat that debriefing would result in self-incrimination, he has failed to establish a Fifth Amendment right not to debrief. See Griffin v. Gomez, 1995 WL 396857 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995); Medina v. Gomez, 1997 WL 488588 at 7 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 14, 1997); Castrellon v. Gomez, 1997 WL 361199 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1997); Garcia v. Gomez, 1996 WL 390320 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 1996) ; Zarate v. Bunnell, 1994 WL 374547 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 1994).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established a Fifth Amendment right to refuse debriefing, and therefore cannot assert a retaliation claim based on his refusal to debrief. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815-16. In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff's transfer to New Jersey advanced legitimate penological goals.
Plaintiff includes an Eighth Amendment component in his retaliation claim, but that portion of the claim fails, as discussed above, because Plaintiff's transfer to New Jersey does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.
II. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment and retaliation claims. Doc. #126. Because those claims fail for the reasons set forth in this order, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #148) is granted.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. #121, 126) is denied.
3. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Party (Doc. #105) is denied as moot.
4. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action.