Britt and Lyman {9} Homeowners contend that the April 2002 order is a final, appealable order under Britt and Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶¶ 7-15, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504. Britt and Lyman, however, are distinguishable. In Britt, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to make three determinations.

Britt , 1995-NMSC-075, ¶ 7, 907 P.2d 994 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lyman v. Kern , 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504 (agreeing that that an order compelling arbitration "is the last deliberative action because it effectively disposes of the matter in the [district] court, leaving nothing further to litigate" (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

It is the last deliberative order of the court if it "effectively disposes of the action" before the court, "leaving nothing further to litigate." Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, 118, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Britt, our Supreme Court held that an order referring to arbitration issues of liability and damages in a personal injury case was a final, appealable order.

See, Dewart v. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co., 139 Conn. 512, 95 A.2d 381 (1953); Simmons, supra note 22; Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. v. Teachers Ass'n, 494 N.E.2d 321 (Ind. App. 1986); Iowa Mgmt. Consultants v. Sac Fox Tribe, 656 N.W.2d 167 (Iowa 2003); Wells, supra note 22; Sawyers v. Herrin-Gear Chevrolet Co., Inc., 26 So. 3d 1026 (Miss. 2010); Wein, supra note 28; Lyman v. Kern, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504 (N.M. App. 1999); Okla. Oncology Hematology v. US Oncology, 160 P.3d 936 (Okla. 2007). See, e.g., Sawyers, supra note 30; Wein, supra note 28.

{10} Nevertheless, we need not decide in this case whether the jurisdictional requirement in Rule 5-614(C) is absolute or equivocal; even if we were to construe the requirement as an equivocal jurisdictional matter, this case presents none of the extremely unusual circumstances that would otherwise justify an exception from the time requirements of Rule 5-614. See Serrano, 117 N.M. at 278, 871 P.2d at 374 ("Only the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties-such as error on the part of the court [in causing the untimely filing]-will warrant overlooking procedural defects."); see also Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 7, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504 ("[I]f the order compelling arbitration was a final order, Defendants failed to appeal the order in a timely fashion and in the absence of unusual circumstances, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider their appeal." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, No. 26,150 (2000).

Once it appears that there is, . . . the court's inquiry is ended." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504 (explaining that "[t]he fact that all issues between the parties were referred to arbitration indicates that the trial court divested itself of any further power to address any of the issues of law or fact presented by the case," and holding that the district court's order compelling arbitration was a final order for purposes of appeal). However, for reasons that are not clear from the record, the district court did not "proceed summarily to decide the issue" presented by Makwa's motion to compel arbitration as required by the Uniform Arbitration Act.

Thus, if either of these orders were final orders as to Century, Praxis "failed to appeal the order in a timely fashion and in the absence of unusual circumstances, this [C]ourt does not have jurisdiction to consider [the] appeal." Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 7, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504. {8} On appeal, Praxis claims that the only final order from which it could have appealed was the June 13, 2013 stipulated order dismissing Praxis's cross-claims against the remaining defendants because this order disposed entirely of all Praxis's remaining cross-claims. However, Praxis does not challenge that order in any substantive way.

We raised this issue on our own motion because if KRSC were appealing the order compelling arbitration and that order was a final appealable order, then the appeal would have been untimely. See Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504. The arguments made in the briefs, however, clarified that KRSC's appeal is from the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award, not from the order compelling arbitration, and the appeal is therefore timely.

The district court also granted Citadel's motion to compel arbitration and denied Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. The district court's order is a final order subject to immediate appeal. Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504 (explaining that an order compelling arbitration and divesting district court of "further power to address any of the issues of law or fact presented by the case" is a final order for purposes of appeal). II. DISCUSSION

Furthermore, this Court held that "by proceeding to arbitration after the trial court entered an order compelling arbitration without any appeal of the order, the parties `forfeited their ability to challenge not only the order itself, but also the loss of the opportunity to try their case to a jury.'" Id. (quoting Lyman v. Kern, 2000-NMCA-013, ¶ 17, 128 N.M. 582, 995 P.2d 504). {15} Even though Section 44-7A-24(5) of the Uniform Arbitration Act deals with a hearing that has been completed on its merits, and in our case it has not, we can draw support for our holding from it.