Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 11-0461
05-17-2012
In re the Matter of: LINNAE MACBETH, Petitioner/Appellee, v. TODD J. TAILLON, Respondent/Appellant, LYNN M. HARRIS, as Best Interests Attorney for Minor Child, Appellee.
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
Yavapai County Superior Court No. P1300DO20050986
DECISION ORDER
The court, Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown, Judge Margaret H. Downie, and Judge Maurice Portley, has reviewed the opening brief and the relevant portions of the record. For the following reasons, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Todd Taillon's ("Father") marriage to his former wife, Linnae Macbeth ("Mother"), terminated in February 2006 when the trial court entered a decree of dissolution. At that time, the court awarded Father "reasonable parenting time." In August 2008, Mother filed a petition for modification of visitation, stating that Father had recently returned from living in Mexico and had not been involved in the child's life for two years. Mother asked the court to modify Father's visitation to "graduated visits" in order to rebuild "the relationship between father and son." Contentious litigation ensued regarding custody and parenting time, and in December 2009 the court appointed an attorney to represent the child's best interests. Throughout the course of the litigation, the court has consecutively appointed three best interest attorneys. The most recent of these appointments was on June 10, 2011, following the withdrawal of the second best interest attorney. Father appeals from this order.
We have an independent obligation to ensure we have jurisdiction in every appeal. Sorenson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008 (App. 1997). Under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(C), a special order made after final judgment is appealable when the following circumstances are present: (1) the special order raises issues different from those in the final judgment, (2) it affects the judgment, and (3) it is not "merely preparatory to a later proceeding that might affect the judgment." In re Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 300, ¶ 3, 9 P.3d 329, 331 (App. 2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Subsequently renumbered as A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) (2011).
None of those circumstances are present here. The trial court's order does not raise issues that are different from the decree nor does it affect the original decree or any of the court's prior appealable orders regarding child support, custody, or parenting time. The court's appointment of a successor best interest attorney, pursuant to statutory authority, was presumably done for the purpose of ensuring protection of the child's interests while awaiting the outcome of further proceedings on those issues. See A.R.S. § 25-321 (2001) (giving courts authority to appoint attorney to represent the best interests of the minor in proceedings on issues of child support, custody and parenting time). The court's appointment order is therefore "merely preparatory" to future appealable orders. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge