Opinion
No. CV 04-0834634 S
October 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE (#102)
The court heard argument on the defendant's motion to strike the third count of the plaintiff's complaint at short calendar on October 18, 2004. After considering the parties' arguments, the court issues this memorandum of decision.
The defendant asserts that the third count of the plaintiff's complaint should be stricken, due to misjoinder. Counts one and two of the complaint concern claims for wrongful dismissal, based on the plaintiff's jury service in March 2004. Count three is based on a claim of negligence, in that the plaintiff alleges that in August 2003, his car was vandalized on his employer's property.
Where several causes of action are united in the same complaint, each shall belong to one of the classes listed in the General Statutes and in the Rules of Practice. See General Statute § 52-97. General Statute § 52-97(7) provides, in pertinent part, "In any civil action the plaintiff may include in his complaint both legal and equitable rights and causes of action, and demand both legal and equitable remedies; but, if several causes of action are united in the same complaint, they shall all be brought to recover . . . (7) upon claims, whether in contract or tort or both, arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action." Practice Book § 10-21(7) contains a similar provision.
The plaintiff does not contend that each count of the complaint falls within another listed class.
Here, the plaintiff alleges that his rights were separately infringed, in events which occurred in widely separated time frames, in August 2003 and in March 2004. The events giving rise to counts one and two, on the one hand, and count three, on the other, are not the same subject of action, even though the plaintiff was employed by the defendant over a period of time. See, in contrast, Goggins v. Fawcett, 145 Conn. 709, CT Page 15887 147 A.2d 187 (1958), where "one tort occurred in Connecticut, near the Massachusetts line, when the . . . defendant drove his station wagon into the plaintiff's car. The other took place in Massachusetts when the plaintiff, in pursuit of the defendant, was forced off the road by the defendant." The court found that these two torts related to "the same subject of action, that is, the operation of the defendant's vehicle." Id., 711. Here, the allegations about alleged discharge resulting from jury service and the earlier vandalism do not amount to "a recitation of a group of related acts which went to make up one entire course of conduct and constituted a single transaction within the meaning of the statute." Id.
The allegations here, as to the third count, in contrast with the first and second counts, "would have to be established by different evidence justifying invocation of the policy of separating issues in order to avoid complexity and confusion." Terris v. Dawson, 173 Conn. 206, 209, 377 A.2d 288 (1977).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike the third count of the plaintiff's complaint is granted. It is so ordered.
BY THE COURT
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT