Opinion
No. 2D20-253
08-13-2021
Becki Ruth MAAS, Appellant, v. HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-7, Appellee.
Becki Ruth Maas, pro se. Nancy M. Wallace, Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; and William P. Heller, Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
Becki Ruth Maas, pro se.
Nancy M. Wallace, Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; and William P. Heller, Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
SLEET, JUDGE.
HSBC Bank USA, National Association, brought a foreclosure action against Becki Ruth Maas. During the nonjury foreclosure trial, Maas altered the original note that HSBC sought to enter into evidence. The trial court subsequently entered a final order finding Maas in direct criminal contempt of court and ordering that she be confined to the county jail for five days. Maas now challenges that order on appeal, and because the record before us does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to commit a contemptuous act, we reverse.
At trial, during the testimony of the bank's representative, counsel for the bank handed the original note to Maas for her to examine it as a pro se litigant before it was offered into evidence. While she "possessed" the note, Maas took out a pen and drew a line through her signature on the note. She maintains that pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code § 3 -604a, this was proper and effectively canceled her debt.
The record before us does not include a transcript of the foreclosure trial or a copy of the court's security camera recording of the incident. However, the trial court's contempt order included factual findings that we must accept as true. See C.G. v. M.M. , 310 So. 3d 977, 980 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("The lack of a transcript of the proceedings below requires us to accept the trial court's factual findings as true."). And in any event, neither party disputes on appeal the trial court's factual findings.
Section 673.6041(1), Florida Statutes (2019), is the equivalent of UCC § 3 -604a and provides in relevant part that "[a] person entitled to enforce an instrument, with or without consideration, may discharge the obligation of a party to pay the instrument ... [b]y an intentional voluntary act, such as ... striking out of the party's signature." § 673.6041(1)(a)(3) (emphasis added). Maas maintains that she was the "person entitled to enforce" the note. Section 673.3011(1) defines "[t]he term "person entitled to enforce" an instrument" to include "[t]he holder of the instrument."
Maas argues on appeal that because she "openly quoted UCC3-604(a) [sic] when she struck her signature there was no intent on her part to commit a criminal act." This argument is based on her mistaken belief that when the note was handed to her in open court, she became the "person entitled to enforce" the note because at that time she was the "holder" of the note. Her confusion stems from the definition of "holder" set forth in section 671.201(21)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), as "[t]he person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession." Maas maintains that when she was handed the note in court, she was "the person in possession" of the note and therefore was the holder and was "entitled to enforce" the note, giving her the right to cancel the debt by the "intentional voluntary act" of striking out her name on the note. See § 673.6041(1)(a)(3). She, of course, was mistaken as she signed the note as the borrower and thus was the "maker" of the note. See § 673.1031(1)(e) (defining "maker" as "a person who signs or is identified in a note as a person undertaking to pay"). The note was merely handed to her for the purpose of inspecting it as a pro se litigant prior to the bank moving it into evidence. As such, the trial court is correct that Maas had no authority to alter the note.
However, marking through her name on the note—which is the only behavior of Maas cited by the trial court in its contempt order—did not amount to direct criminal contempt in this case because the record establishes that Maas mistakenly believed that she could lawfully do so pursuant to the UCC. "A finding of direct criminal contempt may be based upon either a violation of an order of the court or an act which is facially contemptuous." Smith v. State , 954 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). There was no order at issue here, so Maas’ conduct had to be facially contemptuous to warrant holding her in direct criminal contempt. See id.
"Criminal contempt is a crime. Thus, a person charged with criminal contempt is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Forbes v. State , 933 So. 2d 706, 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citations omitted); see also Turner v. State , 283 So. 2d 157, 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). "Contempt is "[a]n act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity." " Haas v. State , 196 So. 3d 515, 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (alteration in original) (underlined emphasis added) (quoting Garcia v. Pinellas County , 483 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ); see also Ex parte Crews , 127 Fla. 381, 173 So. 275, 279 (1937) ("It may be said broadly, but certainly, that any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity, is a contempt.").
As such, it is not enough that the act was calculated to occur; "[t]here must be proof that the accused intended to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice" in performing the act. Forbes , 933 So. 2d at 712 (emphasis added). "Intent is an essential element of contempt," State v. Diaz de la Portilla , 177 So. 3d 965, 973 (Fla. 2015), and "[o]ne's intent to act in contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt," Riley v. State , 293 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
Our dissenting colleague acknowledges that intent is an essential element of contempt but cites Wilson v. Joughin , 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182, 182, 183 (1932), a 1932 Florida Supreme Court opinion involving the contemptuous act of jury tampering, to support the proposition that "the Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that where the act charged clearly constitutes contempt, a denial under oath of a contemptuous intent in committing the act does not require a discharge." In response, we would first point out that Maas’ actions in the instant case are distinguishable from the "clearly contemptuous" actions of the appellant in Wilson , 141 So. at 182-83, who tracked down a juror on the street, had the juror brought over to his car, and told the juror, "It would be best to give [the defendant] life and not execute him." We would also note that the "assertion that "a disclaimer of intent to be contemptuous is not sufficient to deprive a trial judge of the power to punish contempt" is true, but only if a finding of intent is supported by the facts." Sewell v. State , 443 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (emphasis added). Maas is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning that she does not have the burden to prove a lack of contemptuous intent and that each element of the offense, including intent, must be supported by the evidence. See Forbes , 933 So. 2d at 712.
But more importantly, it is not our conclusion here that Maas' striking through her signature on the original note was not contemptuous because she denied a contemptuous intent under oath. Rather, we conclude that the facts of this case do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Maas struck through her signature on the original note with the intent to embarrass the court or to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice.
Although Maas’ action was certainly shocking and may have angered the court, the record establishes that she did it in an effort to legally cancel her debt pursuant to her misunderstanding of statutory provisions. Such is insufficient to constitute criminal contempt. See Via v. State , 633 So. 2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("The test in determining whether conduct constitutes criminal contempt is whether the conduct interferes with or impugns the judicial function, not whether it causes a particular judge to feel aggrieved or vexed."); McRoy v. State , 31 So. 3d 273, 274, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (reversing order of direct criminal contempt where "there [wa]s no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. McRoy's actions, annoying as they undoubtedly were, embarrassed, hindered or obstructed the court in the administration of justice, or lessened the court's authority or dignity" because "[c]ontempt does not exist just because a judge feels aggrieved or vexed"); see also Murrell v. State , 595 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("The standard to be applied in determining whether conduct is contemptuous is an objective one based upon a determination of the conduct's tendency to hinder the administration of justice, rather than a subjective one.... Importantly, ... the conduct alleged to be contemptuous must be calculated to cause harm.").
The dissent makes the conclusory statements that Maas’ "actions were calculated to hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice and to lessen the court's authority over her" and that "she clearly had calculated her action with the intent to hinder or obstruct the court by defacing the note to accomplish her improper objective" but points to nothing in the record to support these conclusions. Although the dissent is correct that the act of striking her name was intentional, the intent necessary to support a finding of direct criminal contempt is not the intent to actually do the physical act. The intent necessary is the intent that the act itself will embarrass the court or that it will hinder or obstruct the administration of justice. In other words, the act itself without a contemptuous intent is not enough to support a finding of direct criminal contempt. See, e.g. , Woods v. State , 987 So. 2d 669, 677-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (reversing order of direct criminal contempt based on utterance of a single curse word because the record did not support the necessary intent "to constitute an imminent threat to the administration of justice"), disapproved of on other grounds by Plank v. State , 190 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2016) ; M.J. v. State , 202 So. 3d 112, 114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("On the record before us, there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that M.J. intended to disobey the court's order by filming the proceedings [on his cell phone]."); Smith v. State , 954 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("There exists no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith intended to disobey any court order.").
The dissent seems to presume that Maas is a member of the sovereign citizen movement and cites a law review article to seemingly suggest that Maas distrusts the government and is actively trying to limit its power. The dissent bases this presumption on Maas’ calling herself an "Aboriginal Slovian [sic] Christian Ohioan," the manner in which she signed her pleadings, and the appearance of her passport. We are perplexed by the dissent's reliance on these facts to conclude that Maas’ striking through her name on the note was some sort of effort to topple our jurisprudence. The trial court made no reference to any of these facts either in its final order of contempt or in its oral comments at the contempt hearing.
It is clear from the record before this court that the only basis for the trial court's finding of direct criminal contempt was Maas’ marking through her signature on the original note in open court. It is the only conduct of Maas’ referenced in the final order of contempt and in the court's show cause order issued pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830(a), in which the court directed Maas to show cause only as to why she should not be held in contempt for "defacing and altering exhibits in the custody of the court" and "attempting to destroy evidence in a court proceeding" when, "while ... looking at the original note, she took a pen and drew a line across her signature."
Although the transcript of the contempt hearing—which is a part of our record—does reveal that the trial court expressed frustration during that hearing with some of Maas’ general courtroom behavior, the court did not include any of this behavior in its determination of contempt. Neither its written order nor its oral pronouncements suggests any other basis for the contempt determination than Maas’ striking through her signature on the original note in open court while stating that the act canceled her debt pursuant to the UCC. As such, the only issue before this court for review is whether that behavior of Maas was contemptuous, and the dissent's reliance on its conclusion that Maas was acting pursuant to the sovereign citizen movement—a fact that is not conclusively proven by this record—is misplaced.
In its order of contempt, the trial court included in its findings of fact that "Maas believed that by striking her signature she could discharge her obligation to HSBC Bank to pay the note." The court also found that "[a]t the time [Maas] crossed through her signature on the note she also made statements on the record that she struck the note, cited to " UCC 3-604(a)" and stated she was the holder in due course, suggesting that the debt was no longer owed." Maas repeated this explanation in her response to the trial court's order to show cause why she should not be held in direct criminal contempt and advances it again on appeal.
Although Maas’ actions demonstrate an ignorance of the law, it is clear that what led her to alter the note was her mistaken belief that at the moment she was handed the note, she legally was the holder of the note and thus could lawfully cancel her debt. The trial court admitted as much when it made the factual finding that Maas’ action of striking through her name was done "with the goal of eliminating her debt to HSBC Bank." She believed that the law allowed her to extinguish her debt in this manner. One cannot hinder or obstruct justice by acting legally. Although the dissent characterizes Maas' action as "intentionally defacing or altering exhibits ... with the intent of gaining an advantage in the litigation," according to the trial court's own findings, her goal was to legally eliminate the debt pursuant to the UCC, not to destroy the evidence to prevent it from being admitted at trial. While we understand the trial court's frustration with Maas, there is no evidence to suggest that her marking through her name on the original note was "calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or ... calculated to lessen its authority or dignity." See Haas , 196 So. 3d at 523 (quoting Garcia , 483 So. 2d at 444 ); see also Murrell , 595 So. 2d at 1050 ("Importantly ... the conduct alleged to be contemptuous must be calculated to cause harm."). And the fact that she cited a legal basis for her actions—albeit incorrectly—supports this conclusion.
We also must disagree with the dissent's characterization of Maas’ misunderstanding of the complex statutory scheme that makes up Florida law governing foreclosures and negotiable instruments as "outlandish interpretations" on her part. While those trained in the law may understand the special definitions that the legislature has assigned to certain statutory terms, we cannot ignore that fact that terms like "holder" and "person in possession" have regular, real world meanings outside of legal proceedings. We cannot label a pro se litigant "outlandish" for attributing regular dictionary definitions to words just because she encounters those words in a legal setting.
We recognize that "[t]rial judges must be allowed to control their courtrooms" and that "[t]hey must have the tools suitable to the purpose when the loss of control is threatened and the dignity and purpose of the court are challenged." McRoy , 31 So. 3d at 275. But "[t]he power of contempt must be used only rarely and with circumspection. ‘The provocation must never be slight, doubtful or of shifting interpretations.’ " Id. (citation omitted). "[B]ecause of the potency of the powerful remedy of criminal contempt, we must carefully guard the requirements for its use, premised only on indisputable record support." Id. (emphasis added).
"While a judgment of direct contempt is entitled to a presumption of correctness, it must be supported by the record." Riley , 293 So. 3d at 35 (quoting Smith v. State , 954 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ). Because the record before us does not contain proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Maas intended "to act in contempt," see id. , based on the facts of this case, we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in holding her in direct criminal contempt. See id. ("The standard of review of a direct criminal contempt conviction is abuse of discretion.").
Our dissenting colleague expresses concern that our conclusion here, based on a misreading of section 673.6041, which deals specifically with the entitlement to discharge an obligation to pay a debt on a negotiable instrument, could somehow lead to rampant mutilation and shredding of court documents or could even be the basis for excusing the actions of criminal defendants who may undertake to destroy evidence. We agree with our colleague that such an expansive misreading of this majority opinion would indeed be a "farcical approach" to the determination of direct criminal contempt. But we are confident that we have made clear that our conclusion here is based on the unique facts of this case alone. In any event, it is improper to try to allay a hyperbolic fear of "groups ... espousing nonsensical readings" of our statutes by lowering our guard and allowing the potent and powerful tool of criminal contempt to be used against Maas where the requirements for its use are lacking. See McRoy , 31 So. 3d at 275. Litigants and their arguments must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and Maas cannot be made the scapegoat for others, especially in a case like this where the evidence of intent is simply not there.
Because the facts of this case do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Maas struck through her signature on the original note with the intent to embarrass the court or to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice, we reverse.
The remainder of Maas’ arguments on appeal challenge the foreclosure judgment itself rather than the order of direct criminal contempt. Because the foreclosure judgment is not before this court in the instant appeal, we do address those arguments.
Reversed.
NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs.
STARGEL, J, Dissents with opinion.
STARGEL, Judge, Dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the trial court was correct in finding Becky Ruth Maas’ actions were willful and intentional. I further agree with the majority that Maas performed an "intentional voluntary act" based on a mistaken belief which included the intentional defacing of a court exhibit. The trial court witnessed the events, and they were recorded on the court's security cameras. The court found that she attempted to destroy evidence, defaced and altered a trial exhibit in the custody of the court, and hindered and obstructed the administration of justice by the actions she took. The Order of Criminal Contempt comes before us with a presumption of correctness, see In re Weinstein , 518 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (citing State ex rel. Garlovsky v. Eastmoore , 393 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) ; Krueger v. State , 351 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) ), and is supported by the law and evidence in the record. Regardless of her mistaken beliefs, her actions were calculated to hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice and to lessen the court's authority over her. I do not believe there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court so I must respectfully dissent.
Section 673.6041(2), Florida Statutes (2019), permits a person entitled to enforce an instrument to discharge the obligation by completing an "intentional voluntary act" which is defined in the statute. Maas relies on this statutory provision to justify her assertion that she canceled the note when she crossed through her name on the original note during her trial testimony.
This does not appear to be the only area of the law, or even the UCC, about which Maas may be misinformed. Multiple references and filings in the record below evidence her distrust of and desire to separate from our legal system. In her pleadings, she provided her passport which shows she was born in Ohio but identifies herself as an "Aboriginal Slovian Christian Ohioan American National" and refers to herself as an "American National" in her court documents but states "I am not nor have I ever been a U.S. Citizen, U.S. National or a part of the 'In God We Trust/U.S.A. Inc.’ " Throughout her filings in this court and the trial court, she makes mistaken assertions regarding the law and the UCC. She signs her documents "without prejudice ... of MAAS, BECKI RUTH corp. sole DBA BECKI RUTH MAAS, All Natural Rights/Constitutional Rights/God Given Rights ‘explicitly’ Reserved." The front and back of her passport have language added stating "ONE HUNDRED troy ounces of .999 pure gold (or its $ equivalent) per stop initiated by any Law Officer/Judge/Magistrate/corporate-agent/citizen." Finally, the record shows her response to the Order to Show Cause included returning a copy to the court with the words, "This Presentment Is Accepted For Value For Its Assessed Value Is Prepaid Exempt from Levy Front And Backside And Is Returned For Closure And Settlement Of This Accounting In Exchange Dated: 12.12.2019. BECKI MAAS s/maas, becki ruth" across the middle of the first page and the words "See First Page of Presentment" across the middle of the remaining pages. These misunderstandings are being followed by many misinformed citizens associated with many groups, and trial judges must address these issues in difficult proceedings while trying to maintain decorum in their courtrooms.
One could easily dismiss these claims as conspiracy theories, but such a terse response would betray one important point: The Sovereign Citizen movement is made up of thousands of U.S. citizens that distrust the federal government and are actively trying to limit its power through reference to the Constitution. Although their means run the gamut from frivolous to downright dangerous, the Sovereign Citizen movement is growing by the day.
Caesar Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen Movement , 80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 156 (2019).
As observed in Thomas v. State , 752 So. 2d 679, 685 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), "[r]ule 3.830, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not define criminal contempt. Case law establishes that a party may be held in direct criminal [contempt] for the violation of an order of the court or for an act which is facially contemptuous ." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the law recognizes two types of contemptuous behavior. Contempt for violations of specific court orders or those for acts which are facially contemptuous. The majority correctly asserts that this action would have to fall under the second prong of this analysis if it is to be deemed contemptuous because there is no prior court order telling her, or anyone for that matter, that they cannot deface or destroy court records. However, judges still have the ability to punish acts that are not covered by a specific statute or court orders. "Criminal contempt may be based on an act calculated to embarrass, hinder[,] or obstruct the trial court in the administration of justice or which is calculated to lessen the court's authority or dignity." Rudolph v. State , 832 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). While intent is an essential element of contempt, Fla. Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson , 67 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1953), the Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that where the act charged clearly constitutes contempt, a denial under oath of a contemptuous intent in committing the act does not require a discharge. "In such cases the question is not whether contempt was intended, but whether the conduct constituted contempt." Wilson v. Joughin , 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182, 182 (1932).
The major purpose of the law of contempt is to maintain and preserve the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly administration of justice. The standard to be applied in determining whether conduct is contemptuous is an objective one based upon a determination of the conduct's tendency to hinder the administration of justice, rather than a subjective one concerned with the sensitivities of a particular judge.
Murrell v. State , 595 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
Looking objectively at the situation, intentionally defacing or altering exhibits in the custody of the court with the intent of gaining an advantage in the litigation certainly should qualify as a facially contemptuous act when the court makes the requisite findings and has complied with the requirements of rule 3.830. Such acts also hinder and obstruct the trial court in the administration of justice. There is no evidence or indication in the record that the trial judge acted in haste or anger; rather, he set the matter for a show cause hearing, attempted to provide an Order to Show Cause to Maas (which she refused), gave her ample time to prepare and respond, and then followed the procedure under rule 3.830. The trial judge considered the evidence and entered the order which complies with the rule. We do not know what mitigation the judge applied, if any, to this case when he sentenced Maas to five days, although this sentence is less than five percent of the maximum sentence he could have imposed. This fact further supports the objectivity the judge employed, rather than a judge who was subjectively addressing the issue because he found this behavior shocking and may have been angered or felt vexed or aggrieved as the majority suggests. Again, there is nothing in the record to support this.
The rule was recently changed. See In re: Amendments to Fla. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830 , 309 So. 3d 657 (Fla. 2021). The rule at the time of the alleged contempt was generally the same: inform the defendant of the accusation and inquire as to whether the defendant has any cause to show why he or she should not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the court and sentenced therefor; give the defendant an opportunity to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances; enter a judgment that includes a recital of the facts on which the adjudication is based; sign the judgment; and pronounce the sentence in open court.
Maas admitted to defacing the court exhibit both in court and in her written response to the Order to Show Cause while asserting that the court was in error to move forward to judgment because her actions had somehow vitiated the plaintiff's case. In fact, much of her argument in this appeal erroneously focused on this continued misrepresentation of the law and the foreclosure rather than the issues surrounding her alleged contempt. Her misguided explanation based on her misinterpretation of section 673.6041(1), Florida Statutes (2019), should not excuse her intentional act of defacing the court exhibit–particularly since the intent of her actions was to preclude the pending litigation. The fact that her intentional act of defacing the court document also served a different purpose in her mind does not excuse the fact she acted in a calculated manner to hinder or obstruct the trial court in the administration of justice. Her subjective understanding of the results of her actions should not vacate the facially contemptuous act simply because there was a denial of criminal intent under oath. See Wilson , 141 So. at 182 ; Rudolph , 832 So. 2d at 828.
The majority then turns its analysis to whether Maas had intent to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice. "It may be said broadly, but certainly, that any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity, is a contempt." Ex parte Crews , 127 Fla. 381, 173 So. 275, 279 (1937) (emphasis added). "The test is not the physical propinquity of the act to the court, but its tendency to directly affect the administration of justice." Id. Maas clearly had calculated her action with the intent to hinder or obstruct the court by defacing the note to accomplish her improper objective and thereby intended to lessen the court's authority over her by eliminating a critical exhibit in the litigation. As stated above, the fact that she was mistaken as to the actual results of her actions should not excuse her intentional act of defacing the document.
The majority, while acknowledging the impropriety of her mistaken beliefs, determines there was a willful and intentional act yet uses her disclaimer to limit the trial court's decision that a facially contemptuous act had been committed because she had a different stated intent. A disclaimer of intent to be contemptuous is not sufficient to deprive the court of the power to punish contempt. See Cormack v. Coleman , 120 Fla. 1, 161 So. 844, 849 (1935).
Section 673.6041 is titled "Discharge by cancellation or renunciation" and includes additional options such as destruction and mutilation of the instrument. Under the majority's analysis, mutilation or shredding documents in court also would be excused if someone later explains they have a different understanding of the statute so their destruction of court documents could not be punished as contempt. There is a myriad of groups who are currently espousing nonsensical readings of the UCC and various other statutes. What if this analysis is carried over to the criminal context and someone destroys evidence because they sincerely believe they are fulfilling a different purpose? Or if a pro se criminal defendant is handed a letter they wrote to review as evidence and they destroy or alter the letter under the mistaken belief it will exonerate them? If my analysis of the case law is incorrect and this farcical approach is to be the law of this state, trial court judges will lose the main tool in their toolbox for maintaining and preserving the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly administration of justice.
Kalinowski, supra note 6, at 165, 166.
The question of intent goes to whether the contemnor intended to commit the contemptuous act—not what he or she thought the result of the contemptuous act would be. Maas’ intention was to deface the court exhibit thereby eliminating her debt. I do not believe Maas’ specific intent to commit a facially contemptuous act is outweighed by her mistaken and outlandish misinterpretations. Such issues of mistaken intent are best left for the trial court to consider whether contempt occurred or for mitigation purposes as the judge deems appropriate. If a judge is unduly harsh in their sentence based on the conduct, that can and should be overturned for abuse of discretion. There is no such abuse of discretion here because the trial court made sufficient findings and the record supports the finding of contempt. Therefore, I dissent.