Summary
rejecting plaintiff's contention that defendant consented to personal jurisdiction when it designated agent for service of process under Motor Carrier Act
Summary of this case from Nat'l Cas. Co. v. KT2 LLCOpinion
CIVIL ACTION No: 01-0209 SECTION: "R" (2)
September 26, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
On December 8, 2000, plaintiff, Mable Lyons, filed an action in Louisiana state court alleging that she suffered personal injuries during a train accident on December 10, 1999, in Russell, Mississippi. Defendants removed the case to federal court. Defendants Swift Transportation Co., Inc. and the Estate of Delbert Bissell (known collectively as "swift defendants") flow move to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer venue for forum non conveniens to the Southern District of Mississippi. For the following reasons, the Swift defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
The Swift defendant have withdrawn their defenses of improper venue and improper service of process.
I. Background
On December 10, 1999, plaintiff was aboard an Amtrak train traveling from New Orleans, Louisiana to Atlanta, Georgia. In Russell, Mississippi, the Amtrak train collided with a tractor trailer owned and operated by Swift. The tractor trailer's diesel tank caught fire, sending smoke and fumes into plaintiff's railcar. Lyons, a partial amputee, was in her wheelchair and unable to evacuate the train with the other passengers because the train was not equipped with a wheelchair lift. She claims to have suffered a number of injuries as a result of the accident. The driver of the tractor trailer, Delbert Bissell, died in the accident.
Lyons filed suit against Swift Transportation Co., Inc., ("Swift"), the estate of Swift's driver, Delbert Bissell ("Bissell"), Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern") and National Railroad Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak ("Amtrak"). Swift is an Arizona trucking corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, that engages in interstate commerce. Ninety percent of its total business is conducted west of the Mississippi River. (Pl.'s Suppl. Hem. Opp'n to. Def's Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, at 1.) It maintains no terminals in Louisiana, but its trucks drive though Louisiana and have delivered cargoes in Louisiana from time to time. (Pl.'s Hem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B.) In the past, it has been sued in Louisiana for causes of action arising in Louisiana. Id. Swift does not own, maintain, or lease offices or other properties in Louisiana. Id. It designated an agent for service of process in Louisiana, pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13304. The estate of Delbert Bissell is domiciled in Washington. Plaintiff does not allege that Bissell had any contacts with Louisiana. Norfolk Southern is a Virginia corporation. Amtrak is a District of Columbia corporation.
Swift Transportation Co., Inc., is a Nevada corporation which acts as a holding company for operating corporations named swift Transportation Co., Inc, an Arizona corporation and Swift Transportation Corporation, a Nevada corporation. The operating corporation, Swift Transportation Co., Inc. is the defendant in this suit.
On February 21, 2001, Swift and the Estate of Delbert Bissell moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer venue to the Southern District of Mississippi, where the accident occurred. Co-defendants Norfolk Southern and Amtrak do not oppose jurisdiction in this case.
II. Discussion
A. Personal Jurisdiction
When, as here, a nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the plaintiff shoulders the burden of establishing jurisdiction over that defendant. See Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985). In deciding the jurisdictional issue, a court may consider affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, "or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery." Spademan, 772 F.2d at 1192 (citation omitted). Here, the Court allowed plaintiff to continue this motion three times, over a period of six months, to conduct discovery on the specific issues of jurisdiction and venue raised in this motion. See Feich v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 327 (1996). In deciding this motion, the Court has considered depositions, interrogatory responses, responses to requests for admissions and documentary evidence produced during the course of discovery.
Swift defendants filed this motion to dismiss, or alternatively, to transfer on February 21, 2001. Plaintiff Lyons requested continuances on this motion on March 2, 2001, April 13, 2001, and July 9, 2001 in order to conduct discovery. The Court granted all the continuances. The Court also granted Lyons' motion to file a supplemental memoranda in opposition to the motion to dismiss on July 3, 2001, July 6, 2001, and September 10, 2001, and a second supplemental memorandum on September 11, 2001.
A court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the forum state's exercise of such jurisdiction complies with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211. Under the Louisiana long-arm statute, jurisdiction is proper it the cause of action arises out of "injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if [the defendant] regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state." La. REV. STAT. § 13:3201(A)(4) (West 2001). In addition, Louisiana's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the full limits of due process. See La. REV.STAT. § 13:3201(B) (West 2001). Thus, the Court must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the due process clause. See Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. V. Avco Corp., 513 So.2d 1188, 1192 (La. 1987)).
1. Due Process
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing "minimum contacts" with that state; and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 (1945)).
1. Minimum contacts
The minimum contacts prong of the due process analysis may be satisfied if the contacts give rise to specific personal jurisdiction or give rise to general personal jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1984); Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647.
(a) Specific Jurisdiction
Plaintiff asserts that the Court has specific jurisdiction over the Swift defendants because: 1) she bought her Amtrak ticket in New Orleans; 2) the train departed from New Orleans; 3) she suffered health complications after returning to New Orleans; and 4) she received medical treatment in New Orleans. Because the Court finds that plaintiff's cause of action did not arise out of the Swift defendants' contacts in Louisiana, there is no specific jurisdiction in this case.
A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the claim asserted against the defendant arises out of or relates to its contacts with the forum state. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 1872 n. 8; Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. To determine whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts must examine whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum state, and whether the cause of action arises out of or relates to those activities. See Guidry, 188 F.3d at 625; D.J. Investments, Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 547-48 (5th Cir. 1985). The defendant's connection with the forum state must be such that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" there. Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567 (1980)). A single act by the defendant directed at the forum state can be enough to confer in personam jurisdiction over him, if the cause of action arises out of that act. See Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993). In order to determine whether defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within this forum, the Court must consider factors such as the quality, nature and extent of defendant's activities in this forum, and the relationship between the cause of action and the contacts. See D.J. Investments, 754 F.2d at 545 n. 1 (quoting Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1981)).
This lawsuit arises out of Ms. Lyons' train accident, a tort which occurred in Mississippi, not Louisiana. Ms. Lyons allegedly inhaled smoke and fumes in Mississippi. Nothing in plaintiff's claim arose out of any actions Swift or Bissell took in Louisiana. Indeed, all of the Swift defendants' negligence, if any, occurred in Mississippi. See Felch, 92 F.3d at 324; Addy v. Club Med and ABC Insurance Company, 1997 WL 30205, at 4 (S.D. La. 1997). Plaintiff argues that because she continued to suffer the effects of the smoke inhalation after returning to Louisiana, the tort occurred in Louisiana as well as Mississippi. The Fifth Circuit has rejected that argument, holding that a tort is complete when the injury itself occurs. See Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, because plaintiff's cause of action did not arise from defendant's contacts with Louisiana, no specific jurisdiction exists.
(b) General jurisdiction
In the absence of an action arising out of the nonresident defendant' s purposeful contacts with the forum, general jurisdiction will exist when the defendant engaged in "systematic and continuous" activities in the forum state. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 9, 104 S. Ct. at 1872 n. 9; Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. Due process requires that "continuous and systematic" contacts exist between the state and the foreign corporation to exercise general personal jurisdiction because the forum state does not have an interest in the cause of action. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16, 104 S.Ct. at 1872-83. Contacts between a defendant and the forum state must be "extensive" to satisfy the "continuous and systematic" test. Submersible Systems, Inc. v. Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2001).
In this case, Lyons argues that Swift's contacts with the state of Louisiana are of the kind and quality to constitute general jurisdiction. The Court disagrees.
In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court held that the numerous contacts defendant had with Texas were not "continuous and systematic." In that case, for seven years, Helicopteros purchased helicopters, spare parts, and accessories from Bell Helicopters in Texas; Helicopteros sent prospective pilots to Texas for training; and managers and maintenance personnel of Helicopteros visited Bell in Texas. 466 U.S. at 411, 104 S.Ct. at 1870. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that "[p]urchases and related trips [into the forum], standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State's assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 417, 104 S.Ct. at 1874. The Supreme Court, instead, emphasized that Helicopteras had never been authorized to do business in Texas, never had an agent for service of process in Texas, never solicited business in Texas, never signed a contract in Texas (although it did contract with residents with Texas several times), never had any employee based in Texas, never maintained an office in Texas, did not maintain any records in Texas, and did not have any shareholders in Texas. See Id. at 411-12, 104 S.Ct. at 1870-71. Thus, despite all the contacts that defendant had with Texas, the Supreme Court found that they were insufficient to allow Texas to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recently pointed that the test for "continuous and systematic" contacts is a "difficult one to meet" and that the Supreme Court has upheld jurisdiction on this basis only once. Submersible, 249 F.3d at 418.
In this case, Swift's contacts are less substantial than those found insufficient to confer general jurisdiction in Helicopteros. Swift has a designated agent for service of process in Louisiana under the Motor Carrier Act. Swift admits that its trucks travel through Louisiana and have delivered goods here from time to time. (Pl.'s Hem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B.) Plaintiff asserts that since Swift admittedly travels on the roads of Louisiana, it has taken advantage of the laws, police protection, and infrastructure of Louisiana, and has therefore purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting business within Louisiana. However, plaintiff has not shown that Swift trucks regularly travel in or through Louisiana. Plaintiff presents no record evidence establishing the volume of business Swift does in Louisiana or the frequency with which Swift's trucks pass through Louisiana. Compare with Domingo v. Paul, 1992 WL 333842, at 5 (D. Md. 1992) (finding that defendant trucking company should have reasonably foreseen being hauled into court in Maryland when it averaged two and one-half delivery trips into Maryland per month); Summit Machine Tool Manufacturing Corp. v. Warren Transport, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 722, (S.D. Tx. 1996) (finding that minimum contacts had been met where defendant motor. carrier transported 1700 loads of cargo in a month to Laredo, Texas, transported 2, 000-3, 000 shipments to a Tens company, and where it received shipments, solicited business, negotiated and consummated contracts and purchased equipment in Texas).
At most, plaintiff has shown that Swift's trucks occasionally enter Louisiana. Plaintiff submits a document from the SafeStat database that details all the accidents that Swift has been involved in the past 30 months as evidence of Swift's Louisiana contacts. (Pl.'s Suppl. Mem Opp'n Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B.) Upon review, the Court notes that of the 1, 017 accidents that Swift has been involved in, only one occurred in Louisiana. The document also shows that only four of Swift's drivers hold Louisiana drivers' licenses. The four accidents involving Swift's Louisiana drivers occurred in Missouri, Florida, Wyoming and Arizona.
Plaintiff also asks the Court to infer that since Swift is a nationwide carrier, it necessarily has an extensive Louisiana presence. Plaintiff submits Swift's stock prospectus in which Swift pronounces that it is the nation's third largest publicly traded truckload carrier and that it transports goods to national retail companies. (Pl.'s Suppl. Hem. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Lx. A, at 1, 25.) However, the prospectus provides no information regarding Swift's business in Louisiana.
Swift is not incorporated in Louisiana, nor is its principal place of business in Louisiana. Swift does not own, maintain, or lease offices or other properties in Louisiana. In addition, plaintiff has not shown that Swift has any business contracts with Louisiana residents.
Accordingly, the Court finds that designating an agent under the Motor Carrier Act, having four employees with Louisiana driver's licenses, being involved in one accident in Louisiana in the past 30 months, passing through Louisiana and occasionally delivering goods in Louisiana, is insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over Swift. In addition, plaintiff does not allege that Delbert Bissell, a Washington resident, had any contact with Louisiana, and therefore the Court finds that it lacks general personal jurisdiction over his estate as well.
B. Motor Carrier Act
Relying on case law developed primarily in the Eighth Circuit and in various out-of-state courts, Lyons asserts that Swift Transportation Co., Inc., having registered an agent for service in Louisiana under the Motor Carrier Act, has consented. to suit in the Louisiana for suits arising outside of Louisiana. Plaintiff further argues that defendant's "consent" obviates the need for a due process inquiry. In contrast, Swift claims that its designation of an agent pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act, constitutes "consent" for only those causes of action arising in Louisiana.
This argument under the Motor Carrier Act does not apply to whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Estate of Delbert Bissell.
The Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13304, requires Swift, as an interstate carrier, to "designate an agent in each State in which it operates . . . on whom service of process issued by a court with subject matter jurisdiction may be brought . . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 13304(a). Congress' purpose in enacting the Motor Carrier Act was to protect the public from accidents arising out of the negligent use of motor vehicles engaged in interstate transportation. See Ocepek v. Corporate Transport, Inc., 950 F.2d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1991); Rounds v. Rea, 947 F. Supp. 78, 83 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
In Ocepek v. Corporate Transport, Inc, the Eighth Circuit held that interstate carriers having designated in-state agents for service of process pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act, could not limit their consent to suit to those causes of action that arose within the state. 950 F.2d 556, 559 (1991). In Ocepek, a Missouri resident was injured in a car accident with a New York interstate carrier in Ohio. Plaintiff sued the interstate carrier in Missouri and argued that defendant consented to personal jurisdiction for all suits filed in Missouri when it designated of an agent for service of process in Missouri under the Motor Carrier Act, regardless of where the tort occurred. Defendant asserted that it limited the agent's authority to receive service of process to those actions arising in the State of Missouri. Id. at 558.
The Eighth Circuit held that the defendant "consented" to all suits filed in the state, regardless of where the tort occurred. Id. Because defendant "consented" to suit, the court did not engage in a due process analysis. The court found that the language of the motor carrier statute requires an unrestricted designation because it does not contain any qualifying language. The statute simply states that an interstate motor carrier "shall designate an agent in each State in which it operates . . . on whom process issued by a court with subject matter jurisdiction may be served in an action brought against that carrier . . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 10330(b) (emphasis added). The statute contains no language limiting "action" to those actions arising within the state. See Ocepek at 559. Further, the court found that a limiting designation would be "inconsistent with the broad remedial purpose of the Act." Id. at 559 ("The obvious purpose of the federal statute is to eliminate potential jurisdictional problems and to provide injured parties with reasonably easy access to the courts, having in mind that the injured party is frequently a resident of some state other than that in which the accident occurred."). See also Scott v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 5 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ohio 1945) (Motor Carrier Act "is broad enough to authorize service against an interstate carrier in any type of action.")
A number of other courts have similarly interpreted the designation of an agent under the Motor Carrier Act as consent to personal jurisdiction for suits arising outside the state. See, e.g, r., Shapiro v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 155 F.2d 135, 136 (6th Cir. 1946) (Kentucky defendant consented to Ohio suit filed by Illinois resident for accident in Georgia); Rounds, 947 F. Supp. at 83-84 (personal jurisdiction exists when defendant designated agent for service of process under Motor Carrier Act even though jurisdiction would not be established under due process analysis); Wynne v. Queen City Coach Co., 49 F. Supp. 103, 104 (D.N.J. 1943) (designation of agent under Motor Carrier Act is consent to be sued in each state in which designation is filed); McKamey v. A.R. Gamez, 744 A.2d 529, 532 (Del.Super.Ct. 1999) (designation of agent to accept service of process under Motor Carrier Act was express consent to personal jurisdiction when defendant was engaged in interstate commerce).
Plaintiff argues that this Court should adopt the holding of these cases and find that the Court has jurisdiction over Swift Transportation Co., Inc. based on consent. The Court finds plaintiff's argument contrary to Fifth Circuit precedent.
The Fifth circuit has already rejected the contention that designation of an agent pursuant to a state statute manifests consent to personal jurisdiction. In Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., the Fifth Circuit found that a non-resident defendant's registration of an agent pursuant to a state statute did not constitute consent to suit over claims that did not arise within the state. 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080, 113.S.Ct. 1047 (1993) ("[T]he mere act of registering an agent . . . does not act as consent to be hauled into Texas courts on any dispute with any party anywhere concerning any matter.").
In Wenche Siemer, the Fifth Circuit considered article 8.10 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.10(A). The statute requires foreign corporations authorized to do business in the state to appoint agents for service of process. The Fifth Circuit held that regardless of the existence of an agent for service of process, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must nevertheless comport with the principles of due process. Id. at 183 ("[T] he appointment of an agent for process has not been a waiver of its right to due process protection.").
The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 5. Ct. 413 (1952). In Perkins, the Court held that regardless of the presence of an agent for service, courts must still determine whether the defendant's actions are continuous and systematic enough to subject a corporation to personal jurisdiction, when the cause of action occurs outside the state. 342 U.S. at 446, 72 S.Ct. at 419 (1952). The Supreme Court wrote, "The corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful but not a conclusive test." Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that presence of an agent within a state alone did not automatically satisfy the requirements of due process. Id.
In accordance with Perkins, the Fifth Circuit rejected the contentions that non-resident defendants either automatically consented to suit or waived their right to due process by designating an agent for process. Instead, the Fifth Circuit applied a minimum contacts analysis to determine whether the nonresident defendant's contacts were extensive enough to subject it to suit. See Wenche Siemer, at 183. See also Ratcliff v. Cooper Laboratories. Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948, 92 S.Ct. 271 (1971) (finding that appointment of an agent for service pursuant to a state statute "is of no special weight" in determining whether defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction); Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882, 888-889 (S.D. Tx. 1993) (adopting the holding in Wenche Siemer).
In light of the contrary authority in Perkins and Wenche Siemer, the Court declines to apply the principles of Ocepek to this case. The Court is not persuaded that the Fifth Circuit would depart from Wench Siemer based on the distinction between designating an agent for service of process under the Motor Carrier Act and designating one under a state statute. While Congress certainly has a strong interest in providing a forum to United States citizens who have been injured by interstate motor carriers, states have an equally strong interest in providing a forum to their citizens who have been injured by the actions of a foreign corporation. Further, the Court's conclusion that the Fifth Circuit would not follow Ocepek is fortified by the fact that Ocepek relied heavily on the rationale of the Eighth Circuit's earlier decision in Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990). In that case, the Eight Circuit held that a corporation consented to suit on out-of-state torts by virtue of having designated an agent under a state statute equivalent to the one involved in Wenche Siemer. See Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1200. Since the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the principle adopted in Knowlton, this Court believes that the Fifth Circuit would likewise reject the extension of this principle reflected in Ocepek. Therefore, the Court rejects plaintiff's contention that Swift consented to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana for suits arising outside Louisiana when it designated an agent for service of process pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants Swift and the Estate of Delbert Bissell's motion to dismiss is granted, and the Court dismisses plaintiff's claims against them without prejudice.
Since the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Swift defendants, it does not reach the forum non conveniens question.