Lyman v. Kurtz

10 Citing cases

  1. William H. Banks Warehouses v. Jean

    96 F. Supp. 731 (D. Idaho 1951)   Cited 3 times

    The same rule is announced in numerous cases, that a person to whom a license or permit has been issued is the person to whom the law will look during the conduct of the business and will hold responsible for compliance with the statutory provisions. Lyman v. City Trust Safe-Deposit and Surety Co., 166 N.Y. 274, 59 N.E. 903; Midland Valley Railroad Company v. Benjamin Toomer, 62 Okla. 272, 162 P. 1127, L.R.A. 1917D, 344. It is contended by counsel for Banks that these licenses to Banks had no effect.

  2. Foley v. Whelan

    219 Minn. 209 (Minn. 1945)   Cited 14 times
    Ascribing an identical meaning to the word "game" in three separate gambling statutes that were in pari materia with one another

    Consequently, slot machines are universally regarded as gambling devices. State v. Falgren, 176 Minn. 346, 223 N.W. 455; State v. Briggs, 84 Minn. 357, 87 N.W. 935; Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274, 59 N.E. 903. Playing a slot machine is playing a game. State v. Shaw, supra; Territory v. Jones, 14 N.M. 579, 99 P. 338, 20 L.R.A.(N.S.) 239, 20 Ann. Cas. 128; State v. Busch, 59 R.I. 382, 195 A. 487; State v. Gaughan, 55 W. Va. 692, 48 S.E. 210; Daniels v. Pinks [1931] 1 K. B. 374; Thompson v. Mason, 20 Cox C. C. 641, 90 L. T. N. S. 649; Fielding v. Turner [1903] 1 K. B. 867, 89 L. T. N. S. 273, 72 L. J. K. B. 542, 51 W. R. 543, 67 J. P. 252, 20 Cox C. C. 531; Annotation, 135 A.L.R. 138. All the cited cases involved situations where playing a slot machine was held to constitute playing a game within the meaning of statutes making it an offense so to do.

  3. Matter of Konopka v. Bruckman

    50 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1943)   Cited 6 times

    No opinion. Concur: LEHMAN, Ch. J., LOUGHRAN, RIPPEY and LEWIS, JJ. Dissenting: CONWAY and DESMOND, JJ., dissent upon the ground that the record discloses circumstances which afforded scope for a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion in the manner which led to the determination of the Authority. ( Matter of Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 469; Matter of Stracquadino v. Dept. of Health, 285 N.Y. 93, 96; Matter of Kasha v. Board of Regents, 290 N.Y. 630, decided March, 1943; Matter of Conomon v. State Liquor Authority, 254 App. Div. 650, affd. 276 N.Y. 591; Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 275; Matter of Yates, 245 App. Div. 146; People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Board of Supervisors, 251 N.Y. 156, 160, 161; Matter of Fortino, 273 N.Y. 31; Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274, 279; People v. Hawk, 156 Misc. 870, affd. 268 N.Y. 678; Clement v. Federal Union Surety Co., 122 App. Div. 18; Matter of Clement [Ruehl certificate] 144 App. Div. 156, 157.) Taking no part: FINCH, J.

  4. State v. Corron

    73 N.H. 434 (N.H. 1905)   Cited 54 times
    In State v. Corron, 73 N.H. 434, 462, involving similar procedure, it was said that there was "in substance a trial, — the facts being ascertained from the statements of counsel conceded to be correct, instead of from the testimony of witnesses."

    The liquor tax law of New York (N.Y. Laws 1897, c. 312, ss. 17, 18), which is claimed to have been the model upon which the New Hampshire statute was drafted, permits the maintenance of a suit without prior conviction of the licensee. Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274, 276. The New York statute contains an express provision to that effect, doubtless considered unnecessary in the New Hampshire statute because of the omission of the condition for the payment of fines and costs, contained in the New York bond.

  5. Matter of Cullinan

    114 A.D. 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906)   Cited 7 times

    To constitute gambling it is not important who may be the loser. In the machine involved in Lyman v. Kurtz ( 166 N.Y. 274), when a five-cent piece was dropped in one of the several slots, the color upon the face of the machine denoted whether the player had won or lost and he might play for ten cents and up to a dollar. There were several chances, but he was not certain to win at all.

  6. Matter of Cullinan

    88 App. Div. 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903)   Cited 2 times

    We cannot believe that the Legislature intended that the words "suffer or permit" should receive the interpretation given to them by the learned Special Term. It has been held that where a liquor tax certificate has been issued or transferred to a person upon his application and filing of a bond, he is the principal, whom the law will look to during the conduct of the business, and will hold responsible for compliance with the statutory provisions. ( Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274.) The contention of the respondent, that the law does not permit the conviction of a person for the unauthorized unlawful acts of an agent, is not germane to this proceeding, for the reason that the application is one to revoke the certificate.

  7. City Trust, S.D. S. Co. v. Am. Brewing Co.

    88 App. Div. 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903)

    Soon after the entry of the judgment aforesaid, and about March 5, 1900, this plaintiff notified this defendant that it would look to defendant for the payment of any judgment which it might be compelled to pay in that action, and for the costs and expenses of the defense of that litigation and of the appeals. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals and the judgment was there affirmed, with costs ( Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274), and judgment for such costs was entered, amounting to $118.85. Kurtz did not appeal to the Court of Appeals apparently, or if he did, the appeal was withdrawn. April 18, 1901, this plaintiff paid the two judgments aforesaid, amounting with interest to $480.33. It also paid $640.53 for expenses and services of counsel incurred in the defense of that action on the trial and upon the appeals, viz.

  8. People v. Diotavio

    204 Misc. 830 (N.Y. Sp. Sess. 1953)   Cited 1 times

    Human ingenuity in inventing devices to appeal to the undeniable gambling instincts in man (and that term is used generically to include women and children as well) apparently knows no bounds, and the cases are replete with instance after instance of the continued efforts of slot machine manufacturers to get around the salutary provisions of our Penal Law which seek to protect our citizens from their own frailties ( People v. Gravenhorst, 32 N.Y.S.2d 760). In an effort to overcome the decision in Lyman v. Kurtz ( 166 N.Y. 274), which held illegal a machine in which the player by the insertion of a coin either lost the amount played or received moneys in varying amounts, slot machine manufacturers produced machines which omitted the "payoff" in money but substituted therefor either additional merchandise or tokens exchangeable for such merchandise. Meeting with judicial condemnation of the use of such machines in Matter of Cullinan ( 114 A.D. 654), People ex rel. Verchereau v. Jenkins ( 153 A.D. 512) and People v. Stein (146 N.Y.S. 852), the manufacturers next proceeded to produce machines which indicated exactly what the "payoff" or win would be. These, too, were held to violate the terms of the statute ( Green v. Enright, 208 A.D. 819; People v. Spitzig, 133 Misc. 508).

  9. Matter of Hammerstein

    52 Misc. 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1907)

    In Matter of Cullinan, 88 A.D. 6, it was held that the failure of the respondent to prevent gambling under that statute clearly made out a case within its letter as well as its spirit, and that the acts of his agent forfeited his certificate. See also Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274; Cullinan v. Fidelity Casualty Co. (Parker Certificate), 84 A.D. 296; Cullinan v. Burkard, 93 id. 31; Matter of Cullinan (Kuch Certificate), 39 Misc. 641; affd., 84 A.D. 642. A portion of the respondent's brief argues the case as though this were an attempt to punish him criminally, but such, of course, is not the fact.

  10. Matter of Cullinan

    39 Misc. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1903)   Cited 1 times

    As the holder of the certificate "he is the principal whom the law will look to during the conduct of the business, and will hold responsible for compliance with the statutory provisions." Lyman v. Kurtz, 166 N.Y. 274. The evidence supports the inference of his consent to the use of this certificate by the person in charge of the place, and, indeed, the statute appears to contemplate the responsibility of the holder irrespective of an actual consent while the certificate remains in his name, but in the possession of another at the place designated for traffic in liquors.