Opinion
Civ. No. 3:99-CV-760-H.
March 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case may be concluded by the proper application of the statute of limitations to Plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The key issue turns out to be whether the statute is tolled during the pendency of an administrative complaint filed with the state Cabinet for Families and Children. For the reasons set forth in the opinion, the Court concludes that the filing of an administration complaint does not toll the statute.
I.
On December 9, 1997, Julia Lyon, fifteen-year-old daughter of Plaintiffs John and Rebecca Lyon, told school authorities at North Hardin High School that her father had sexually abused her. The school contacted the Kentucky Cabinet for Families and Children (the "CFC"), and an investigation began immediately. Defendant Lisa Skaggs, an intake worker for the CFC, and Defendant Steven D. Witte, an officer of Defendant Radcliff Police Department, visited Julia at school. During that interview, Julia described the circumstances and duration of her sexual abuse.
Later that day, Skaggs, Witte, and another officer interviewed Plaintiffs regarding Julia's report of abuse, and Julia was moved to her grandmother's home. On December 11, 1997, after further school reports that Julia's family were pressuring her to disclaim her allegations, Skaggs and Witte obtained a custody order removing Julia from Plaintiffs' custody. At that time, Julia reaffirmed her allegations. On December 12, 1997, Skaggs concluded her portion of the investigation, and the case was assigned to Defendant Lisa Forrest, an ongoing worker for the CFC. On December 15, 1997, the Hardin County District Court barred contact between Julia and her family, and placed Julia in temporary foster care. Plaintiff John Lyon was arrested for sexual abuse in the first degree, and Plaintiff Rebecca Lyon was arrested for harassment.
On March 23, 1998, the Hardin County District Court held a trial on the CFC's petition of child sexual abuse, and the charges against Plaintiffs were dismissed. That same day, Plaintiffs filed a service complaint with the CFC, presumably pursuant to 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:320 § 3 (2000). Hearings on the service complaint were held October 5 and 9, 1998, and a final order was entered November 11, 1998. The outcome or relief afforded by that final order is unknown to the Court.
When called to testify, Julia recanted her prior allegations of abuse.
Although Plaintiffs may have filed their service complaint pursuant to 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:320 § 3, nothing in those regulations, the statutes governing the CFC, or case law interpreting regulations and statutes mandates that the subjects of a child abuse investigation must resort to those procedures before filing a court action. Plaintiff's claim was about their treatment by the CFC, not about a request for services. As to Plaintiffs, the procedures seem completely voluntary. Furthermore, the hearing officer had no authority to award compensatory or punitive damages (which is the only relief requested in this complaint), so it is unclear what desired relief, if any, was even available to Plaintiffs. Unlike a service complaint for "denial, suspension, reduction, discrimination, exclusion or termination of services," id. at preamble, Plaintiffs' service complaint did not admit of any remedial action. They merely disliked the way the CFC handled their daughter's accusations of abuse.
On November 12, 1999, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, which alleges violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, through the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998), and the Kentucky tort of outrageous conduct. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to investigate Julia's history of emotional disorder; that they failed to compare Julia's various descriptions of the abuse, which allegedly varied in some degree and detail; that they took no heed of Julia's efforts to recant her allegations; and that they failed to inform Plaintiffs of an illness suffered by Julia while she was in foster care in a timely manner. Defendants Skaggs and Forrest moved to dismiss the claims against them on many grounds, including the statute of limitations, absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity. Because of the disposition of the statute of limitations, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the other issues.
II.
Time-barring under § 1983 is a melange of state and federal laws. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from the general or residual statute for personal injury actions of the relevant state. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1998); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79 (1985). In Kentucky, the applicable statute is the one-year limitation on general personal injury actions. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann . § 413.140(1)(a) (Michie 1992); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1990). The only question in this case is whether Plaintiffs filed their complaint within the one-year period. Defendants argue that the limitations period began to run March 23, 1998, at the latest — the date when all charges were dropped and Julia returned to her parents. Plaintiffs contend that the statute must be tolled during the pendency of their service complaint, so it could not begin to run until November 11, 1998.
Although the actual statute is borrowed from state law, "federal law determines the accrual of civil rights claims." Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996) ( citing Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Under federal law as developed in this Circuit, the statute of limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her injury has occurred. Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991).Id. Clearly, the alleged injuries to Plaintiffs ceased March 23, 1998, if not earlier. On that date, Plaintiffs had complete knowledge of the injuries they now allege, as evidenced by their immediate filing of a service complaint upon the conclusion of the state criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the accrual of the § 1983 claim could not be affected by either the need to exhaust administrative remedies or the voluntary election to pursue a service complaint. The Supreme Court has specifically held that "exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983." Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Therefore, absent any applicable tolling provision, the one-year limitation period would have ended March 23, 1999.
Although accrual of § 1983 claims is a federal law question, their tolling is a state law question. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 ("the length of the limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application, are to be governed by state law") (footnote omitted); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). Plaintiffs do not cite — nor does the Court find — support for their contention that participation in a voluntary service complaint procedure tolls the running of the state limitations period. Instead, they cite a recent Kentucky Court of Appeals case for the proposition that "an aggrieved party must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review." Spainhoward v. Henderson, Henderson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 7 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Ky.Ct.App. 1999). Even if this legal principle were generally applicable to all civil actions in Kentucky, it would not carry the day for Plaintiffs. Spainhoward has nothing to do with tolling; instead, it addressed the required amount of exhaustion before resort to judicial process. Its holds that, in Kentucky, a plaintiff's cause of action does not accrue until the appropriate administrative remedies are exhausted and the harm inflicted is final. But the Court has already found that accrual of a
The Spainhoward case concerned the finality of a decision by a Board of Zoning Adjustment to disallow a certain use for land. See id. at 397. The cases cited in Spainhoward to support its exhaustion requirement are also cases where a state administrative body denied land uses, and the court addressed the necessity of the exhausting state administrative internal review procedures. See Swatzell v. Kentucky, 962 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Ky. 1998); Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 215 S.W.2d 557, 557-59 (Ky. 1948). The facts of those cases are arguably so narrow and specific as to rebut the general applicability of the Spainhoward rule.
§ 1983 claim is a federal question, and one that requires no exhaustion of remedies for the injury to be finally inflicted, so Spainhoward does not control our case.
Even if Plaintiffs' service complaint could toll the limitations period, resort to that procedure was futile. Plaintiffs seek only compensatory and punitive damages, and after March 23, 1998, no other relief was available from the hearing officer. As stated above, see supra note 2, the hearing officer had no authority to grant the relief now sought.
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim accrued on March 23, 1998. Since there is no support for Plaintiffs' claim that participation in the service complaint procedures tolls the running of the limitations period, the Court must find that the complaint filed November 12, 1999, is time-barred.
III.
Because the Court holds that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and because there is no diversity of citizenship among the parties, the remaining state tort claim for outrageous conduct should also be dismissed. Defendants have raised a number of contentious state law issues, including reporters' immunity under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.050(1), which present a compelling reason to leave their resolution to Kentucky's state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1998); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993); Taylor v. First of America Bank — Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir. 1992).
The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
cc: Counsel of Record
ORDER
JOHN G. HEYBURN II, JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion is SUSTAINED and, therefore, Count I is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This is a final and appealable order.
This ____ day of March, 2000.
cc: Counsel of Record