Lynch v. Bogenrief

8 Citing cases

  1. NUNN v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOCIETY, ETC

    272 N.W.2d 780 (N.D. 1979)   Cited 15 times

    No cases have been referred to us and none have been discovered in our research that allow insurance proceeds to be distributed in this situation other than to the designated beneficiary, i. e., without even a general clause that might indicate the parties' intent to dispose of the insurance. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, Iowa, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), the Supreme Court of Iowa dealt with a similar question. In Lynch, the ex-wife (named beneficiary) and widow-administrator of a deceased fireman both claimed his retirement system death benefits.

  2. Fox Valley Vic. Const. Wkrs. Pen. F v. Brown

    897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990)   Cited 148 times
    Holding that a proper waiver of interest by a nonparticipant in a plan is not preempted by ERISA's anti-alienation provisions

    Many states follow this rule when interpreting divorce settlement provisions. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 666 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D.Idaho 1987) (applying Idaho law), aff'd, 859 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1988); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Blight, 399 F. Supp. 513, 515 (E.D.Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 1976); Keeton v. Cherry, 728 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo.Ct.App. 1987); Bell v. Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982); Haley v. Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 562, 642 P.2d 164, 165 (1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906, 913-14 (Utah 1981). The district court was correct in finding that the waiver contained in the marital property settlement specifically dealt with the pension fund benefits, including the Death Benefit at issue in this case.

  3. Fox Valley Vicinity Const. Workers v. Brown

    879 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1989)   Cited 7 times
    Approving use of statutory interpleader for such a purpose

    Many states follow this rule when interpreting divorce settlement provisions. See, e.g., Bell v. Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assur. Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). The district court was correct in finding that the waiver contained in the marital property settlement specifically dealt with the pension fund benefits, including the Death Benefit at issue in this case.

  4. Rice v. Webb

    287 Neb. 712 (Neb. 2014)   Cited 15 times
    Finding waiver where decree awarded former spouse "all interest ... free from any claim of [the other spouse]"

    See, e.g., id.; Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984). See, e.g., Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb.App. 579, 732 N.W.2d 368 (2007); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). .29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

  5. Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co.

    264 Neb. 312 (Neb. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    In Pinkard, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the effect of a divorce decree in relation to an ex-wife's asserted interest as the designated primary beneficiary of her deceased former spouse's workers’ compensation annuity.

    The court noted that in previous Iowa cases, the focus of the inquiry had been on the language of the dissolution decree and whether there was any stipulation or agreement that governed the parties' property rights. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), the ex-spouse was awarded retirement system death benefits because the dissolution decree made no mention of the death benefits payable and therefore did not control the contingent interest of the ex-spouse. An opposite result was reached in Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984), in which the provisions of the dissolution decree disposed of the life insurance policy proceeds.

  6. Sorensen v. Nelson

    342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984)   Cited 20 times
    In Sorensen, we noted the same general rule that a dissolution does not automatically void a beneficiary designation naming the former spouse.

    It is a well-established rule that divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976), 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1714 (1982). On other hand, where a stipulation specifically provides for disposition of insurance proceeds, that provision is given effect.

  7. Girard v. Pardun

    318 N.W.2d 137 (S.D. 1982)   Cited 8 times
    In Girard, this Court was faced with a stipulation and agreement provision which stated that "`the defendant shall keep in force and effect all presently existing hospitalization insurance.'"

    Id. 485 P.2d at 139-140 (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as Mullenax on facts essentially the same as in the case before us. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). The Iowa court first noted that the general rule is that divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation and that jurisdictions holding to the contrary are "in stark contrast to the great weight of authority."

  8. Frigillana v. Frigillana

    266 Ark. 296 (Ark. 1979)   Cited 36 times
    In Frigillana v. Frigillana, 266 Ark. 296, 584 S.W.2d 30 (1979), the court said that in unjust enrichment cases "the simple, but comprehensive, question is whether the circumstances are such that equitably defendant should restore to plaintiff what he has received[,]" (quoting 77 C.J.S. Restitution 322). The Restatement of Restitution § 1 states simply, "A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."

    There is respectable authority supporting the chancellor's view that appellee had an insurable interest. Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 (1907); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa, 1976); Tromp v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 143 Kan. 98, 53 P.2d 831 (1936). In considering insurable interest in the life of another in Home Mutual Benefit Association v. Keller, 148 Ark. 361, 230 S.W. 10, we quoted liberally from Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 26 L.Ed. 924 (1881).