.Lyons Twp. ex rel. Kielczynski v. Vill. of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 11, 84 N.E.3d 1118, 1122. Because the IFCA "closely mirrors" the FCA, Illinois courts have looked to federal case law when analyzing the public disclosure bar.

There is no doubt that a private relator can bring a False Claims Act suit to recover damages on behalf of a local entity like the defendant that is included in that definition. See Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park , 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 14, 416 Ill.Dec. 641, 84 N.E.3d 1118. The question in this case is whether the broad definition of the "State" means that an entity such as the defendant cannot be a "person" subject to liability under the False Claims Act in cases where it is alleged to have made fraudulent claims against another entity that is also included in that definition.

¶ 13 In order to determine whether the "public disclosure bar" applies to a particular complaint, the court is to conduct a multi-step analysis. Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 11, 84 N.E.3d 1118, lays out a four-part inquiry to avoid dismissal under a qui tam action: "(1) whether the alleged 'public disclosure' contains allegations or transactions from one of the listed sources of section 4(e)(4)(A) of the [False Claims] Act [citation]; (2) whether the alleged disclosure was made 'public' within the meaning of the [False Claims] Act; (3) whether the relator's complaint is 'based upon' the 'public disclosure'; and (4) if the answer is positive for the

¶ 35 In resolving whether "contemporaneous" modifies "offer," we find Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, instructive. There, the appellate court construed section 2-106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 2014)), which stated:" '[A] local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by an oral promise or misrepresentation of its employee, whether or not such promise or misrepresentation is negligent or intentional.'

" 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4)(A) (West 2014).See also Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park , 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 11, 416 Ill.Dec. 641, 84 N.E.3d 1118. ¶ 31 The public disclosure bar is intended to preclude a relator's action when the alleged fraud was publicly disclosed in a listed source, unless the relator was an original source of certain information underlying the action.

Accordingly, based on common grammar principles and our prior conclusion that the legislature intended to allow a home rule unit to tax a broad category of nicotine products, the words "a tax" as employed in the context of section 8-11-6a(2) refers not to a specific tax, but to a tax generally on either cigarettes or tobacco products or both. See Warner v. King , 267 Ill. 82, 87, 107 N.E. 837 (1915) (the grammatical construction of a statute is one mode of interpretation and "[s]tatutes * * * are to be read and understood primarily according to their grammatical sense, unless it is apparent from a perusal of the context of the whole statute that the Legislature did not express its intention"); see also People v. Cherry Valley Public Library District , 356 Ill. App. 3d 893, 896-97, 293 Ill.Dec. 438, 828 N.E.2d 748 (2005) (interpreting a statute based on the grammar of the statute itself); Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park , 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 26, 416 Ill.Dec. 641, 84 N.E.3d 1118 (employing the "commonly understood principles of grammar and usage" to interpret a statute). Reading section 8-11-6a(2) in its entirety, it follows that the legislature intended for a home rule municipality to be able to tax cigarettes or tobacco products so long as the home rule municipality had "a tax " in place on either "cigarettes or tobacco products" prior to July 1, 1993.

Illinois courts have repeatedly held that an initial modifier in a series of nouns or phrases modifies each noun or phrase in the series unless an intervening adjective appears in the series. See, e.g., Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 26 (Principles of grammar and usage inform interpreting the adjective "oral" to modify both "promise" and "misrepresentation" in the Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-106, which provides a "local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by an oral promise or misrepresentation of its employee.").

It is true that under the IFCA, "the ‘State’ has the primary responsibility for conducting a qui tam action and maintains the authority to dismiss a case despite a relator's objections," but given the amended definition of "State," "logic dictates that the defrauded government unit retains the decision-making power regarding the fate of a case." Lyons Twp. ex rel. Kielczynski v. Vill. of Indian Head Park , 416 Ill.Dec. 641, 84 N.E.3d 1118, 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). And the Illinois Supreme Court's emphasis in previous cases on the "Attorney General's constitutional role as the chief legal officer of the state" and the statute's provision providing that the Attorney General "in all circumstances effectively maintains control over the litigation" was not to settle a power struggle between the City's corporation counsel and the Attorney General over responsibility for false claims litigation, but to support its conclusion that the IFCA's qui tam provision does not usurp the Attorney General's exclusive authority to represent the state in litigation.

Merriam-Webster defines "medical" as "of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or the practice of medicine" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medical (last visited Aug. 21, 2024) [https://perma.cc/3DH5-W6K2]). "Given the commonly understood principles of grammar and usage," the adjective "medical" would modify both nouns that follow it: "care" and "treatment." Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 26. Thus, a "patient" is someone who is presently awaiting or receiving care and treatment from a medical professional.

Lean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 97 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the language of section 2-107 "is a clear statement of absolute immunity for public entities for the provision of information that results in an injury"); Thompson v. Board of Education Township High School District 113, 2016 IL App (2d) 150226-U, ¶¶ 45-49 (the immunity for provision of information granted by section 2-107 is "not subject to common law exceptions" and matters within the scope of this provision "are absolutely immune from challenge in the courts"; affirming the dismissal of claims for unauthorized release of information, public disclosure of private facts, and the disclosure or re-disclosure of confidential communications); cf. Wright-Young v. Chicago State University, 2019 IL App (1st) 181073, ¶ 73 (portions of the Act immunizing the "provision of information" did not immunize the failure to provide information); Lyons Township ex rel. Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 29 (section 2-107 did not bar qui tam suit regarding village's submission of false time sheets and tickets to township). Neither Doe-3 nor Thompson is precedential.