Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Gainsley on the two fifth amendment claims. Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978) (where reasonable minds can reach only one result causation is a question of law). II
As for the first argument, it is not fatal to Herrmann's case that she does not know why she fell. See Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. 1978) (jury "was free to [infer] from the circumstantial evidence . . . that [a] portable rack was the cause of the [plaintiff's] injury" even though plaintiff was unsure what caused her fall); see also Scheerer v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 16 F.3d 272, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Missouri law) (genuine issue on causation despite fact that plaintiff did not know what caused her to slip and fall); Ganoe v. Koch Refining Co., 106 F.3d 405, 1997 WL 34416, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 30, 1997) (unpublished) (applying Minnesota law) (following Scheerer). The issue is not Herrmann's knowledge, but rather whether she has proffered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she fell because of the height difference in the service staircase's top step. See Evans v. Mathis Funeral Home, Inc., 996 F.2d 266, 269 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying Georgia law) ("It is not necessary that [the plaintiff] herself know what caused her to fall; rather, she need only establish a causal connec
Causation is generally a question of fact left to the finder of fact that only becomes a question of law "where different minds can reasonably arrive at only one result." Lyons v. Scnei, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978). The question whether Fidelity's actions required Hughes to litigate some or all issues in this property dispute is a question not significantly different in kind from the question whether an attorney's negligence "would have made a difference" in an attorney malpractice claim.
However, if reasonable minds cannot disagree, proximate cause becomes a question of law. See Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978). We believe reasonable minds cannot disagree that the amendment of the statute to create a whole new cause of action was a superseding cause of Wartnick's damages, and therefore Gainsley's fifth amendment advice, if originally negligent, was not the proximate cause of Wartnick's damages.
"Proximate cause is a question of fact which normally must be left to the jury, and causation becomes a question of law only where different minds can reasonably arrive at only one result." Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978). Mere speculation and general assertions, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.
This is not to say that we feel the trial court was incorrect in describing the chain of events as "unforeseeable," or that the trial court necessarily was incorrect in granting summary judgment on that basis. If reasonable minds could not arrive at differing results concerning proximate causation, the court may decide the issue itself as a matter of law. Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978); Lennon, 411 N.W.2d at 228 (Minn.App. 1987); Maanum v. Aust, 364 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn.App. 1985) pet. for review denied (Minn. June 14, 1985).
May 20, 1987). Under circumstances where different minds can reasonably arrive at only one result, however, causation becomes a question of law. Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978). Summary judgment is proper in a legal malpractice action where the facts are undisputed and appellants fail to establish a prima facie case.