However, such generalized and vague statements about "not getting along" with one's cellmate do not give rise to an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner exists. Lynn v. Melton, No 2:15-cv-0003, 2015 WL 403977 at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan 28, 2015)(allegation that prisoner had reported that he and his cellmate were "unable to get along" insufficient to state a claim that cellmate posed an objectively serious risk of harm to prisoner and that officials deliberately disregarded that risk). As in Lynn, notably absent here are any allegations that Johnson's cellmate had actually threatened him with physical harm.

Cf. Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2008) ("a police officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may still be held liable where "(1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring."); Shelton v. Ray, No. 3:10-684, 2011 WL 1100088, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. March 22, 2011); Lynn v. Melton, No. 2:15-CV-3, 2015 WL 403977, at *2-3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2015). In addition, Lowe's vague allegation that Taulbee "obstructed" the investigation is too conclusory to support a constitutional claim, Terry, 604 F.3d at 276, and he can state no constitutional claim arising out of the obstruction of a criminal investigation over which he lacks a property or liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Cf. Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F. 3d 861, 865-68 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution" because "a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.")).