Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:99-CV-320-C
May 29, 2002
ORDER
On this date the Court contemporaneously considered (1) Jerome Lyons' ("Plaintiff") Rule 54 Motion for and Brief in Support of Judgment, Costs, and Attorney's [sic] Fees filed on February 26, 2002; (2) Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion filed February 27, 2002; and (3) Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion and Brief in Support Thereof filed February 27, 2002. Pandy Aleman ("Defendant") filed Defendant's Response and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 54 Motion in Support of Judgment, Costs, and Attorney's [sic] Fees on March 6, 2002. Plaintiffs Reply and Brief to Defendant's Response and Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 54 Motion in Support of Judgment, Costs, and Attorney's [sic] Fees was filed on March 14, 2002.
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion and Brief in Support Thereof was filed on March 6, 2002, and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion and Brief in Support Thereof was filed on March 20, 2002.
After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, this Court GRANTS, to the extent more fully set forth below, Plaintiffs Rule 54 Motion for and Brief in Support of Judgment, Costs, and Attorney's [sic] Fees; GRANTS, to the extent more fully set forth below, Plaintiffs Supplemental Motion; and DENIES as moot Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion and Brief in Support Thereof.
DISCUSSION
On February 19, 2002, the jury rendered its verdict in this prisoner civil rights case in favor of Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, and against Defendant, a Lamb County jailer. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was the "prevailing party" against Defendant. Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff seeks judgment on the jury verdict of $87,500 for past physical pain and mental anguish and $200,000 for future mental anguish. Plaintiff also seeks taxable and nontaxable costs and expenses, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and attorneys' fees incurred through trial. In addition, Plaintiff seeks post-trial attorneys' fees, through appeal to the United States Supreme Court, in the approximate amount of $65,000.
Attorneys' Fees The "Lodestar Method"
The Fifth Circuit uses the "lodestar method" to calculate attorneys' fees and requires that the district court examine the following factors:
(1) the time and labor required for the litigation;
(2) the novelty and complication of the issues;
(3) the skill required to properly litigate the issues;
(4) whether the attorney had to refuse other work to litigate the case;
(5) the attorney's customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) whether the client or case circumstances imposed any time constraints;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) whether the case was `undesirable';
(11) the type of attorney/client relationship and whether that relationship was longstanding; and
(12) awards made in similar cases.
Riley v. City of Jackson, Miss., 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing factors set out in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
With regard to attorney's fees, "[t]he fee applicant bears the burden of proving that the number of hours and the hourly rate for which compensation is requested is reasonable." Id. The "district court's Johnson analysis . . . need not be meticulously detailed to survive appellate review, but it must articulate and clearly apply the Johnson criteria." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The district court should explain its analysis of the Johnson factors with a reasonable degree of specificity in making its fee award determination. Id.
In determining reasonable hourly rates, a district court must consider the attorney's regular rates followed by a comparison to the prevailing community rates. La. Power Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1995). "When the requested rate of compensation exceeds the attorney's usual charge but remains within the customary range in the community, the district court should consider whether the requested rate is reasonable." Id.
The district court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward depending on its analysis of the Johnson factors. Id. In making its Johnson analysis, the "trial courts have been instructed to utilize their own knowledge relating to various aspects of the lodestar. The trial judge should weigh the hours claimed against his . . . knowledge, experience and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities." Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
In addition, "a district court may reduce the number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or incomplete." La. Power Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324 (emphasis in original). An applicant's hours may be reduced for "vague entries such as `legal research,' `trial preparation,' and `met with client.'" Id. at 326. The Fifth Circuit acknowledges, however, that caselaw has not precisely defined the appropriate standard for vague or incomplete and, accordingly, "gives the district court sufficient leeway within which to accept or reject fee applications." Id. (emphasis in original). Furthermore, "[a] reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole." Id. at 330.
Plaintiff's Attorney Derrel Luce Attorney's Fees Through Trial
In his Affidavit to this Court, Plaintiffs attorney Derrel Luce ("Luce") stated that he is an AV rated attorney, board certified in personal injury, with approximately twenty-two years' experience. Although his law practice is primarily conducted on a contingency fee basis, Luce stated that he attempted to keep accurate and contemporaneous time records in this matter, but at no time were charges made for ordinary expenses such as paper, copying, ordinary postage, toll calls, or paralegal or legal assistant time.
Luce stated that the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in this case were above average and also noted that the lawsuit necessitated an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit on qualified immunity issues. Because of the lengthy history of this case and Luce's commitment of time and firm resources, Luce asserted that other potentially lucrative employment was turned down. Moreover, Luce contends that substantial pretrial out-of-pocket cash outlays were made, the repayment of which, and attorney's fees in general, were wholly contingent on Plaintiffs success in what is typically considered an "undesirable" cause of action.
Luce asserts that he spent 589.85 hours on this case through trial and requests an hourly rate of $250. Luce set his $250/hour rate based on the "Salary Billing Survey Hourly Billing Rates" for Austin, San Antonio, Dallas, Houston, and "other" cities. The survey's average equity partner hourly rate, including the major metropolitan cities listed above, was $249.90. However, the average hourly rate for equity and non-equity partners in "other" cities ranged from $188/hour to $200/hour, respectively.
Defendant argues that Luce's hourly rate is too high and offers this Court's previous awards of attorneys' fees in the recent judgments entered in the unpublished orders of Lazdowski v. Henderson, Civil File No. 5:00-CV-136-C, judgment entered January 9, 2002, and Gerard v. Brinker International Payroll Corp., Civil File No. 5:00-CV-428-C, judgment entered February 5, 2002, as support for Defendant's position. In Lazdowski, Defendant notes that local Lubbock attorney Donald E. Cummings was awarded $150/hour, and in Gerard, local Lubbock attorney Craig Johnston was awarded $100/hour. Defendant notes that Mr. Cummings has been licensed for over thirty-five years and Mr. Johnston has been licensed for approximately nine years. Defendant urges this Court to reduce Luce's hourly rate to $150/hour. In response, Luce points out that neither Mr. Cummings nor Mr. Johnston is AV rated or board certified
Defendant also argues that the total number of Luce's hours should be reduced because Luce's time records do not provide sufficient detail for this Court to determine whether such hours were actually and reasonably expended. Defendant argues that 199.19 hours should be deducted from the lodestar calculation because Luce's billing statements include such entries as "trial preparation," "preparation of brief," "preparation for mediation," "investigation and preparation of Amended Complaint," and "research and prepare for deposition." Defendant also argues that Luce should not be awarded speculative, future appellate fees.
In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs attorneys are "double dipping" by duplicating work efforts and dual billing entries. Defendant argues that each of Plaintiff's attorney's billed hours should be reduced by an additional ten percent. However, Defendant cites no caselaw to support this position. Nevertheless, this Court notes that the Fifth Circuit has concluded that
the use of a number of attorneys frequently results in some duplication of effort, and a district court may take this factor into account by deducting some small percentage of the total hours. It is impermissible, however, to eliminate wholesale the services of attorneys without identifying the particular services which are regarded as duplicative.Tasby v. Estes, 651 F.2d 287, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1981). "Obviously, where duplication of effort is found by the court to be not small, the court is not limited to making a small percentage reduction." Id. at 290.
This Court is persuaded that retaining multiple attorneys in a significant, lengthy, and complex case such as this is understandable and not a ground for reducing the hours claimed. See generally Tasby, 651 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981); Ward v. Kelly, 515 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1975). A reduction is warranted only if the attorneys are unreasonably doing the same work. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717. An award for time spent by two or more attorneys is proper as long as it reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to the case and the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation. Ward, 515 F.2d at 912 n. 11. This Court is not convinced that Luce and French unreasonably duplicated any services rendered on Plaintiffs behalf.
Lastly, Defendant argues that this Court must reduce by three-fourths the amount of Luce's and co-counsel's fees and expenses accumulated for all work performed prior to October 2, 2001. Defendant contends this is necessary in order to account for the fact that there were initially four defendants to this action, three of whom, for various reasons, were ultimately dismissed. However, Defendant offers no caselaw to support this position.
"[W]hen claims against multiple parties share a `common core of facts' or `related legal theories,' a fee applicant may claim all hours reasonably necessary to litigate those issues." Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 327. See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983). If a plaintiff is required to prove the same facts and issues against several parties to recover against any one party, the applicant is entitled to claim the hours it spent litigating against the other defendantsKellstrom, 50 F.3d at 327.
There can be no question but that a common core of facts and related legal theories against all defendants were presented by Plaintiff in this action. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a three-fourths reduction in time spent litigating against the subsequently dismissed defendants is inappropriate.
In determining the reasonable number of hours and hourly rate for Luce, this Court considered each of the Johnson factors vis-a-vis Luce's supporting Affidavit and the Court's own knowledge and experience with regard to prisoner civil rights cases and qualified immunity issues. Although this Court's consideration was not limited to the following, the Court specifically notes that the complexity of the issues in this case required significant time, labor, and skill and that the lengthy history of this action undoubtedly imposed time, resource, and fee income constraints on Plaintiffs attorneys involved. In addition, this Court agrees that this type of case is typically considered undesirable.
First, after conducting a line-by-line review of Luce's Exhibit 3, "Attorney Derrel Luce's Time," this Court conclude:; that a total of 584.1 hours were reasonably expended by Luce in this matter. However, of those 584.1 hours, this Court finds that 136.5 hours were vague and incomplete, and this Court reduces said 136.5 hours by twenty percent As a result, (584.1 — 136.5) + (136.5 x .80), this Court finds that 556.8 hours were reasonably expended by Luce in this matter.
Second, in determining Luce's reasonable hourly rate, this Court considered the arguments and evidence presented by the parties and the Court's own knowledge and experience as to the prevailing community hourly rate in Lubbock and the surrounding areas. This Court finds that Luce's salary survey is not representative of the fee standards for attorneys in the Lubbock area. This Court is persuaded that the prevailing community hourly rate for Luce's peers in the Lubbock area is $150/hour.
Finally, by multiplying the reasonable number of hours by the reasonable hourly rate, 556.8 hours x $150/hour, this Court finds that Luce is entitled to $83,520 as and for reasonable attorney's fees in this matter.
Appellate Attorney's Fees
Awards of reasonable attorney's fees for appellate work are permitted for the prevailing party. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756 (1980). Attorney's fees for successful appellate efforts are permitted but certainly not in advance of such services being rendered and before a judicial determination that plaintiffs are the prevailing parties on appeal and that the fees they incurred were reasonable. Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234, 238 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1990). Additionally, in Heasley, the Fifth Circuit stated that they "have the power to make an award for services rendered in this court; and we elect to do so here in order to bring this long-pending dispute to a close"Heasley, 967 F.2d at 125. This Court agrees that an award of attorney's fees in advance of appellate work performed is inappropriate. Therefore, this Court declines to award any appellate attorney's fees to Luce.
Plaintiffs Attorney Angela French Attorney's Fees Through Trial
In her Affidavit to this Court filed February 27, 2002, Plaintiffs co-counsel Angela L. French ("French") stated that she has been a licensed Texas attorney since September 1996. French stated that her regular fee is $150/hour and that she attempted to keep contemporaneous time records; but French asserted that she did not bill for incidental tasks such as scheduling and telephone calls. French represented to the Court that her time and expense records were true and accurate.
In her Amended Affidavit to this Court filed March 14, 2002, French stated that she has been a licensed Texas attorney since November 1996. French reiterated that $150/hour is her regular hourly fee. French also stated that the time and billing records submitted by her to this Court reflected which time was kept contemporaneously and which time was reconstructed from a review of the file. This Court, however, was unable to discern what method French used to differentiate between time contemporaneously kept and time which had been reconstructed after-the-fact, unless this Court assumes from French's records that the only time which French kept contemporaneously was that time which included "travel." Finally, French's Amended Affidavit inexplicably omitted her previous Affidavits representation to the Court that her time and expense records were true and accurate.
French asserts that she spent 525.5 hours on this case through trial and requests an hourly rate of $150.
Defendant argues that French's hourly rate is too high and that French's hours are duplicative of work performed by Luce. Defendant also argues that many entries on French's billing statement do not provide sufficient detail for this Court to determine whether such hours were actually and reasonably expended. Further, Defendant argues that French's billing records contain numerous, blatant misrepresentations to this Court and, therefore, French's requested attorney's fees should be denied entirely or significantly reduced. Defendant also contends that French's fees, if any, should be reduced by three-fourths to reflect the dismissal of three of the four original defendants in this action.
This Court agrees that French's billing records contain a number of wholly incredible claims for hours impossibly expended in furtherance of this action. This Court is of the opinion that the obvious errors in connection with French's billing records, whether purposeful or inadvertent, cast doubt on the reasonableness of the remaining hours claimed by French in connection with this litigation. Although French states that she attempted to keep contemporaneous billing statements, this Court concludes that these blatant mistakes suggest otherwise.
In determining the reasonable number of hours and hourly rate for French, this Court considered each of the Johnson factors vis-a-vis French's supporting documentation and the Court's own knowledge and experience with regard to prisoner civil rights cases and qualified immunity issues. Although the Court's consideration was not limited to the following, the Court specifically notes that the complexity of the issues required significant time and labor and that the lengthy history of this action imposed time, resource, and fee income constraints on French Additionally, this Court agrees that this type of case is typically considered undesirable.
First, after conducting a line-by-line review of Exhibit 2, "Attorney Angela French's Time," this Court concludes that a total of 416.75 hours were reasonably expended by French in this matter. However, of those 416.75 hours, this Court finds that 139.0 hours were vague and incomplete and, given the numerous discrepancies this Court found in French's billing records, this Court reduces said 139.0 hours by fifty percent. As a result, (416.75-139.0) + (139.0 x .5), this Court finds that 347.25 hours were reasonably expended by French in this matter.
Second, in determining French's reasonable hourly rate, this Court considered the arguments and evidence presented by the parties and the Court's own knowledge and experience as to the prevailing community hourly rate in Lubbock and the surrounding areas. This Court finds that the prevailing community hourly rate for French's peers in the Lubbock area is $90/hour.
Third, by multiplying the reasonable number of hours by the reasonable hourly rate, 347.25 x $90/hour, this Court finds that French is entitled to $31,250 as and for reasonable attorney's fees in this matter.
Finally, consistent with this Court's discussion supra, this Court is not convinced that French and Luce unreasonably duplicated any services rendered on Plaintiffs behalf and further concludes that a three-fourths reduction in time spent litigating against the subsequently dismissed defendants is inappropriate.
Appellate Attorney's Fees
Consistent with this Court's discussion supra, this Court declines to award any appellate attorney's fees to French.
COSTS
Plaintiff's Bill of Costs
"[C]osts other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). Those items allowed as taxable expenses are listed by statute as follows:
§ 1920. Taxation of costs
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree.28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994).
A court may decline to award the costs listed in [§ 1920] but may not award costs omitted from the list. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S 437, 442 (1987). Plaintiff seeks $3,258.62 in taxable costs, and Defendant makes no objection. This Court finds that each of the items requested by Plaintiff's Bill of Costs is sufficiently described by Plaintiff as being taxable items specifically set forth in § 1920 and, therefore, Plaintiff as prevailing party in this action, is entitled to recover $3,258.62 in taxable costs.
Nontaxable Costs and Expenses Plaintiffs Attorney Luce
"Attorney Derrel Luce's Non-Taxable Costs and Expenses" seeks reimbursement of miscellaneous out-of-pocket costs and expenses in the amount of $17,924.25. Defendant argues that Luce is seeking reimbursement for many expenses more akin to unrecoverable overhead and asks that Luce's office supplies, electronic legal research, and postage costs be disallowed.
In civil rights cases such as this action, the costs associated with litigation are generally recoverable if they are "reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services, such as postage, photocopying, paralegal services, long distance telephone charges, and travel costs." Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). "Whether these expenses are reasonable is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Associated Builders Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Parish Sch., 919 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1990).
Further, "computer research is merely a substitute for an attorney's time that is compensable under an application for attorneys fees." Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Mkts., No. 97-2757, 2002 U.S Dist. LEXIS 6768, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2002) (citing United States v. Merritt Meridian Constr. Corp., 95 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that costs of reasonable computerized legal research are recoverable as reasonable out-of-pocket expenses). See also Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that computer research costs "are indeed to be considered attorney's fees"); Johnson v. Univ. Coll. of the Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "all reasonable [computer research] expenses incurred in case preparation, during the course of litigation, or as an aspect of settlement of the case may be taxed as costs").
This Court conducted a line-by-line review of Luce's nontaxable costs and expenses and concludes that Luce is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $14,849.35. This Court disallowed Luce's charges for "mediation," "supplies," "VHS copying," and "deposition copies."
First, Fifth Circuit caselaw indicates that the costs of mediation are not reasonable out-of-pocket expenses which should be awarded to the prevailing party. See Mota, 261 F.3d at 530 (concluding "that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the cost of . . . mediation"). Second, the mere listing of "supplies" is insufficient to convince this Court that this expense is not a portion of ordinary overhead. Third, Fifth Circuit caselaw does not allow the cost of videotaped depositions to be taxed against the losing party. See Mota, 261 F.3d at 529 (finding that the court erred in taxing against the [nonprevailing party] the cost of videotaped depositions"). Therefore, because Luce's claimed expense as to "VHS copying lacks sufficient explication to determine whether this expense should be allowed vel non, this Court must disallow this expense. Fourth, as discussed supra, the costs of deposition have been awarded as taxable costs. Luce offers no explanation as to the necessity or use of the claimed "deposition copies." This Court cannot determine whether these costs are duplications of previously awarded expenses or whether these deposition copies were obtained by Luce merely for counsel's convenience. Because no explanation is included in Luce's billing record as to the necessity or use of the "deposition copies," and because additional charges incurred merely for the convenience of one party's counsel should not be taxed to the other," Auto Wax Co., Inc. v. Mark V Prods., Inc., No. 3:99-CV-0982-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2944, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2002), this Court disallows Luce's "deposition copies" claims.
Plaintiffs Attorney French
"Attorney Angela L. French's Non-Taxable Costs and Expenses" seeks reimbursement of miscellaneous out-of-pocket costs and expenses in the amount of $9,609.44. Defendant argues that French is seeking reimbursement for many expenses more akin to unrecoverable overhead and items which do not fall within the course of providing legal services.
This Court conducted a line-by-line review of French's nontaxable costs and expenses and concludes that French is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $8,591.30. Consistent with the Court's discussion supra, this Court disallowed French's charges related to mediation, supplies, and deposition copies. This Court also disallowed, as unreasonably charged against Defendant, Plaintiffs clothing for trial and certain charges for Plaintiffs pretrial meals. Finally, this Court disallowed French's claims in connection with Edward Rowton's capital murder trial. Although this Court recognizes the interrelation of Edward Rowton to Plaintiff's case, the Court finds that French is not entitled to charge against Defendant fees and expenses incurred in connection with a wholly separate and individual cause of action.
INTEREST
Prejudgment Interest
The award of prejudgment interest is "within the Court's sound discretion" Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 1990). An award of prejudgment interest reflects an appropriate exercise of the district court's authority to fashion relief which makes whole the injured party. Id. However, "an award of prejudgment interest was at least partially improper as a portion of the compensatory award involved intangible losses." Id. (citing Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 573 (1st Cir. 1985)).
Here, the greatest percentage of Plaintiffs damages were awarded for mental anguish, with the lion's share aimed at compensating future mental anguish. "One would normally expect any of an amount awarded that is aimed at compensating for future . . . emotional loss to be included in the lump sum award itself without additional interest." Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 573. An award of prejudgment interest on future damages would be erroneous. Breaux v. City of Garland, No. 3:94-CV-2291-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18663, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1997).
This Court is of the opinion that an award of prejudgment interest is not necessary to compensate Plaintiff fully. Therefore, this Court, in its discretion, finds that an award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate in this case.
Postjudgment Interest
Awards of postjudgment interest are governed by federal law as follows:
18 § 1961. Interest
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court. Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry ofjudgment, at a rate equal to the coupon yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment.28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1994).
Pursuant to § 1961, this Court finds that interest shall accrue on the judgment entered herein at the legal rate until paid.
CONCLUSION
After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Rule 54 Motion for and Brief in Support of Judgment, Costs, and Attorney's [sic] Fees to the extent more fully set forth below:
1. that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendant on the jury verdict in the amount of $87,500 for past physical pain and mental anguish;
2. that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendant on the jury verdict in the amount of $200,000 for future mental anguish;
3. that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendant in the amount of $83,520 as and for Luce's reasonable attorney's fees, plus $14,849.35 as and for Luce's reasonable nontaxable costs;
4. that Plaintiff have judgment against Defendant in the amount of $31,250 as and for French's reasonable attorney's fees, plus $8,591.30 as and for French's reasonable nontaxable costs;
5. that Plaintiff take nothing as and for appellate fees;
6. that Plaintiff take nothing as and for prejudgment interest;
7. that Plaintiffs judgment entered herein shall bear interest at the legal rate until paid; and
8. that Plaintiffs taxable costs in the amount of $3,258.62 be taxed against Defendant.
Based on the Court's foregoing grant of Plaintiffs Rule 54 motion vis-a-vis the Court's contemporaneous consideration of Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion and Brief in Support Thereof filed February 27, 2002, this Court DENIES as moot Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion and Brief in Support Thereof. Judgment shall be entered in accordance with this order.