Summary
reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, where the plaintiff had a semiamnesia condition and could not recall the events of the accident; the defendant's testimony was that she felt a "jolt" and turned to see the plaintiff's car leave the ground and strike a post; the court reversed the summary judgment grant after determining that "a jury might logically infer that the accident resulted from an attempt by appellee to leave her lane in preparation for an exit from the expressway," where the defendant testified she was planning to take an exit two exits away
Summary of this case from Miller v. ComeryOpinion
No. 73-92.
July 24, 1973. Rehearing Denied September 10, 1973.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Grady L. Crawford, J.
Carter, Anderson, Anstine, Martin Barnett, Orlando, for appellants.
Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann Jennings and Walter S. Holland, Miami, for appellees.
Before BARKDULL, C.J., and HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
Appellant plaintiff seeks review of an adverse summary judgment against her in an automobile negligence action. We reverse.
The sole testimony in this case regarding the accident in question was that of the appellee defendant, since appellant plaintiff had no recollection of the accident due to a semiamnesia condition. Defendant testified, in deposition, that she was traveling north via I-95 near the 95th Street exit, intending to exit at the 119th Street exit (2 exits away) when she passed appellant's car and felt a jolt. Looking back appellee then saw appellant's car leave the ground and the expressway, thereafter striking a signpost. As previously noted, appellant had no remembrance of the accident and upon this basis alone the trial judge entered final summary judgment in favor of appellee.
We reverse since we are of the opinion that a jury might logically infer that the accident resulted from an attempt by appellee to leave her lane in preparation for an exit from the expressway. Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, we are of the opinion that the trial judge erred in entering final summary judgment in favor of the appellee. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered herein is reversed.
Reversed.