{8} It is a well-established and oft-repeated principle in our judicial system that subject matter jurisdiction is “the power to adjudicate the general questions involved in the claim and is not dependent upon the state of facts which may appear in a particular case, or the ultimate existence of a valid cause of action.” Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 133, 138, 899 P.2d 576, 581 (1995); Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012–NMCA–103, ¶ 12, –––N.M. ––––, 287 P.3d 357 (2012) (defining subject matter jurisdiction as the “power of a court to hear and determine cases”). Our Supreme Court has directed that “[t]he only relevant inquiry in determining whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction is to ask whether the matter before the court falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or statute.”
D.R. HORTON, INC., et al., petitioners, v. Loren LYNDOE, et al.Case below, 287 P.3d 357. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New Mexico denied.
In other words, “New Mexico district courts are courts of general jurisdiction having the power to hear all matters not excepted by the constitution and those matters conferred by law.” Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012–NMCA–103, ¶ 12, 287 P.3d 357; see also Daniels Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Jordan, 1982–NMSC–148, ¶ 8, 99 N.M. 297, 657 P.2d 624 (“[T]he district courts have original jurisdiction over all cases other than those specifically excepted by the New Mexico Constitution and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law....” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {8} Austin Capital falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the district court by Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution because no provision in the New Mexico Constitution specifically excepts it.
The homeowner complaints began to be filed in November 2009 and a large number were eventually made part of a "consolidated arbitration." See Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 287 P.3d 357 (describing the homeowner complaint litigation at issue in the present case). Communications continued between Horton and Berger Briggs, Horton and Vinyard, and Vinyard and Berger Briggs.
The homeowner complaints began to be filed in November 2009 and a large number were eventually made part of a "consolidated arbitration." See Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 287 P.3d 357 (describing the homeowner complaint litigation at issue in the present case). Communications continued between Horton and Berger Briggs, Horton and Vinyard, and Vinyard and Berger Briggs. Beginning in 2012, two individual arbitrators in the homeowner cases determined that Horton did not heed Vinyard's advice. On March 5, 2014, a few months before the first consolidated arbitration hearing, the consolidated arbitrator determined that "certain liability findings" from the prior two arbitrations, including Horton's failure to follow Vinyard's advice, would have preclusive effect-though for future claims, Horton would be permitted to question the relevancy of the specific findings.
The homeowner complaints began to be filed in November 2009 and a large number were eventually made part of a "consolidated arbitration." See Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMC A-103, ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 287 P.3d 357 (describing the homeowner complaint litigation at issue in the present case). Communications continued between Horton and Berger Briggs, Horton and Vinyard, and Vinyard and Berger Briggs.
[MIO 7] Plaintiff has not identified any authority to suggest the arbitrator acted improperly by controlling the manner in which the case progressed. See In re Arbitration Between Town of Silver City &Silver City Police Officers Assoc., 1993-NMSC-037, ¶ 18 (stating rule that partiality cannot be inferred from the enforcement of procedural rules); Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶ 28, 287 P.3d 357 (rejecting the argument that arbitrator erred in exercising "control over the procedural aspects" of an arbitration and concluding that "the arbitrator can reasonably orchestrate the arbitration to streamline the process, avoid duplication of effort, and resolve the individual claims in a consistent manner"); see also § 44-7A-16(a) (acknowledging that "[t]he authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the power to . . . determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence"); Dollens v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015-NMCA-096, ¶ 23, 356 P.3d 531 (acknowledging that granting leave to file a surreply is a matter of discretion). {¶6}Additionally, Plaintiff continues to argue that the arbitrator improperly refused to postpone the hearing.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A., the Court held that "a party may not be compelled under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so." 559 U.S. at 664 (emphasis omitted); Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶ 24, 287 P.3d 357 (same). {22} The State argues that the "nationwide arbitration" concept adopted in American Tobacco Co. is the functional equivalent of class arbitration, that it has not agreed to have the determination of its diligence consolidated with the PMs' disputes with other states, and that Stolt-Nielsen S.A., therefore precludes application of American Tobacco Co.
[MIO 11] Curb South contends that the arbitration proceeding under AAA rules and procedures conflicts with the arbitration provision it entered into with Centex in several ways, and that these differences constitute the type of prejudice that should prevent consolidation of the proceedings. See Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶ 19, 287 P.3d 357 (pointing out that Section 44-7A-11(a)(4) contemplates the existence of conflicting provisions in separate arbitration agreements as one type of prejudice that could override the prejudice caused by non-consolidation). The conflicts Curb South relies on include, primarily, the fact that it will be compelled to participate in an AAA arbitration rather than a non-AAA arbitration; Curb South contends that AAA "is a costly organization that provides its own rules for selection of arbitrators, discovery, hearings, awards, etc."
We note too that, although this case began with a petition for legal separation between Father and Mother, the district court had authority to consider the guardianship matter that arose in the course of the proceedings relating to the petition for legal separation. See Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶ 12, 287 P.3d 357 (providing that our district courts "are courts of general jurisdiction having the power to hear all matters not excepted by the constitution and those matters conferred by law"). {5} We further continue to disagree with Maternal Grandparents' argument that they were not afforded adequate notice of the matters to be addressed at the hearing.