Lynch v. Bogenrief

19 Citing cases

  1. Rice v. Webb

    287 Neb. 712 (Neb. 2014)   Cited 15 times
    Finding waiver where decree awarded former spouse "all interest ... free from any claim of [the other spouse]"

    See, e.g., id.; Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984). See, e.g., Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb.App. 579, 732 N.W.2d 368 (2007); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). .29 U.S.C. ยง 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

  2. FRONTIER LEASING v. LINKS ENG

    776 N.W.2d 886 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)

    No particular words are necessary to effectuate an assignment. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 1976). An assignment need not be in writing and may be shown by evidence of intent to create the assignment.

  3. Frontier Leasing v. Treynor

    776 N.W.2d 886 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)

    No particular words are necessary to effectuate an assignment. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 1976). An assignment need not be in writing and may be shown by evidence of intent to create the assignment.

  4. Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co.

    264 Neb. 312 (Neb. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    In Pinkard, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the effect of a divorce decree in relation to an ex-wife's asserted interest as the designated primary beneficiary of her deceased former spouse's workersโ€™ compensation annuity.

    The court noted that in previous Iowa cases, the focus of the inquiry had been on the language of the dissolution decree and whether there was any stipulation or agreement that governed the parties' property rights. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), the ex-spouse was awarded retirement system death benefits because the dissolution decree made no mention of the death benefits payable and therefore did not control the contingent interest of the ex-spouse. An opposite result was reached in Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984), in which the provisions of the dissolution decree disposed of the life insurance policy proceeds.

  5. Schultz v. Schultz

    591 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1999)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that the award under a divorce decree of an IRA to one spouse does not terminate "the other spouse's expectancy interest as the designated beneficiary of that asset" absent language in the decree indicating that the court intended to affect the expectancy interest

    Accordingly, we start with a brief review of the Iowa cases wherein we have determined the effect of a dissolution on a former spouse's right to recover the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy as the designated beneficiary. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), we held that a spouse named as a beneficiary maintains that status even though subsequently divorced from the insured. 237 N.W.2d at 797.

  6. Matter of Estate of Bickford

    549 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1996)   Cited 2 times
    Stating that the Supreme Court broadly defines the term "relates to" in the context of ERISA preemption

    We believe that, even if we were to adopt the estate's argument that ERISA does not preempt state law on this issue, it cannot prevail. Under our cases, a dissolution decree does not automatically terminate the interests of a life insurance beneficiary. See Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984) ("It is a well-established rule that divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy."); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976); see also 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance ยง 1714, at 697-98 (1982) In Sorensen, we concluded that the general rule did not apply under the facts of that case and held that the dissolution decree terminated the interests of a named beneficiary.

  7. Fox Valley Vic. Const. Wkrs. Pen. F v. Brown

    897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990)   Cited 148 times
    Holding that a proper waiver of interest by a nonparticipant in a plan is not preempted by ERISA's anti-alienation provisions

    Many states follow this rule when interpreting divorce settlement provisions. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 666 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D.Idaho 1987) (applying Idaho law), aff'd, 859 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1988); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Blight, 399 F. Supp. 513, 515 (E.D.Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 1976); Keeton v. Cherry, 728 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo.Ct.App. 1987); Bell v. Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982); Haley v. Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 562, 642 P.2d 164, 165 (1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906, 913-14 (Utah 1981). The district court was correct in finding that the waiver contained in the marital property settlement specifically dealt with the pension fund benefits, including the Death Benefit at issue in this case.

  8. Fox Valley Vicinity Const. Workers v. Brown

    879 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1989)   Cited 7 times
    Approving use of statutory interpleader for such a purpose

    Many states follow this rule when interpreting divorce settlement provisions. See, e.g., Bell v. Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assur. Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). The district court was correct in finding that the waiver contained in the marital property settlement specifically dealt with the pension fund benefits, including the Death Benefit at issue in this case.

  9. Sorensen v. Nelson

    342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984)   Cited 20 times
    In Sorensen, we noted the same general rule that a dissolution does not automatically void a beneficiary designation naming the former spouse.

    It is a well-established rule that divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976), 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance ยง 1714 (1982). On other hand, where a stipulation specifically provides for disposition of insurance proceeds, that provision is given effect.

  10. Girard v. Pardun

    318 N.W.2d 137 (S.D. 1982)   Cited 8 times
    In Girard, this Court was faced with a stipulation and agreement provision which stated that "`the defendant shall keep in force and effect all presently existing hospitalization insurance.'"

    Id. 485 P.2d at 139-140 (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as Mullenax on facts essentially the same as in the case before us. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). The Iowa court first noted that the general rule is that divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation and that jurisdictions holding to the contrary are "in stark contrast to the great weight of authority."