Opinion
24A-SC-957
10-23-2024
Maria M. Lynch and Mike Lynch, Appellants v. Prime Body and Paint, Appellee
APPELLANTS PRO SE Maria M. Lynch Mike Lynch Attica, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Brian A. Karle Ball Eggleston, PC Lafayette, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 79D04-2311-SC-829 The Honorable Sarah M. Wyatt, Magistrate Judge
APPELLANTS PRO SE Maria M. Lynch Mike Lynch Attica, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Brian A. Karle Ball Eggleston, PC Lafayette, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Brown, Judge
[¶1] Maria M. Lynch and Mike Lynch (together, "Plaintiffs"), pro se, appeal from the judgment of the small claims court. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On May 13, 2022, Plaintiffs were involved in an accident in their Chevrolet Colorado and had the vehicle towed to Prime Body and Paint ("Defendant") for repairs. Plaintiffs picked up their vehicle from Defendant on June 14, 2022. Plaintiffs expressed certain concerns regarding the paint work and the frame and axle. Plaintiffs returned the vehicle to Defendant on June 27, 2022. Defendant sent a message to Plaintiffs stating: "The alignment was complete and everything is in spec. The axle is not bent." Defendant's Exhibit D.
Plaintiffs sent messages to Defendant stating: "Stop all work on truck do not do anything else[.] Please send alignment and frame straining sheets email to us ASAP" and "We will be there to pick up truck today." Id. Plaintiffs picked up the vehicle on June 30, 2022.
[¶3] On November 30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim against Defendant in small claims court alleging "improper paint and body work" and "improper mechanical repair." Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 5. The court scheduled a hearing for January 8, 2024. On January 8, 2024, the court issued a "Judgment" stating "Plaintiff(s) appears . . . in person" and "Defendant(s) appear . . . by full-time employee" and indicating the court continued the cause to February 5, 2024, for Defendant to obtain counsel. Id. at 7. On January 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for discovery, and the court granted the motion. On January 24, 2024, counsel for Defendant filed an appearance and a motion to continue. The court granted the motion to continue and set the hearing for February 26, 2024.
The record does not contain a transcript of the January 8, 2024 proceedings.
[¶4] On February 26, 2024, the court held the scheduled hearing. Plaintiffs presented documentary evidence including email and text messages, payments, and photographs of the vehicle. Maria Lynch testified that Defendant's work on the vehicle was unsatisfactory. Plaintiffs presented Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 20, which contained a list of their claimed damages including an estimate to repaint the vehicle. Matthew Hood, a regional manager for Defendant, testified that Defendant replaced a leaf spring on Plaintiffs' vehicle and measurements of the rear alignment were taken showing the alignment was "clearly in spec." Transcript Volume II at 48. He testified that Plaintiffs expressed concern, Defendant took the vehicle to a third-party vendor for another measurement, and the measurement showed the alignment was "[c]learly within manufacture speck [sic] with no issues found." Id. Hood further testified regarding the "special effects paint" used on the vehicle. Id. at 50. He stated:
When [Plaintiffs] dropped the vehicle off . . . the first matter at hand was for us to address the rear axle. Because if there was in fact something wrong with the rear axle that truck was going to need to stay a longer amount of time. So we addressed that first before we
even got to any paint concerns that I was going to review. But it didn't get to that point because just like the text messages say once we let them know that again there was no damage to the rear axle they asked us to stop ....Id. at 55.
[¶5] The court noted that, according to the claimed damages in the exhibit marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 20, Plaintiffs were seeking damages related to the paint work and not the mechanical work. The court noted that Plaintiffs submitted "a number of photographs of the current condition of the vehicle as well as the condition at the time that it was turned over to [Defendant] for work to be done on the car" and asked Hood if he agreed "that there was a substandard paint job on this vehicle." Id. at 59. Hood responded that he did not agree and testified:
There are certain factors when painting a vehicle that you may have to touch up. And that's something that we attempted to do, but were never allowed to do. It's you know painting a vehicle is a very tedious process. There are things that are missed. We do fix them. We attempted to fix them. But we were never allowed to fix them.Id. The court asked, "it sounds like you acknowledge that there may have been some touch ups that needed to be done, but your position is that the overall paint job was a satisfactory paint job," and Hood replied, "Correct. Yes." Id. The court asked Hood about identifying the color that needed to be used, and Hood testified regarding factory paint codes and that Defendant used a General Motors approved paint. Hood testified:
So basically you start in on the back of that card there's formulas. On a three stage paint that is how you start to create that color. So a three stage paint means you have multiple layers of color and then you have a clear on top of it that gives it the shine. That is what they call a spray out card. So on a three stage paint job you could actually end up three or four of those different variations to get your match to the color that's on the vehicle.Id. at 62.
[¶6] The court issued an order entering judgment in favor of Defendant. The order provided:
While Plaintiffs spent significant time presenting evidence regarding the mechanical issues and the insurance checks, Plaintiff Maria Lynch . . . clarified that they were only seeking judgment for those actual and potential future damages listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 with primary focus on alleged faulty paint work. No expert/educated testimony was presented regarding the faulty nature of any work performed. Nor did Plaintiffs specifically articulate how, or in what manner, Defendant's work was below standard. The Court further finds that, at least with respect to the paint work, Plaintiffs failed to give Defendant a reasonable opportunity to cure any perceived defect.
The Court, having considered all evidence and arguments presented, finds the Plaintiffs have failed to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence and enters judgment in favor of Defendant.Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 16.
Discussion
[¶7] Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and are required to follow procedural rules. Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 136-137 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). To the extent Plaintiffs do not present cogent argument, the issues or assertions they attempt to present are waived. See id. at 137.
I.
[¶8] In the argument section of their brief, Plaintiffs state:
[Plaintiffs] along with the defendant Matt Hood appeared in Court for the First hearing 01/08/2024. The Magistrate asks Mr. Hood what type of business he is working for and what his title is for that business. Mr. Hood states that he is a regional manager and the type of business.
The Magistrate states that the type of business that the courts cannot hear the case because of rule 8c informality of hearing (Indiana rules of Court small Claims) and has Mr. Hood request a continuance. Mrs. Lynch disagreed and said that the defendant should have been prepared. [Plaintiffs] argue that rule 10B default should have been used with a failure to appear being granted in favor of [Plaintiffs] (Indiana rules of Court small Claims).
The Magistrate granted and signed motion for continuance on 01/08/2023 (CCS CT p2). [Plaintiffs] were being unfairly treated granting another continuance on 01/25/2024 to [Defendant] (CCS CT pp2,3). Rule 9 Continuances only allows for 1 continuance per party. (Indiana rules of court small Claims)Appellants' Brief at 8-9.
Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(C) addresses the circumstances in which corporate entities must be represented by counsel.
Ind. Small Claims Rule 10(B) provides in part:
If the defendant fails to appear at the time and place specified in the notice of claim, or for any continuance thereof, the court may enter a default judgment against him. Before default judgment is entered, the court shall examine the notice of claim and return thereof and make inquiry, under oath, of those present so as to assure the court that:
(1) Service of notice of claim was had . . .;
(2) Within the knowledge of those present, the defendant is not under legal disability and has sufficient understanding to realize the nature and effect of the notice of claim;
(3) Either (a) the defendant is not entitled to the protections against default judgments provided by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act . . . or (b) the plaintiff has filed . . . the affidavit required by the Act . . .; and
(4) The plaintiff has a prima facie case.
Ind. Small Claims Rule 9 provides:
Either party may be granted a continuance for good cause shown. Except in unusual circumstances no party shall be allowed more than one (1) continuance in any case, and all continuances must have the specific approval of the court. Continuances shall be for as short a period as possible, and where feasible the party not requesting the continuance shall be considered in scheduling a new hearing date. The court shall give notice of the continuance and the new date and time of trial to all parties.
[¶9] Defendant argues "[t]he record does not contain any indication that [Plaintiffs] formally objected to the continuance, and there is no indication in the record that they ever requested a default judgment" and "it was entirely reasonable for the trial court to continue the case in order to allow a corporate defendant to hire counsel and present its case in compliance with the Small Claims Rules." Appellee's Brief at 13-14.
[¶10] As previously noted, the record does not contain a transcript of the January 8, 2024 proceedings. The chronological case summary does not indicate that Plaintiffs requested default judgment or challenged Defendant's January 24th motion to continue, and Plaintiffs do not cite the record to show they objected to the court's January 8th or 25th orders rescheduling the hearing. Plaintiffs have waived their argument that the small claims court erred in ordering the continuances and in not entering default judgment. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 834 (Ind. 2016) ("Appellants may not sit idly by and raise issues for the first time on appeal."); First Chicago Ins. Co. v. Collins, 141 N.E.3d 54, 61 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (issue or argument raised for first time on appeal generally waived).
[¶11] Waiver notwithstanding, the decision to grant a motion to continue or to enter default judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Litherland v. McDonnell, 796 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (continuance), trans. denied; Whetstine v. Menard, Inc., 161 N.E.3d 1274, 1279 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (default judgment), trans. denied. We will reverse only if the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Litherland, 796 N.E.2d at 1240; Whetstine, 161 N.E.3d at 1279. The small claims court scheduled a hearing for January 8, 2024. On January 8th, the court issued an order stating that Defendant appeared "by full-time employee" and that it continued the cause for Defendant to obtain counsel. Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 7. The court rescheduled the hearing for February 5, 2024. Counsel for Defendant filed an appearance on January 24, 2024. That same day, Defendant's counsel filed a motion to continue stating that he "has a scheduling conflict and will be unable to attend the hearing at the time currently set" and requesting that "the hearing for February 5, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. be reset and for February 26, 2024, at 10:00 a.m." Id. at 12. Plaintiffs did not file a response. The court granted the motion to continue and set the hearing for February 26, 2024, as requested. Plaintiffs have not shown how they were harmed by the continuance. We find no abuse of discretion.
II.
[¶12] Plaintiffs argue that they presented pictures and documentation to prove the poor work and that they provided three days for Defendant to fix the issues that were discussed. Defendant maintains the evidence supports the judgment and Plaintiffs' argument amounts to a request to reweigh evidence.
[¶13] Plaintiffs appeal from a negative judgment. We will reverse only if the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the small claims court reached the opposite conclusion. Kim v. Vill. at Eagle Creek Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 133 N.E.3d 250, 252 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). Each party to a small claims action has the burden of proof for a claim or counterclaim and is responsible for bringing evidence to court that is sufficient to sustain that burden. Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130, 132 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). Judgments in small claims actions are subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes. Eagle Aircraft, Inc. v. Trojnar, 983 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence supporting the judgment. Id. This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. Id. We presume the court correctly applied the law. Id. A court's findings control as to the issues they cover and a general judgment controls as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). Findings will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
[¶14] Plaintiffs and Defendant presented evidence regarding the work Defendant was retained to perform. The court thoroughly questioned Maria Lynch and Hood regarding the work performed by Defendant, the painting of the vehicle, and the parties' communications. The parties introduced numerous exhibits including photographs of the vehicle. To the extent the parties presented conflicting testimony regarding the paint work, including related to the color and touch-up work required, the small claims court was able to consider the testimony and exhibits and find the evidence presented by Defendant to be persuasive. The court found that Plaintiffs failed to give Defendant a reasonable opportunity to cure any perceived defect with respect to the paint work. It is apparent from our review of the record that the small claims court carefully considered the testimony and evidence presented by the parties related to Defendant's work. We will not reweigh the evidence. See Eagle Aircraft, 983 N.E.2d at 657. Our review of the evidence does not leave us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made, and we cannot say that the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the small claims court reached the opposite conclusion.
[¶15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the small claims court.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.