Lynch v. Alexander

14 Citing cases

  1. Hicks v. Herring

    246 S.C. 429 (S.C. 1965)   Cited 52 times
    Finding the amount of damages awarded in a personal injury action is a question for the jury

    Messrs. Willcox, Hardee, Houck, Palmer O'Farrell, of Florence, for Appellant, cite: As to the Respondent beingguilty of contributory recklessness and heedlessness so as tobar recovery under the guest statute: (S.C.) 130 S.E.2d 563; 191 S.C. 429, 4 S.E.2d 797; 239 S.C. 529, 123 S.E.2d 876; 196 S.C. 381, 13 S.E.2d 918. As to the verdict for punitive damages not having properfoundation in the record and is so excessive and disproportionateas to indicate that it was a result of caprice, passionor prejudice on the part of the jury: 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408; 199 S.C. 156, 18 S.E.2d 719. Messrs. Gasque, Seals Gasque, of Marion, for Respondent, cite: As to Appellant being guilty of reckless or heedlessconduct resulting in the collision: 239 S.C. 508, 123 S.E.2d 857. As to the Respondent not being guilty of contributoryrecklessness and heedlessness as a matter of lawso as to bar recovery under the guest statute: 232 N.C. 149, 59 S.E.2d 787; 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563; 228 S.C. 34, 88 S.E.2d 838; 244 S.C. 524, 137 S.E.2d 780. As to the verdict not being excessive: 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258; 226 S.C. 451, 85 S.E.2d 729.

  2. Singleton v. Hughes

    139 S.E.2d 747 (S.C. 1965)   Cited 2 times

    Messrs. Burroughs Green, of Conway, for Appellant, cite: As to Respondent's intestate knowingly participatingin an automobile race on the highway and, therefore, wasguilty of contributory recklessness as a matter of law: 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335; 237 S.C. 1, 115 S.E.2d 667; 242 S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486; 253 N.C. 652, 118 S.E.2d 12; 32 S.E.2d 5, 205 S.C. 333; 102 Ga. App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885; 84 A.L.R.2d 449, Sec. 1, 25 Ill. App.2d 395, 166 N.E.2d 806; 102 Ga. App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885; 88 S.E.2d 838, 228 S.C. 34; 130 S.E.2d 563, 242 S.C. 208; 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, Sec. 491; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, Sec. 155. Messrs. J. Reuben Long and J.M. Long, Jr., of Conway, for Respondent, cite: As to where the testimony is susceptibleof more than one reasonable inference, the case shouldbe submitted to the jury: 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563; 130 S.E.2d 486, 242 S.C. 221.

  3. Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp.

    74 F. Supp. 2d 548 (D.S.C. 1999)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Jimenez, the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence did not support the jury verdict for plaintiff on a negligent misrepresentation claim because the plaintiff did not prove that plaintiff's wife saw commercials related to a specific vehicle or that the plaintiff's wife relied on the commercials.

    Their loss to the beneficiaries must be estimated by the jury in the exercise of their sound judgment under all the facts and circumstances of the case." Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1963). Wrongful death verdicts in South Carolina involving minor children and no pecuniary loss have ranged from $22,000 in 1952 to $3 million in 1996.

  4. Williams v. Carr

    68 Cal.2d 579 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 47 times
    In Williams v. Carr (1968) 68 Cal.2d 579, 583-584 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505], the court explained that "willful misconduct," in an automobile guest statute, "implies the intentional doing of something either with knowledge, express or implied, that serious injury is a probable, as distinguished from a possible, result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences.

    ns the common law right of having redress for injuries wrongfully inflicted ( O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal.2d 994, 997 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 840, 429 P.2d 160]; Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal.2d 89, 93 [ 98 P.2d 729]; McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 281-282 [ 70 P.2d 909]), and the great majority of other jurisdictions have held that contributory negligence is not a defense in statutory guest litigation where the plaintiff in order to recover must prove willful misconduct or its equivalent ( Lionetti v. Coppola, 15 Conn. 499 [ 161 A. 797, 798]; Wagner v. Shanks (Del.) 194 A.2d 701, 706-708; Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17 [ 375 P.2d 184, 194]; Valentine v. England, 6 Ill. App.2d 275 [127 N.E.2d 473, 475]; Hoeppner v. Saltzgaber, 102 Ind. App. 458 [ 200 N.E. 458, 463, 464]; Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383 [ 52 N.W.2d 79, 84]; Long v. Foley, 180 Kan. 83 [ 299 P.2d 63, 71-72]; Downing v. Marlia, 82 Nev. 294 [ 417 P.2d 150, 153]; Melville v. Greyhound Corp., 94 Ohio App. 258 [ 115 N.E.2d 42, 45-46]; Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208 [ 130 S.E.2d 563, 564-565]; see 5 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice (3d ed. 1966) p. 304; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, supra, p. 1214; cf. Lessen v. Allison, 25 Ill. App.2d 395 [ 166 N.E.2d 806, 809-810]). We are satisfied that the introduction of negligence concepts in guest litigation is contrary to the great weight of authority, finds no support in the guest statute, is misleading, and is improper.

  5. Benton v. Davis

    150 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1966)   Cited 10 times

    Further review of the testimony would serve no useful purpose. It is well settled that questions as to the contributory negligence or recklessness of a guest in an automobile are ordinarily for determination by the jury and become a matter of law for determination by the court only when the evidence admits of but one reasonable inference thereabout. Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563. We have consistently recognized the principle that "[a] guest is barred from recovery for injuries caused by the host's reckless disregard of the guest's safety, if knowing of the host's reckless misconduct and the danger involved to said guest, the guest recklessly exposes himself thereto."

  6. Hiott v. Bishop

    137 S.E.2d 780 (S.C. 1964)   Cited 12 times

    Hagood, Rivers Young, of Charleston, forAppellant, cite: As to when a jury has returned a verdictfor actual damages only, it eliminates a question of recklessnessand mere contributory negligence on the part of theinjured that proximately caused his injuries will bar arecovery: 217 S.C. 436, 60 S.E.2d 889; 229 S.C. 176, 92 S.E.2d 159; 220 S.C. 323, 67 S.E.2d 516. Asto failure of Respondent to leave the automobile, when hehad ample opportunity to do so, amounting to recklessnessand willfulness on his part: 191 S.C. 429, 4 S.E.2d 797; 196 S.C. 381, 13 S.E.2d 918. Messrs. Murdaugh, Eltzroth Peters, of Hampton, forRespondent, cite: As to Respondent not being guilty of contributorynegligence, recklessness and willfulness as a matterof law, and the case was properly submitted to the jury: 123 S.E.2d 857, 239 S.C. 508; 108 S.E.2d 86, 234 S.C. 291; (S.C.) 130 S.E.2d 563; 28 S.C. 577, 91 S.E.2d 276; 216 S.C. 456, 58 S.E.2d 734; 216 S.C. 554, 63 S.E.2d 465; 123 S.E.2d 857, 239 S.C. 508; 205 S.C. 162, 31 S.E.2d 133. August 4, 1964.

  7. Thompson v. Michael

    433 S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    A passenger has a duty to exercise due care for her own safety to caution the driver and, if the warning is disregarded and speed unaltered, she must request the automobile be stopped and she be permitted to leave. Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963). Whether a warning should have been given is often a question of fact for the jury.

  8. Lucht v. Youngblood

    266 S.C. 127 (S.C. 1976)   Cited 36 times
    Affirming the trial court's application of the family purpose doctrine, and stating, “Further, the testimony is uncontradicted that the boy was seventeen years old and a student living at home with his parents. The father agreed he bought the car for the use of his son, and that it was used practically exclusively by the son except on occasions when the father drove the car.”

    2d 230; 249 S.C. 483, 154 S.E.2d 910; 46-750.31 of the South Carolina Safety Responsibility Act (Act No. 312 of 1963); 260 S.C. 157, 194 S.E.2d 890; 253 S.C. 91, 168 S.E.2d 282; 228 Minn. 20, 36 N.W.2d 711, 11 A.L.R.2d 1429; 254 Iowa 45, 116 N.W.2d 491. As to the Court'sbelow erring in not permitting defense counsel to cross-examinePlaintiff on his earlier pleadings in the case: 192 S.C. 483, 7 S.E.2d 223; 29 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, Section 687; 29 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, Section 693; 44 S.C. 1, 21 S.E. 617; 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759; 252 S.C. 442, 166 S.E.2d 814. As to the Court's below erringin failing to set aside the verdict and to order a newtrial: 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640; 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470; Section 10-1954, South Carolina Code, 1962; 244 S.C. 217, 136 S.E.2d 286; 201 S.C. 367, 42 S.E.2d 705; 226 S.C. 516, 86 S.E.2d 56; 238 S.C. 364, 120 S.E.2d 209; 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830; 260 S.C. 235, 195 S.E.2d 389; 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 641; 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830; 242 S.C. 208; 259 S.C. 632, 193 S.E.2d 594. George E. Campsen, Jr., Esq., of Charleston, for Respondent, cites: As to evidence of actionable negligence on thepart of the Appellant, John Scott Youngblood: 261 S.C. 582, 201 S.E.2d 620; 84 S.C. 202, 65 S.E. 1051; 196 S.C. 381, 13 S.E.2d 918; 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649; Volume 20 S.C.L.R. p. 409; 245 N.C. 152, 95 S.E.2d 514; 243 S.C. 14, 134 S.E.2d 248; 5 Am. Jur. p. 167; 185 S.C. 449, 194 S.E. 332; 148 S.C. 161, 145 S.E. 790; 250 S.C. 499, 159 S.E.2d 47; 246 S.C. 261, 143 S.E.2d 521. As to the Trial Judge's properlyruling as a matter of law that the "Family Purpose Doctrine"applied to the Youngblood vehicle: 225 S.C. 454, 179 S.E.2d 607; 249 S.C. 483, 154 S.E.2d 910; 229 S.C. 346, 93 S.E.2d 113; 222 S.C. 401, 73 S.E.2d 277. As to the Trial Judge's not having committed reversibleerror in prohibiting Defendant's counsel from cross examiningPlaintiff on his earlier pleadings in this case: 243 S.C. 121, 132 S.E.2d 278; 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759; 244 S

  9. Martin v. Martin

    262 S.C. 168 (S.C. 1974)   Cited 1 times

    As to acharge that simple negligence is sufficient under the gueststatute being erroneous: 249 S.C. 168, 153 S.E.2d 312; West's S.C. Digest, Automobiles Key, 181 (1), 201 (1), 242 (1.7). As to Appellant's being entitled to his requestto charge No. 1 relating to latent defects in its entirety withoutmodification: 148 S.E.2d 338; 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338. As to when physicians are allowed to testifyas to history given by an injured party Plaintiff, a Defendantis entitled to a requested charge as to the weight tobe given such testimony: Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1718-1719; 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112. Messrs. Gasque Seals, of Marion, for Respondent, cite: As to the evidence being sufficient to carry the issue of liabilityto the jury: 312 Mich. 161, 20 N.W.2d 144; 137 N.J.L. 573, 61 A.2d 69, affirmed 1 N.J. 566, 64 A.2d 612. As to there not being any evidence that Respondentwas guilty of contributory negligence and recklessness: 244 S.C. 524, 137 S.E.2d 780; 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563; 246 S.C. 429, 144 S.E.2d 151. As to a lackof error in the charge of the Trial Judge relating to theGuest Statute: 121 S.C. 143, 113 S.E. 579. As to theTrial Judge's not having erred in his modification of Appellant'srequest to charge No. 1 relating to latent defects: 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112; 216 S.C. 401, 58 S.E.2d 675, page 681; 100 S.C. 294, 84 S.E. 825; 67 S.C. (347 and) 359, 45 S.E. 810. March 4, 1974.

  10. Dixon v. Weir Fuel Co.

    160 S.E.2d 194 (S.C. 1968)   Cited 7 times

    Messrs. Gregory Gregory, of Lancaster, and Roddey,Sumwalt Carpenter, of Rock Hill, for Appellant, WeirFuel Company, cite: As to the automobile driver's state ofintoxication, of which plaintiff's intestate was fully aware,being the proximate cause of the fatal collision: 243 S.C. 524, 134 S.E.2d 760. As to a guest being barred fromrecovery for injuries caused by the host's reckless disregardof the guest's safety, if the guest knew of the host'sreckless misconduct and the danger involved to her andrecklessly exposed herself to such danger: 248 S.C. 402, 150 S.E.2d 235; 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335; 191 S.C. 429, 4 S.E.2d 797; 196 S.C. 381, 13 S.E.2d 918; 234 S.C. 291, 108 S.E.2d 86; 239 S.C. 529, 123 S.E.2d 876; 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563; 244 S.C. 454, 137 S.E.2d 594; 187 S.E. 742; 42 C.J. 1170. Messrs. James H. Howey and Williams Parler, of Lancaster, and D. Reece Williams, III, of Columbia, forAppellant, A. Jack Roberts, Administrator, cite: As to theevidence supporting the jury's determination that DavidRoberts was free of contributory negligence or wilfulnessas a concurring proximate cause of the occurrence: 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321; 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335; 248 S.C. 316, 149 S.E.2d 761; 245 S.C. 48, 138 S.E.2d 640; 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d 92; 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338; Anno. 169 A.L.R. 798, 804; 30 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 1087; 241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131; 238 S.C. 217, 119 S.E.2d; 248 S.C. 389, 150 S.E.2d 473; 54 S.C. 485, 32 S.E. 539; 234 S.C. 59, 106 S.E.2d 883; 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d 435; 218 S.C. 554, 63 S.E.2d 465; 234 S.C. 59, 106 S.E.2d 883.