Prior convictions may be proven by the testimony of the defendant at sentencing. Lyner v. State, 398 So.2d 420 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). Thus, appellant's convictions were proven and properly considered by the court for purposes of sentence enhancement pursuant to the Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act.
" See also Peoples v. State, 415 So.2d 1230-31 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Crittenden v. State, 414 So.2d 476, 482 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Miliner v. State, 414 So.2d 133, 135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981), cert. denied, 431 So.2d 582 (Ala. 1983); McGhee v. State, 412 So.2d 327, 328 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Lyner v. State, 398 So.2d 420, 421 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). II
A defendant's admission is a proper method of proving a prior conviction for purposes of the Habitual Felony Offender Act. Burrell v. State, 429 So.2d 636, 640 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Peoples v. State, 415 So.2d 1230 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Crittenden v. State, 414 So.2d 476, 482 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Miliner v. State, 414 So.2d 133, 135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Lyner v. State, 398 So.2d 420 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). See also Donahay v. State, 287 Ala. 716, 718, 255 So.2d 599 (1971).
An accused's testimony that he has been previously convicted of a felony is proper. See Lyner v. State, 398 So.2d 420 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). Where the accused admits the prior convictions at trial, there is no legal requirement for notice.
This court has held that the admission of such prior convictions, by the defendant himself, is a proper method of proving those convictions. Lyner v. State, 398 So.2d 420 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981); Hope v. State, 381 So.2d 676 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980); Palmer v. State, 54 Ala. App. 707, 312 So.2d 399 (1975). The following excerpt from Childers v. Holmes, 207 Ala. 382, 92 So. 615 (1922) has been cited several times by this court:
From the foregoing facts it is clear that the question of appellant's guilt was properly a question for the jury which they resolved. Law v. State, 407 So.2d 572 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Lyner v. State, 398 So.2d 420 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); King v. State, 395 So.2d 489 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). Appellant contends that the prosecutrix, due to a mental defect, was incompetent to testify as a witness in this case.
Section 13A-5-9 has recently been held by this Court to be constitutional, and does not violate the due process, or ex post facto clauses of the constitution. Watson v. State, supra; Johnson v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 398 So.2d 393; Lyner v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 398 So.2d 420; Williams v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 393 So.2d 492; Smith v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 392 So.2d 1273. The third and fourth prejudicial errors argued in appellant's brief are that the trial court refused to charge the jury on the lesser offense of trespass in the third degree, and refused to give written charges numbers 1, 2, 3, and 10 requested by the appellant.