Accordingly, we start with a brief review of the Iowa cases wherein we have determined the effect of a dissolution on a former spouse's right to recover the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy as the designated beneficiary. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), we held that a spouse named as a beneficiary maintains that status even though subsequently divorced from the insured. 237 N.W.2d at 797.

The section does not expressly state that a former spouse could not have an insurable interest, and we note than an ex-spouse may have such an interest. Cf. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976) (individual entitled to alimony has insurable interest in former spouse). We also note the appeal to equity in the special concurrence in Cose, id. at 1233 (Matthews, J.):

No cases have been referred to us and none have been discovered in our research that allow insurance proceeds to be distributed in this situation other than to the designated beneficiary, i. e., without even a general clause that might indicate the parties' intent to dispose of the insurance. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, Iowa, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), the Supreme Court of Iowa dealt with a similar question. In Lynch, the ex-wife (named beneficiary) and widow-administrator of a deceased fireman both claimed his retirement system death benefits.

Many states follow this rule when interpreting divorce settlement provisions. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 666 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D.Idaho 1987) (applying Idaho law), aff'd, 859 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1988); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Blight, 399 F. Supp. 513, 515 (E.D.Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 1976); Keeton v. Cherry, 728 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo.Ct.App. 1987); Bell v. Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982); Haley v. Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 562, 642 P.2d 164, 165 (1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d 906, 913-14 (Utah 1981). The district court was correct in finding that the waiver contained in the marital property settlement specifically dealt with the pension fund benefits, including the Death Benefit at issue in this case.

Many states follow this rule when interpreting divorce settlement provisions. See, e.g., Bell v. Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assur. Co., 631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). The district court was correct in finding that the waiver contained in the marital property settlement specifically dealt with the pension fund benefits, including the Death Benefit at issue in this case.

See, e.g., id.; Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984). See, e.g., Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb.App. 579, 732 N.W.2d 368 (2007); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). .29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

The court noted that in previous Iowa cases, the focus of the inquiry had been on the language of the dissolution decree and whether there was any stipulation or agreement that governed the parties' property rights. In Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976), the ex-spouse was awarded retirement system death benefits because the dissolution decree made no mention of the death benefits payable and therefore did not control the contingent interest of the ex-spouse. An opposite result was reached in Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984), in which the provisions of the dissolution decree disposed of the life insurance policy proceeds.

We believe that, even if we were to adopt the estate's argument that ERISA does not preempt state law on this issue, it cannot prevail. Under our cases, a dissolution decree does not automatically terminate the interests of a life insurance beneficiary. See Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa 1984) ("It is a well-established rule that divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy."); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976); see also 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1714, at 697-98 (1982) In Sorensen, we concluded that the general rule did not apply under the facts of that case and held that the dissolution decree terminated the interests of a named beneficiary.

It is a well-established rule that divorce or dissolution per se does not void the designation of a named spouse on a life insurance policy. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Iowa 1976), 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 1714 (1982). On other hand, where a stipulation specifically provides for disposition of insurance proceeds, that provision is given effect.

Id. 485 P.2d at 139-140 (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as Mullenax on facts essentially the same as in the case before us. Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976). The Iowa court first noted that the general rule is that divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation and that jurisdictions holding to the contrary are "in stark contrast to the great weight of authority."