Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3407-13T2
02-16-2016
SHERILL L. LYM, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and SUNOVION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.
Sherill L. Lym, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arupa Barua, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Carroll and Sumners. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 435,536. Sherill L. Lym, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arupa Barua, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Sunovion Research and Development has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claimant Sherill L. Lym appeals from a March 5, 2014 final decision of the Board of Review finding her ineligible for continued unemployment benefits, and requiring her to repay $15,886 in benefits that she already received. Our examination of the record, in light of our standard of review, satisfies us that the Board's decision was properly premised upon facts in the record and consistent with relevant statutory provisions. Accordingly, we affirm.
The record reflects that Lym was employed by Sunovion Pharmaceuticals Inc. from October 2009, until she was terminated effective June 29, 2011. Sunovion provided Lym with a severance package that included a $79,216.50 payment, medical/dental coverage, and miscellaneous other benefits. Lym simultaneously applied for unemployment benefits on June 26, 2011. The claim established a weekly benefit amount of $598.
On June 24, 2012, after her original benefits ran out, Lym filed a claim for successive or transitional benefits. Initially, by notice mailed on July 2, 2012, Lym's claim was approved, up to a $15,886 maximum benefit amount. Although unclear from the record, it appears that the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) mistakenly deemed the severance payment Lym received from Sunovion to be wages she earned after her termination. Consequently, Lym was paid unemployment benefits of $611 per week for the weeks ending June 30, 2012 through December 22, 2012, totaling $15,886.
On July 17, 2013, following a redetermination of Lym's eligibility, the Division ruled Lym's successive claim invalid because she lacked the requisite re-qualifying wages. The same day, the Division issued a Request for Refund of Unemployment Benefits in the amount of $15,886 for the benefits Lym had been paid while ineligible.
Lym appealed, and, after a hearing, the Appeal Tribunal found Lym ineligible for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(e)(6). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d), the Appeal Tribunal also required Lym to repay the benefits she received to which she was not entitled. Lym next appealed to the Board of Review, which affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision on March 5, 2014. The present appeal followed.
N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(e)(6) provides that to be eligible for benefits in a successive benefit year, an individual must have earned at least six times her previous weekly benefit amount and have had four weeks of employment since the beginning of the immediately preceding benefit year. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that Lym did not meet these statutory eligibility requirements.
N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1) requires the full repayment of unemployment benefits received by any individual who was not entitled to receive the benefits regardless of the reason for the overpayment. This result follows whether the employee was aware of her non-entitlement, expended benefits in reliance on the initial determination, or would face difficulty repaying the benefits. Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674-76 (App. Div. 1997). The Division is required by regulation to issue a demand for a refund of improperly paid benefits whenever a determination of overpayment is made. N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.1. We have recognized that the recovery of such benefits "furthers the purpose of the unemployment compensation laws," and that "[t]he public interest clearly is not served when the Unemployment Trust Fund is depleted by the failure to recoup benefits erroneously paid to an unentitled recipient, however blameless he or she may have been." Bannan, supra, 299 N.J. Super. at 674.
Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). In challenging an agency conclusion, the claimant carries a substantial burden of persuasion and the determination of the administrative agency carries a presumption of correctness. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002). We also accord substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing. Bd. of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 144 N.J. 16, 31 (1996). Further, "[w]e are obliged to defer to the Board when its factual findings are based on sufficient credible evidence in the record." Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty. v. Bd. of Review, 197 N.J. 339, 367 (2009). We overturn an agency determination only if it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence as a whole, or inconsistent with the enabling statute or legislative policy. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210-11 (1997).
Applying these principles, we conclude the Board's determination of Lym's ineligibility for successive benefits is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, McGowan, supra, 347 N.J. Super. at 563, and fully comports with applicable law. We further conclude that the Board's decision requiring Lym to repay the benefits was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Our decision is not, however, intended to preclude Lym from seeking to establish a reasonable repayment schedule. See N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(d).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION