Opinion
No. 2098 C.D. 2013
10-03-2014
Lzog L.P. o/b/o James Herzog General Partner and Scott Herzog, Appellants v. McKean County Board of Commissioners, Specifically Joseph DeMott, Jr., Clifford Lane, and Al Pingie, & The McKean County Office of Assessment, Angela Tennies, McKean County Chief Assessor
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
This appeal appears to be a continuation of a dispute between landowners of undeveloped forest land in McKean County, and County real estate tax assessment authorities, over forest use values under the "Clean and Green program."
See Herzog v. McKean County Board of Assessment Appeals, 14 A.3d 193 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (Herzog I) (dealing with tax years 2000 to 2011). The current appeal deals with tax assessment notices for tax year 2013.
As discussed below, another appeal between the parties, docketed in this Court at 413 C.D. 2014, deals with 2014 tax assessment notices.
The owner of forest reserve property may apply for preferential tax treatment for the property. If granted, the property is assessed not at fair market value, but at forest use value, generally a lower value. The forest use value "provides an incentive to the taxpayer to delay harvesting until the timber is fully matured, while ensuring a tax break to the owner of the forest reserve who keeps his land in forest." Herzog I, 14 A.3d at 205.
The "Clean and Green" program is authorized by the Pennsylvania Farmland and Forest Land Assessment Act of 1974, commonly known as the Clean and Green Act, Act of December 19, 1974, P.L. 973, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5490.1-5490.13.
More particularly, Lzog L.P., on behalf of James Herzog General Partner and Scott Herzog (collectively, Plaintiffs), ask whether the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County (trial court) erred in dismissing their mandamus suit in response to preliminary objections filed by Defendants. Through their complaint, Plaintiffs averred the McKean County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) unlawfully changed the assessed value of four parcels they own, as well as more than 100 other parcels enrolled in the County's "Clean and Green" program, through the issuance of invalid change of assessment notices. Plaintiffs sought an order compelling Defendants to issue corrective notices as well as the return of any funds overpaid as a result of the invalid change of assessment notices. The trial court sustained Defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed the suit on the ground that mandamus could not lie where Plaintiffs had available, statutory remedies in the nature of tax assessment appeals. Upon review, we affirm.
Defendants are the McKean County Board of Commissioners, Joseph DeMott, Jr., Clifford Lane, and Al Pingie, the McKean County Office of Assessment, and Angela Tennies, the McKean County Chief Assessor.
I. Background
Through their complaint, Plaintiffs averred the following facts. In June 2012, the McKean County Commissioners passed a resolution directing the increase of Clean and Green use values to $255 per acre. According to the complaint, the Chief Assessor of McKean County (Chief Assessor) made the change pursuant to the dictates of the resolution.
In July 2012, Plaintiffs received "Change of Assessment Notices" for four parcels that are enrolled in the County's Clean and Green program (subject properties). Certified Record, Item #15, Complaint for Issuance for a Writ of Mandamus at ¶4 (Complaint). The subject properties lie within Norwich and Keating Townships, and they have various forest use values ranging from $60 to $94 per acre as approved by the Board in October 2011.
In January 2013, the trial court issued an order voiding the resolution and declaring the Commissioners' actions invalid and illegal. As a result, Plaintiffs averred, the trial court's order invalidated the resolution and any related assessment changes including the assessment notices mailed in July 2012. Corrective notices, returning the properties to their pre-July 2012 use values, should have been issued to all landowners who received the defective change notices. Plaintiffs aver that, in total, at least 100 properties enrolled in the Clean and Green program were mailed defective change of assessment notices. Plaintiffs allege no corrective notices were mailed.
Pursuant to Section 4.2 of the Clean and Green Act, 72 P.S. §5490.4b, the county assessor establishes use values for forest reserve land. The county assessor may use values provided yearly for each applicable county by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, or she may use a value less than that supplied by the Department. See Herzog I.
Plaintiffs averred the unauthorized change of assessment notices state: "The Board ... has set a new [a]ssessed [v]alue on this property." Compl. at ¶8. However, Plaintiffs alleged, the Board never authorized the change notices. Nevertheless, Defendants claimed the Board approved and authorized the defective notices under the guise of the resolution. Plaintiffs alleged there is no public record of such action.
Plaintiffs sought an order directing Defendants to mail corrected notices at Defendants' expense that rescind the defective notices sent in July 2012, which are defective because their underlying authority, i.e., the resolution, was declared invalid. Plaintiffs alleged the change of assessment notices were not subject to the "normal" property tax assessment appeal process because they were "spurious, counterfeit and not authentic." Compl. at ¶9. According to Plaintiffs, the Board, by law, can only hear and determine legitimate assessment notices and appeals pursuant to Section 8844 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §8844. It cannot hear and decide appeals of unlawful assessment changes. To date, Plaintiffs averred, it remained uncertain what entity provided the basis or authority for the Board to mail the change of assessment notices. The Board, at its October 2012 meeting, confirmed the notices were not authorized.
Based on these averments, Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus, compelling Defendants to: (1) issue corrective notices returning properties to their pre-July 2012 use values and to notify all recipient landowners of the defective notices; and, (2) refund any overpayment of property taxes paid to any taxing district based on the defective change of assessment notices.
Defendants responded by filing preliminary objections, asserting: (1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to seek revised assessment notices and refunds for parcels in which they had no interest; (2) Defendants lacked authority to issue refunds of taxes paid to other taxing districts; (3) Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law to address their claims; (4) Plaintiffs lacked a clear right to relief; and, (5) issuance of a writ of mandamus would create disorder and confusion in Defendants' governmental departments.
After the parties filed briefs and presented oral argument, the trial court issued an opinion and order in which it sustained Defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, with prejudice.
Specifically, the trial court determined mandamus could not lie where Plaintiffs did not exhaust their available, statutorily-provided administrative remedies by appealing the change of assessment notices to the Board pursuant to the Consolidated County Assessment Law. The trial court explained:
The Defendants argue that the current mandamus action is deficient because the Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law by which to challenge the validity of the Notices. The Notices, dated July 11, 2012, state at the bottom the landowner's right to an appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals. However, the Plaintiffs did not take any appellate action regarding the properties now under complaint. Therefore, the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative remedies under the current county assessment law. Title 53, Section 8844 provides that any person aggrieved by any assessment may appeal to the board for relief. It is clear that the Consolidated County Assessment Law provides a direct avenue by which to challenge the validity of an assessment. This avenue the Plaintiffs either ignored or refused to adhere to given the passage of time from the date of the Notice[s]. The
Plaintiffs cannot now go back in time to request relief to which they had a clear right of appeal more than eighteen months ago.Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 11/4/13, at 3-5. The trial court also explained that Plaintiffs lacked a clear right to relief, noting the challenged notices actually lowered the assessments on three of the four subject properties, while the fourth subject property was assessed $10 higher.
The purpose of the requirement that the petitioner exhausts administrative remedies prior to instituting an action in mandamus is to ensure that claims will be heard, as a preliminary matter, by the body having expertise in the area and to provide the administrative agency with the opportunity to correct its own mistakes, thereby mooting judicial controversies. Matesic [v. Maleski, 624 A.2d 776 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)]. ...
As the Defendants argue, the 2013 assessment rolls are finalized while the 2014 assessment rolls are being processed for finalization. Moreover, as the Defendants indicate, this process involves the issuance of assessment notices to all property owners. Therefore, it follows that the Plaintiffs will receive new notices for the present assessment. This would mean, then, that the Plaintiffs may file an appeal. Though the Plaintiffs are quick to highlight that this case does not involve an assessment appeal, that appeal alone provides them with the statutory avenue for relief.
The issue before the Court is not whether the 2012 Notices were invalid. Rather, the issue now before the Court is whether the mandamus action is a proper vehicle with which to raise the invalidity of said Notices. Based upon a clear reading of the law, the Court finds that it is not. Again, the Court is not ruling that the Notices were invalid. The Court is pronouncing that the current action is an improper means by which to challenge their validity or effectiveness. ... This is not an extraordinary case that warrants the issuance of such a rare writ. The Plaintiffs had administrative remedies available to them as a means by which to pray for relief. The Plaintiffs have simply failed to exhaust the statutorily-provided administrative remedies, and the right to relief is not clear. Thus, the Court cannot issue a writ to the Defendants directing them to perform a ministerial act. Because the Court finds that the Plaintiff[s] failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and because the right to relief is clear, the Court need not analyze the remaining grounds of the Preliminary Objections.
Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and the trial court directed them to file a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal, which they did. The trial court then issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) in which it rejected Plaintiffs' assertions. Unfortunately, this process increased the complexity of the dispute and enlarged upon the averments of the complaint, as follows.
The trial court observed that Plaintiffs, in their Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, challenged as inaccurate the trial court's original statement that they failed to perfect timely appeals from the notices of change of assessments. To the contrary, valid tax assessment appeals were perfected. Plaintiffs cited to McKean County civil cases docketed at 1469, 1470, 1471, and 1472 CD 2012, in which Defendants filed tax assessment appeals because the Clean and Green values on the subject properties were lowered.
In considering those appeals, which challenged the Board's reduction of assessments for Plaintiffs' property initiated by the same notices of change of assessments, the trial court had narrowed its focus to the validity of the notices because they were issued by the Board rather than by the County's Chief Assessor in July 2012. However, before the hearing could be held on the issue of the validity of the change of assessment notices, Defendants withdrew their appeals.
In their 1925(b) Statement, Plaintiffs placed great weight on the issue of the alleged fraudulent notices. However, the trial court stated it did not rule on whether the July 2012 notices of change of assessment were valid or fraudulent. The trial court explained this issue was not a component of the trial court's opinion sustaining Defendants' preliminary objections, yet it formed the basis of Plaintiffs' current appeal. Rather than focusing on the propriety of the trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections, the trial court stated, Plaintiffs focused on the alleged fraudulent change of assessment notices, the change in Clean and Green use values, and the refund of taxes allegedly overpaid by 100 property owners. Again, the trial court stated, these issues were not disposed of by the trial court when it ruled on Defendants' preliminary objections.
Further, the trial court stated, Pennsylvania courts disapprove the filing of a mandamus suit as a means to change an assessment or lower a use value. See Clark v. Burschel, 69 A. 900 (Pa. 1908); Goodman v. Meade, 60 A.2d 577 (Pa. Super. 1948). The trial court pointed out that Plaintiffs claimed that because Defendants filed tax assessment appeals with the trial court from the Board's decisions, Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies. Contrary to this contention, the trial court stated, Plaintiffs did not prosecute their claims in a timely manner, nor did they pursue the issue of the alleged fraudulent notices beyond the appeal filed by Defendants. In other words, Plaintiffs took no action to challenge the change in use values other than appearing in Defendants' tax assessment appeals docketed at 1469, 1470, 1471, and 1472 CD 2012. The trial court determined mandamus did not lie where Plaintiffs did not avail themselves of their appropriate remedy by pursuing their own tax assessment appeals.
The trial court stated it could not further respond to the issues raised in Plaintiffs' Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement because of the confusing nature of the Statement and because Plaintiffs attempted to supplant more facts and argument into their Statement than what was before the trial court when it ruled on Defendants' preliminary objections. The trial court stated the majority of the suppositions in Plaintiffs' Statement exceeded the scope of the trial court's ruling. Moreover, the very composition of Plaintiffs' Statement made any reply difficult. In sum, the trial court stated this Court should affirm its decision sustaining Defendants' preliminary objections. This matter is now before us for disposition.
II. Discussion
A. Contentions
On appeal, Plaintiffs raise the following issue: "Did the trial court error [sic] in dismissing the Appellant's complaint in mandamus as the appropriate relief where the underlying tax change notices were fraudulent and not issued by a legally authorized county agency; where the taxpayer lacks any other adequate remedy at law and the county refuses to so perform their duties properly?" Appellant's Br. at 12. Although Plaintiffs raise numerous contentions in support of this issue, the crux of this appeal is whether Plaintiffs had an adequate and appropriate remedy in the nature of a statutorily-provided tax assessment appeal, which precludes their mandamus action.
Specifically, Plaintiffs assert they initiated a mandamus suit to compel Defendants to rescind the fraudulent notices sent to landowners enrolled in the County's Clean and Green program. Plaintiffs contend these notices were applicable to the 2013 taxable year and the notices were generated and issued by a fictitious agency that lacked any statutory authority to substantiate its existence. Plaintiffs seek to have the actions of the issuing agency declared fraudulent and invalid and have the proper, lawful county agency issue notice to all Clean and Green program participants that the notices were fraudulent and invalid.
Plaintiffs maintain there is an official and legally appointed McKean County Board of Assessment Appeals created under the Consolidated County Assessment Law, and this Board verified it neither approved nor was involved in the fraudulent change of assessment notices. In fact, at an October 2012 hearing, the Board instructed the Chief Assessor to rescind the notices, but its direction was ignored. Plaintiffs assert an official Board of Assessment Appeals has no legal authority to initiate change of assessment notices, but rather only to hear appeals. Plaintiffs contend a fictitious entity using the Board's name lacks authority to issue change of assessment notices.
Plaintiffs argue there is no other adequate remedy here because the notices were issued by a county board that does not exist in an open county forum that taxpayers can contact or communicate with openly. Therefore, an aggrieved taxpayer who is enrolled in the Clean and Green program has no vehicle to challenge the fictitious board's action other than a mandamus suit. Plaintiffs assert there are well over 100 enrolled landowners in the County Clean and Green program. They contend they have proper standing to challenge the Board's actions and not every enrolled landowner must initiate his own individual mandamus action. To force every aggrieved taxpayer to assume the task of appealing, when the larger question can be efficiently resolved in a single action, would be unnecessarily burdensome.
Plaintiffs point out the trial court's order dismissing their suit stated Plaintiffs did not appeal the fraudulent notices. Plaintiffs contend they did appeal, but found the Board was not involved in the issuance of the fraudulent notices that used its name. Plaintiffs maintain the Board has no authority to hear fraudulent change notice appeals, nor could it once it instructed the Chief Assessor to rescind the notices. Plaintiffs further assert, contrary to the trial court's determination, Pennsylvania law is devoid of any appeal process when a fictitious governmental agency issues change of assessment notices absent a countywide reassessment. Plaintiffs assert a county can perform a reassessment of select properties, but it cannot impose taxes on a new assessment until a total reassessment is completed. See City of Lancaster v. Cnty. of Lancaster, 599 A.2d 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (en banc).
For their part, Defendants assert the trial court properly held Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law that they did not exhaust, thereby precluding the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Defendants assert the Consolidated County Assessment Law establishes a comprehensive statutory procedure for the appeal of assessments, including preferential assessment under the Clean and Green program. Defendants contend the issues raised in Plaintiffs' complaint should have been addressed by Plaintiffs filing appeals of the decision orders issued by the Board in accordance with that statutory procedure. Mandamus does not lie where there is an otherwise adequate remedy at law. Thus, Defendants argue, the trial court properly held Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law that precluded the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
B. Analysis
On appeal from a trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing a complaint, we review whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs., 936 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). We accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences deducible from those facts. Id. We need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. Wagaman v. Attorney Gen. of the Commonwealth, 872 A.2d 244 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). To sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them. Id.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty. Moyer v. Gudknecht, 67 A.3d 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). A court may issue a writ of mandamus only where the plaintiff shows: (1) he has a clear legal right to the relief requested; (2) the defendant has a corresponding duty to perform the requested act; and, (3) there is no other appropriate and adequate remedy. Id. If any one of the foregoing elements is absent, mandamus does not lie. Dotterer v. Sch. Dist. of City of Allentown, 92 A.3d 875 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). "[I]t remains the plaintiff's burden to establish the inadequacy of any available remedies, as well as the other requisites to mandamus relief." Id. at 881 (quoting Burger v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of McGuffey Sch. Dist., 576 Pa. 574, 584, 839 A.2d 1055, 1061 (2003)).
Further, litigants are required to exhaust adequate and available administrative remedies prior to resorting to judicial remedies. Dotterer; Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 607 Pa. 527, 8 A.3d 866 (2010). As this Court explained in Seeton v. Adams, 50 A.3d 268 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc):
Mandamus is not a substitute for a statutory remedy that provides the means to review a public official's action and correct error. Rather, a writ of mandamus provides the means to compel a public official to act where he has refused to act. As summarized by our Supreme Court: '[M]andamus is chiefly employed to compel the performance (when refused) of a ministerial duty, or to compel action (when refused) in matters involving judgment and discretion. It is not used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, nor to direct the retraction or reversal of an action already taken. Mandamus is a device that is available in our system to compel a tribunal or administrative agency to act when that tribunal or agency has been "sitting on its hands.'"Id. at 277 (quoting Pa. Dental Ass'n v. Ins. Dep't, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (Pa. 1986) (underlined emphasis added)).
"[W]here the statutory remedies are clearly adequate and the facts of a case fail to rise to the level necessary to invoke equity, mandamus will not lie." City of Lancaster v. Cnty. of Lancaster, 599 A.2d 289, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (en banc) (citations omitted). A statutory remedy is inadequate only if it either: (1) does not allow adjudication of the issue raised by the petitioner; or, (2) allows irreparable harm to occur to the petitioners during the pursuit of the statutory remedy. Smolow v. Dep't of Revenue, 547 A.2d 478 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), aff'd, 521 Pa. 534, 557 A.2d 1063 (1989).
As to the availability of a statutory remedy here, Section 9(a) of the Clean and Green Act states, "[t]he owner of a property which is subject to preferential assessment or for which preferential assessment is sought, and the political subdivision in which said property is situated, shall have the right of appeal in accordance with existing law." 72 P.S. §5490.9(a). In turn, Section 8844(c) of the Consolidated County Assessment Law provides, as relevant: "Any person aggrieved by any assessment, whether or not the value thereof shall have been changed since the preceding annual assessment, or any taxing district having an interest in the assessment, may appeal to the board for relief." 53 Pa. C.S. §8844(c). "This statutory remedy is exclusive and mandatory." In re Rausch Creek Land, L.P., 59 A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), appeal denied, 74 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added).
Further, the board of assessment appeals has the power to, "[h]ear and determine appeals as provided in Section 8844 (relating to notices, appeals and certification of values)." Section 8851(b)(3) of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §8851(b)(3). Additionally, after an appeal to the board of assessment appeals, any appellant, property owner or affected taxing district may appeal the board's decision to the court of common pleas in the county in which the property is located in accordance with 42 Pa. C.S. §5571(b) (relating to appeals generally) and local rules of court. Section 8854(a) of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a).
To put it mildly, Plaintiffs' arguments are hard to follow, especially with regard to the charges of a "fictitious government entity" and "fraudulent" notices. We note generally that the notices of change of assessment attached to Plaintiffs' complaint are on a letterhead bearing the title "McKean County Board of Assessment Appeals." The notices also state that "The Board of Assessment Appeals has set a new Assessed Value on this property." Plaintiffs apparently contend that the Board cannot initiate changes of assessments of property, and the Board denied doing so. Immediately below the title of the letterhead, however, appear the County assessment office address, telephone number and fax number, the names of the Commissioners of McKean County, the names of the members of the Board, and the name of the Chief Assessor.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of notices of change of assessment on the ground that the Board is a "fictitious government entity" and the change of assessment notices are "fraudulent." Appellant's Br. at 15. Pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Clean and Green Act, and Sections 8844(c) and 8854(a) of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, Plaintiffs had an available, statutory remedy to challenge the validity of the change of assessment notices, namely, the filing of appeals from the notices to the Board and, if necessary, to the trial court. Indeed, at the bottom of each of the four challenged change of assessment notices, which Plaintiffs attached to their complaint, are instructions on filing a formal appeal with the Board. See Compl. at Exs. A-D.
Further, Plaintiffs assert they did, in fact, appeal the change of assessment notices "but found the legally appointed Board ... was not involved [in] the fraudulent notice using their name. The [B]oard has no authority to hear fraudulent change notice appeals nor could they once they had instructed the assessor to rescind." Appellant's Br. at 17. Contrary to Plaintiffs' contentions, Section 8844(c) of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, places no limitation on the types of issues that a party may raise in an assessment appeal. As noted above, Section 8844 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law provides that any person aggrieved by "any assessment" may appeal to the assessment board. 53 Pa. C.S. §8844(c). "This statutory remedy is exclusive and mandatory." Rausch Creek, 59 A.3d at 6. Thus, Plaintiffs only remedy to contest the validity of the notices was through an appeal to the Board.
Included in Plaintiffs' Reproduced Record are four Board decision orders relating to the change of assessment notices at issue, all of which lowered the assessed values for the subject properties. See Reproduced Record at 2.D-5.D. Plaintiffs' brief offers no indication of whether they appealed the Board's orders to the trial court, but, as noted above, the trial court's Pa. R.A.P.1925(a) Opinion states that Defendants filed appeals from the Board's orders, but subsequently withdrew those appeals, and Plaintiffs themselves chose not to appeal.
Defendants point out that Plaintiffs filed appeals with the Board of similar assessment notices issued for the 2014 tax year, and appealed the Board's decisions to the trial court. Defendants assert the trial court denied Plaintiffs' appeal, and Plaintiffs then filed an appeal of the trial court's decision to this Court, which is docketed at 413 C.D. 2014. Defendants argue that in their appeal of the 2014 tax assessment notices, Plaintiffs asserted, among other things, their argument that the notices were "fictitious;" notwithstanding their position in this appeal that they could not raise such an argument in an assessment appeal. Appellee's Br. at 12. Thus, by their actions, Defendants contend, Plaintiffs admit that the statutory appeal procedures in the Consolidated County Assessment Law and the Clean and Green Act are adequate to address their claims.
Because Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy in the nature of an appeal to the Board, followed, if necessary, by an appeal to the trial court, mandamus is not the appropriate vehicle by which to challenge the validity of the notices. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of N. Pocono Sch. Dist. v. Gouldsboro Taxpayers Ass'n, 466 A.2d 299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (reversing common pleas court's order issuing writ of mandamus to compel school district to refund taxes that district improperly collected as taxpayers had adequate statutory remedy to obtain refund of overpayment of taxes); Runyan v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Montgomery Cnty., 401 A.2d 870 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (upholding common pleas court's dismissal of taxpayers' mandamus suit against county board of assessment appeals premised on existence of various defects in assessment notices because taxpayers had an adequate statutory remedy in the form of an assessment appeal).
While Plaintiffs purported to bring their suit on behalf of over 100 property owners enrolled in the County's Clean and Green program, as Defendants point out, they did not seek to file their suit as a class action or otherwise join these other property owners as parties to this suit. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that they possess any interest in those properties. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek mandamus relief on behalf of these other individual property owners.
In addition, we agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs do not have a clear right to seek mandamus relief for other taxpayers who participate in the County's Clean and Green program. Plaintiffs offer no factual averments to support such a right, as follows.
In this regard, this Court's decision in City of Lancaster, cited by Plaintiffs for the proposition that its mandamus suit is proper here, is distinguishable. There, we determined the county's actions of "singling out ten of the [c]ounty's [sixty] taxing districts, in utilizing a different method of assessment on the properties in those districts, and in making unsubstantiated wholesale adjustments to grade and depreciation factors of certain of those properties violated both the uniformity requirement of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the equalization requirement in [former Section 7(d) of the Third Class County Assessment Law,] 72 P.S. §5348(d)." Id. at 299. We further determined the county's review and reassessment of the 10 districts was, in effect, a county-wide reassessment performed in a piecemeal fashion. Under those circumstances, we determined a mandamus suit was proper as there was no adequate remedy through the assessment appeals process given that "the inequality created by the county's recent re-valuations pervade[d] the entire taxing scheme." Id. at 300. We stated that, to force every aggrieved taxpayer to assume the task of appealing, when the larger question could be efficiently resolved in a single action, would be unnecessarily burdensome on property owners and the judicial system.
Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1379, as amended. That Section was repealed by the Act of October 27, 2010, P.L. 895. --------
Here, unlike in City of Lancaster, Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants engaged in a geographically selective reassessment, or that Defendants issued change of assessment notices to only selected property owners enrolled in the County's "Clean and Green" program. Nor did they raise any constitutional issue. Rather, Plaintiffs appear to claim that change of assessment notices were issued to all property owners enrolled in the Clean and Green program. Appellant's Br. at 15. While Plaintiffs assert the change of assessment notices they received were improperly issued by a "fictitious county agency," Appellant's Br. at 18, and are therefore invalid, such an issue is capable of resolution through the statutorily-provided assessment appeal process.
Finally, we agree with the Defendants that they lack a duty to arrange for tax refunds from other taxing authorities. Plaintiffs do not respond to this issue. Thus, mandamus does not lie for this requested relief.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of October, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge