Opinion
5:19-CV-459-FL
03-30-2020
HILDRED MANUEL LYLES, II, Plaintiff, v. NORWOOD CARLTON TILLEY, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This case, brought by plaintiff Hildred Manuel Lyles, II ("plaintiff"), is before the court for a frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). By order entered 5 March 2020 (D.E. 21), the court allowed plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2) and (b)(1)(2). The frivolity review was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See unnumbered 5 Nov. 2019 Public D.E. As set out below, it will be recommended that this case be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) to (iii).
This is the name plaintiff gives for himself in the complaint at issue. See Compl. (D.E. 3-2) 1; see also id. at 8, 9 (discussing plaintiff's objection to court's version of his name). In his IFP motion, he identifies himself as Hildred Manuel Lyles Jr. See IFP Mot. 1. The offender information report for plaintiff (offender ID 0251566) on the website of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety ("NCDPS") gives his name as Hildred M Lyles without any generational designation. See NCPDS, Offender Search, Offender Public Information Search/Inmate Locator, Entry for Hildred M Lyles ("NCDPS report") (https://www.ncdps.gov/) (last visited 30 Mar. 2020). The court is taking judicial notice of the NCDPS report pursuant to Rule 20(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
In the complaint at issue, filed 4 November 2019, and the ostensible supporting filings (D.E. 6 to D.E. 14 and D.E. 17), plaintiff appears to assert claims arising primarily from his conviction on 18 October 1993 in the Superior Court of Orange County (North Carolina) for first-degree rape, for which he is serving a life sentence in the custody of the NCDPS, and other cases against him in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ("MDNC") and this court. See, e.g., Compl. 2; NCDPS rep. 1-2. He alleges: "This Claim is in regard to criminal acts and human rights violations committed by the actors in ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT in Case Number 1992CRS008215 and in all EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA — ALL MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN Case Number(s) [unspecified]." Compl. 2 (capitalization original). Plaintiff also seeks vacatur of several criminal convictions in Greene County and McDowell County, although he does not appear to set out allegations regarding any purported deficiencies in these cases. See id. at 17. Plaintiff names nine individuals as defendants: two judges, two prosecutors, and five NCDPS officials. See, e.g., Compl. 1-2; Summonses (D.E. 3-4 to D.E. 3-10).
Plaintiff filed this complaint as an attachment to his IFP motion. He had commenced this case by filing an entirely different complaint (D.E. 1) without paying a filing fee, which prompted the court's entry of an order of deficiency (D.E. 2). Plaintiff responded to this order by filing his IFP motion.
The defendants are: Senior District Judge Norwood Carlton Tilley, Jr. and Superior Court Judge Richard Allen Baddour, Jr.; Assistant United States Attorney Sandra Jane Hairston and District Attorney James R. Woodall, Jr.; and NCDPS officials Secretary Erik Hooks, Director Kenneth E. Lassiter, Administrator Danny Safrit, Administrator Katy Poole, and Superintendent James Vaughan.
Specific allegations of note include the following: plaintiff is petitioning "to vacate what is lawfully a void judgment, and in all cases the judges have outright denied the hearing, which is a denial of due process, therefore, I cannot expect justice in court and must create my own remedy," Compl. 2; the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the rape case and the judgment of conviction is therefore void, id. at 3-5, 7; plaintiff was wrongfully sentenced in the MDNC in 1992 on apparent bank robbery charges transferred from this court pursuant to a plea agreement the terms of which the prosecutor mispresented, id. at 7-8, 9, 17; and plaintiff was forced to plead guilty in the rape case, id. at 10.
Plaintiff summarizes his argument on jurisdiction as follows:
Summarization of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction: It is not the judge that decides jurisdiction. It is the prosecutor's paperwork on the record of the court which decides jurisdiction. If there is no evidence of jurisdiction on the record, the judge has no discretion, but MUST vacate the judgment. The judge's failure to define the jurisdiction of the court was a deliberate and intentional miscarriage of justice, a violation of the judge's oath to uphold the constitutions, rendering the judgment void.Compl. 5 (capitalization original).
Plaintiff asserts claims for: violation of public oath; breach of fiduciary duty; constructive treason; sedition; felony perjury; trespass upon the law; malfeasance of office; due process violations; conducting a sham legal process; misapplication of codes; fraud upon the court; obstruction of justice; deprivation of rights under color of law; conspiracy against rights; conflict of interest; felony misappropriation of funds; theft by deception; failure to disclose financial dealings in plaintiff's name; falsification of accounts by public officers; kidnapping; human trafficking; false imprisonment; racketeering; identity theft; securities fraud; entrapment; involuntary servitude; unlawful conversion; unjust enrichment; criminal mischaracterization and misrepresentation of plaintiff's being and political status; violations of international law on human rights and domestic terrorism; putative fraud; and dishonest services through scheme or artifice to defraud. Id. at 15. He seeks damages of $39,550,000.00 comprised of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and damages for "unlawful imprisonment." Id. at 13-14. He also asks the court to vacate his rape conviction and several Greene County and McDowell County convictions, and immediately release him from prison. Id. at 17.
Plaintiff states that he asserts his claims generally pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985(3), any claims for declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and his claims for injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283 and 2284 and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 6. He alleges that the court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 1332 (diversity jurisdiction), 1343(a)(3) (jurisdiction over certain civil rights actions), and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Id.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR FRIVOLITY REVIEW
A case brought by a person who is proceeding in forma pauperis, that is, without prepaying filing fees, is subject to a frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). While a party who is incarcerated is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee, see id. § 1915(b)(1), his complaint nevertheless is subject to a frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That provision provides that the court must dismiss a case if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992) (standard for frivolousness).
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Case law explains that the complaint must "'state[ ] a plausible claim for relief that 'permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct' based upon 'its judicial experience and common sense.'" Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Likewise, a complaint is insufficient if it offers merely "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In evaluating frivolity specifically, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys. White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Instead, the court is permitted to "pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Provided that a plaintiff's claims are not clearly baseless, the court must weigh the factual allegations in plaintiff's favor in its frivolity analysis. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The court must read the complaint carefully to determine if a plaintiff has alleged specific facts sufficient to support the claims asserted. White, 886 F.2d at 724.
A court may consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of the frivolity review. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure"); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, at *2-4 (D.S.C. 8 Jan. 2007) (discussing the lack of diversity jurisdiction during frivolity review as a basis for dismissal). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific situations authorized by Congress." Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968). The presumption is that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless it is demonstrated that jurisdiction exists. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336 (1895). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking jurisdiction, here plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction."). The complaint must affirmatively allege the grounds for jurisdiction. Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. If in a frivolity review under § 1915 the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the statute requires the court to dismiss the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). More generally, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
One basis for subject matter jurisdiction, so-called federal question jurisdiction, is that a claim arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Another basis is diversity of citizenship or so-called diversity jurisdiction, which requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be different from that of each defendant. Id. § 1332; see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). There are also statutes conferring jurisdiction for particular types of cases.
III. GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
Each of plaintiff's claims is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on one or more the following grounds: (1) the principles recognized in Heck v. Humphrey; (2) lack of diversity jurisdiction; (3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (4) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted due to deficient pleading; and (5) immunity. Each ground is addressed in turn below.
A. Heck v. Humphrey
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code ("§ 1983") provides a cause of action for alleged constitutional violations. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 487 (emphasis original).
Heck v. Humphrey applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"), which provides a right of action to protect the equal right to make and enforce contracts, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 ("§ 1985"), which provides a right of action for damages resulting from a conspiracy to violate civil rights. See, e.g., Drake v. Court of Common Pleas of Washington Cty., Pa, No. CV 17-1489, 2018 WL 1136201, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 30 Jan. 2018) ("Where a claim is raised in a civil rights action, such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a) and 1988 . . . and success in that civil action would necessarily call into question a conviction, such a claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey . . . ."), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2018 WL 1136120 (26 Feb. 2018); Osborne v. Carey, No. 2:16-CV-01651, 2017 WL 939008, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. 9 Mar. 2017) (§ 1985 claims) (citing Poston v. Shappert, 222 F. App'x 301, at *1 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); Haynesworth v. Ozmint, No. C.A. 8:08-1841-PMDBH, 2009 WL 3233470, at *4 (D.S.C. 30 Sept. 2009) (noting that "Heck bar applies equally to cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986" (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd sub nom. Haynesworth v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 367 F. App'x 408 (4th Cir. 2010). In addition, Heck v. Humphrey applies not only to claims for damages, but also claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. See, e.g., Legette v. Wilson, No. CV 4:19-1845-JFA-KFM, 2019 WL 5884302, at *4 (D.S.C. 12 Nov. 2019) (citing, e.g., Mobley v. Tompkins, 473 F. App'x 337, 337 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)).
Here, as noted, plaintiff cites § 1981 and § 1985 as authorizing his claims. See Compl. 6. Plaintiff, though, has made no showing that his rape conviction has been reversed or that any of the other actions specified in Heck v. Humphrey have been taken with respect to it. Indeed, to the contrary, the allegations by plaintiff, as well as his current incarceration, suggest that the conviction remains in force. The NCDPS offender information report for plaintiff confirms that the rape conviction remains in effect. See NCDPS Rep. 1. Nor has plaintiff made the required showing with respect to the alleged convictions in Greene County and McDowell County that he seeks to have vacated. Accordingly, any claims by plaintiff challenging the rape conviction and the convictions in Greene County and McDowell County are not cognizable under § 1981 or § 1985 and should be dismissed. Green v. McClary, No. 2:07-4160-TLW-TER, 2008 WL 4177307, at *3 (D.S.C. 28 Dec. 2007) ("Until the plaintiff's convictions or fines are set aside, any civil rights action based on the convictions and fines will be barred because of the holding in Heck v. Humphrey."), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2014 WL 4662428, at *1 (4 Sept. 2008); see also Martinez v. Chappell, No. C 12-4356 PJH, 2013 WL 504809, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 11 Feb. 2013) ("Plaintiff is challenging the validity of the restitution aspect of his conviction, but the conviction has not been invalidated, so this claim must be dismissed."); Hillman v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-201, 2011 WL 797315, at *5 (S.D. Ohio 11 Jan. 2011) (rejecting § 1983 claim challenging imposition of a fine as part of a criminal conviction where "[n]either that conviction nor any other portion of Plaintiff's conviction and sentence have been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus"), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2011 WL 795732, at *1 (1 Mar. 2011).
B. Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction
While plaintiff cites the statute providing for diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as a basis for jurisdiction of this case, Compl. 6, he fails to demonstrate that it exists. He identifies himself as a citizen of North Carolina in the civil cover sheet. Civ. Cover Sheet (D.E. 3-1) § III no. 1. But he does not allege the citizenship of any defendants, although he does allege that they are all residents of North Carolina. Id. Diversity jurisdiction therefore cannot salvage any claims over which federal question jurisdiction does not exist.
C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Independent of the principles in Heck v. Humphrey, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from sitting "in direct review of state court decisions." District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-84 (1983). "[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself." Davani v. Virginia Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)). This doctrine also prohibits a district court from reviewing constitutional claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision. Shooting Point, LLC v. Cumming, 368 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 2004). A constitutional claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision if "'success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.'" Id. (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Curley v. Adams Creek Assocs., 409 F. App'x 678, 680 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Rooker-Feldman precluded subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that the state court violated her due process rights by failing to give her notice before disposing of real property owned by her); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a federal claim is "inextricably intertwined" where "'in order to grant the federal relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state] court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual'" (quoting Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997))).
In other words, Rooker-Feldman applies "when the federal action 'essentially amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review of [the state court's] decision by a lower federal court.'" Davis v. Durham Mental Health Devel. Disabilities Substance Abuse Area Auth., 320 F. Supp. 2d 378, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (quoting Plyer, 129 F.3d at 733). "The key inquiry is not whether the state court ruled on the precise issue raised in federal court, but whether the 'state-court loser who files suit in federal court seeks redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself.'" Willner v. Frey, 243 F. App'x 744, 747 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davani, 434 F.3d at 718). "'[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.'" Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)).
As discussed, a principal focus of plaintiff's allegations is alleged improprieties in the Orange County case resulting in his conviction for rape, including the court's lack of jurisdiction and his being forced to plead guilty. Determination in plaintiff's favor of the claims challenging the rape conviction would necessarily require this court to find that the state court proceedings were conducted in an improper manner and produced an improper result. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this court from making such a determination. Plaintiff, of course, retained access to the state courts for pursuit of such claims. These claims by plaintiff are accordingly subject to dismissal on this independent ground. See Dye v. Hatfield, No. Civ.1:03CV01077, 2004 WL 3266029, at *5 (M.D.N.C. 26 Aug. 2004) (finding that civil rights claims based upon "an alleged conspiracy among virtually everyone involved with the North Carolina state court system" which "appear to be nothing more than a collateral attack on decisions of the North Carolina state courts in civil and criminal matters" were barred by Rooker-Feldman); see also Richardson v. Greene, No. 5:11-CV-202-H, 2011 WL 8318429, at *1 (E.D.N.C. 6 July 2011) (affirming as frivolous plaintiff's complaint which sought review of a state court decision denying his request for appeal of a state court criminal conviction); Newman v. Alexander, No. Civ. A. 7:02CV01024, 2003 WL 1746320, at *4 (W.D. Va. 1 Apr. 2013) ("[Plaintiff] is essentially attempting to attack her criminal conviction by accusing the judicial officers involved in her criminal prosecution of conspiring against her. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this court from hearing claims that seek to determine whether the decisions of a state court were wrong.").
The same conclusion would ostensibly apply to alleged improprieties in the proceedings underlying his request that convictions in Greene County and McDowell County be vacated although, as noted, he did not set out any allegations addressing specifically any such alleged improprieties. See Compl. 17.
D. Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief May be Granted Due to Deficient Pleading
If for purposes of analysis the court were deemed to have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, the deficient pleading of them in the complaint (as supplemented by the ostensibly supporting documents) would subject the complaint to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. While pro se litigants are entitled to leniency, such leniency is not without bounds. See Holder v. U.S.Marshals Office, No. 5:16-CV-00145-FL, 2016 WL 3919502, at *1 (E.D.N.C. 17 May 2016) ("[T]he principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits."), mem. & recomm. adopted, 2016 WL 3920213 (15 July 2016). Plaintiff's complaint exceeds the permissible bounds.
Specifically, plaintiff's allegations are frequently unintelligible, seemingly fanciful, and conclusory, devoid of clear factual support. They generally fail to describe in a meaningful way the conduct of which he is complaining and to identify which defendants engaged in such conduct. Indeed, aside from naming them, the complaint fails to make any allegations at all regarding numerous defendants. Because of these deficiencies, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and subjects it to dismissal on that ground. See, e.g., McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are 'so nutty,' 'delusional,' or 'wholly fanciful' as to be simply 'unbelievable.'"); Fetherson v. Blackmon, No. CV 0:16-3189-JFA-PJG, 2017 WL 1365114, at *2 (D.S.C. 9 Feb. 2017) (recommending dismissing as frivolous claims against defendant that are "conclusory and lack supporting facts"), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2017 WL 1344616 (12 Apr. 2017); Cush-El v. State, No. 1:16CV176, 2016 WL 1212427, at *2 (M.D.N.C. 10 Mar. 2016) (recommending dismissal of complaint wherein "[p]laintiff recites claims that consist largely of incomprehensible ramblings composed of commercial and legal doctrines"), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2016 WL 1228626 (28 Mar. 2016); Padilla v. Priest, No. 1:13-CV-287, 2013 WL 12156670, at *2 (E.D. Va. 25 June 2013) (dismissing case as frivolous where complaint was "devoid of any facts to support Plaintiff's allegations" and "contains precisely the type of naked assertions of wrongdoing which are unsupported by any factual enhancement and therefore necessitates dismissal"), aff'd, 543 F. App'x 353 (4th Cir. 2013).
As an illustrative example, plaintiff states:
Respondents spelled claimant's name in all block capital letters—a fraud. It is a diminishment of my status, reducing me to slave status, as well as declaration of war against me, which is treason. Respondents spelled claimant's mail location in all block capital letters and used a two-letter state abbreviation and a zip code which is designed to place me in a federal zone without my consent—a fraud.Compl. 9.
E. Immunity
Of the two prosecutors named as defendants, plaintiff appears to assert allegations regarding the conduct of only one, the prosecutor in the MDNC. Even if these allegations were otherwise deemed sufficient to state actionable claims against the prosecutor, the claims would be barred by prosecutorial immunity. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-43 (2009) (citing, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976)); Ehrlich v. Giuliani, 910 F.2d 1220, 1222 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that federal prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability for damages in the initiation and pursuing of a criminal prosecution pursuant to Imbler and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)); Powell v. United States, No. 5:12-CT-3052-FL, 2012 WL 5395814, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 5 Nov. 2012) (holding that a prosecutor's absolute immunity extends to plea negotiations).
Similarly, even if plaintiff's allegations against the two judges named as defendants were otherwise deemed sufficient to state claims against them, absolute judicial immunity would bar the claims. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 & n.12; Jackson v. Houck, 181 F. App'x 372, 373 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1991)); Greene v. Ash, No. CV 1:15-14561, 2015 WL 8489416, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. 5 Nov. 2015), rep. & recomm. adopted, No. CV 1:15-14561, 2015 WL 8492760 (10 Dec. 2015).
The paucity of allegations regarding the NCDPS officials named as defendants makes unnecessary and essentially impossible meaningful analysis of the extent to which any claims against these defendants are barred by qualified immunity. See generally Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) ("Even if a correctional officer has violated a prisoner's constitutional right, however, he is shielded from liability by qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages to the extent that 'their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'") (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) to (iii).
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation and Associated Orders be served on plaintiff or, if represented, his counsel. Plaintiff shall have until 13 April 2020 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding District Judge must conduct her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If a party does not file written objections by the foregoing deadline, 13 April 2020, plaintiff will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding District Judge as described above, and the presiding District Judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review, subject to the District Judge's consideration of any separate memorandum plaintiff files on the issue of entry of a pre-filing injunction. In addition, plaintiff's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar plaintiff from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding District Judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of March 2020.
/s/_________
James E. Gates
United States Magistrate Judge