Glenn v. McDonald Dairy Co., 270 Mich. 346." Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co. (1941), 297 Mich. 1. "To entitle plaintiff to compensation, he must have been in the employ of defendant at the time of the accident, under a contract of hire, express or implied. CL 1929, § 8413, as amended by PA 1937, No 204, and PA 1939, No 107 (CLS 1940, § 8413, Stat Ann 1941 Cum Supp § 17.147). It is fundamental in this type of proceeding that before plaintiff can recover, the relationship of employer and employee must be admitted or proved."
Spada v. Ford Motor Co., 269 Mich. 354. As a part of this fact-finding function of the commission, it naturally follows that the commission may make reasonable inferences from established facts. Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1; Harris v. Fry Kain, 306 Mich. 1. These precedents provide a pattern to be followed in considering the present case. Defendant contends that the commission erred as a matter of law in finding that plaintiff lost industrial vision in his left eye as a result of the accident in April of 1948 because a doctor's diagnosis in 1944 had shown that at that time he had already lost 80% of his vision, which according to the workmen's compensation act constituted full loss of industrial vision.
In passing on the factual issues before it, it was the province of the commission to weigh the testimony and to draw permissible inferences therefrom. Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1; McVicar v. Harper Hospital, 313 Mich. 48. Under the express provisions of the statute, findings of fact by the commission, if supported by testimony, are conclusive in the absence of fraud. Stewart v. Lakey Foundry Machine Co., 311 Mich. 463; Ryder v. Johnson, 313 Mich. 702. On the record before us we cannot say that the finding of the commission that plaintiff became disabled from employment on May 12, 1948, as the result of the hernia incurred by him in defendant's employ, was not sustained by testimony and by legitimate inferences deducible therefrom.
" In Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1, 6, the court quoted from Faber v. Eastman, Dillon Co., 271 Mich. 142, as follows: "`It is elementary that persons dealing with an agent may rely on his apparent authority ( Marx v. King, 162 Mich. 258), and that such authority is to be gathered from all of the facts and circumstances properly admitted in evidence.
Laws Supp. 1940, § 8413, Stat. Ann. 1941 Cum. Supp. § 17.147). It is fundamental in this type of proceeding that before plaintiff can recover, the relationship of employer and employee must be admitted or proved. Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1."
2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8451 (Stat. Ann. § 17.186); Putnam v. Beechler, supra; Flores v. Nicholson Terminal Dock Co., 299 Mich. 5; Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1. In the present case the medical testimony clearly indicated that the source of the infection could not be positively determined.
Laws Supp. 1940, § 8413, Stat. Ann. 1941 Cum. Supp. § 17.147). It is fundamental in this type of proceeding that before plaintiff can recover, the relationship of employer and employee must be admitted or proved. Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1. The facts as found by the department of labor and industry, although supported by the record and therefore not subject to inquiry by us, do not sustain the legal conclusion that the required relationship existed.
We review questions of law but not issues of fact, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8451 (Stat. Ann. § 17.186); Lynch v. R.D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1; Donahoe v. Ford Motor Co., 295 Mich. 422; Neumeier v. City of Menominee, 293 Mich. 646; Smith v. Pontiac Motor Car Co., 277 Mich. 652. By working at "favored employment" from February, 1934, until June 3, 1937, when he was found to have leprosy, plaintiff did not establish a so-called "earning capacity" at his former employment of grinding pistons or at any other work. The award of compensation was for the injury to plaintiff's hand; and his having worked at such "favored employment," though he was paid more than at the time of his injury, does not bar his right to compensation.
Upon appeal from an award by the department, we do not judge the facts but confine ourselves to a review of the record to determine whether or not there is evidence supporting the award. Neumeier v. City of Menominee, 293 Mich. 646; Lynch v. R. D. Baker Construction Co., 297 Mich. 1. In the case at hand there is no testimony from which an accident could logically and reasonably be inferred; in fact, the testimony rather negatives the inference of an accident.