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Lyles v. L.A. Cnty. Courts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Aug 24, 2016
Case No. CV 16-5401 DOC (SS) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016)

Opinion

Case No. CV 16-5401 DOC (SS)

08-24-2016

JOSEPH D. LYLES, Petitioner, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY COURTS, COMPTON, Respondent.


MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 20, 2016, Joseph D. Lyles ("Petitioner"), a California resident proceeding pro se, filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ("Petition," Dkt. No. 1). For the reasons discussed below, the Petition must be dismissed with leave to amend.

"The filing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is analogous to the filing of a civil complaint . . . ." Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036, 1038 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 208 (2003) ("[A] habeas suit begins with the filing of an application for habeas corpus relief -- the equivalent of a complaint in an ordinary civil case."). A Magistrate Judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval of the District Judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court has the authority to dismiss habeas actions sua sponte under the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 4 ("If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner."); see also Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 641 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rule 4); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that summary dismissal is appropriate where petition's allegations are vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, patently frivolous or false) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75-76 (1977)).

II.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION

The Petition appears to challenge a 2013 Los Angeles County conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to sell in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11359. (Petition at 10, 64). The Petition purports to raise thirteen grounds for relief, some of which are further subdivided into sub-grounds for relief and many of which overlap. (Id. at 9-59).

Ground One alleges that Petitioner's sentence was wrongly enhanced based upon an earlier conviction for a crime of violence. (Id. at 9-11). Ground One is divided into several sub-grounds arguing that various witnesses who testified in support of the earlier conviction conspired to introduce perjured testimony. (Id. at 9-23).

Ground Two appears to argue that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Petitioner intended to sell marijuana: he claims that he stores marijuana in numerous baggies to ration it for his own use, not because he intends to sell it to others. (Id. at 25-27). Ground Two further argues that Petitioner was unlawfully searched for marijuana by Los Angeles Metro Transit Police officers. Petitioner raises similar unlawful search claims in Grounds Three, Four, Five, and Eight. (Id. at 23-34, 39).

Ground Six appears intended to state a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act, but simply reiterates Petitioner's contentions that: (1) he was unlawfully searched; (2) perjured testimony was introduced to obtain his earlier conviction; and (3) his marijuana was not packaged for sale to others. (Id. at 34-38). Ground Seven argues that, at the time of his arrest, he had a "valid medical marijuana recommendation." (Id. at 38-39).

Grounds Nine and Eleven argue that California's prisons are overcrowded and that non-violent offenders should be released before violent offenders. (Id. at 42, 52-53). Grounds Ten and Thirteen allege that Petitioner had no access to marijuana in prison for medical use or for use in Petitioner's religious rituals. (Id. at 40-52, 56-59). Ground Twelve alleges that Petitioner lacked access to a phone in prison. (Id. at 53-56).

In the scanned version of the Petition available on the Court's docket, the page describing Ground Nine is in the wrong place.

III.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Court must dismiss the Petition due to the defects discussed below. However, the Court grants Petitioner leave to amend. A. The Petition Must Be Dismissed Because Petitioner Did Not Use The Appropriate Form

Local Civil Rule 83-16.1 provides that "[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall be submitted on the forms approved and supplied by the Court." Here, Petitioner did not use the form issued by the Central District of California, and the Petition does not include all of the information requested on the Central District's standard form. This Court adheres to the practice of asking a petitioner who has not used the required form to submit his petition on the local form. See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 2 advisory committee's note to 2004 amendments (acknowledging this practice). Accordingly, the Petition is dismissed with leave to amend so that Petitioner may file a First Amended Petition using the correct form. B. The Petition Must Be Dismissed Because It Fails To Comply With Rule 8

Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Rule 8(a) requires only "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'") (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A pleading can violate Rule 8 in "multiple ways." Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). "One well-known type of violation is when a pleading says too little." Id. (citation omitted). "The Rule is also violated, though, when a pleading says too much." Id. (citing Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Additionally, Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, which demands an even "more detailed statement" than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 649 (2005), requires that a petition "specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner" and "state the facts supporting each ground." Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.

While Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires a "more detailed statement," the instant Petition is needlessly lengthy and repetitive. It is over fifty-nine pages long, excluding exhibits and, as noted above, there is extensive overlap and duplication in Petitioner's claims. A respondent would have difficulty understanding and responding to the Petition as currently drafted. The Petition must be dismissed with leave to file a First Amended Petition complying with the authorities discussed above. C. Several Of Petitioner's Claims Are Defective Or Are Not Cognizable On Habeas Corpus Review

The foregoing defects in the Petition are sufficient to warrant dismissal. However, in the interest of providing Petitioner with a full opportunity to file a First Amended Petition containing meritorious claims, the Court identifies several legal deficiencies in his current claims that likely warrant modifying or omitting these claims.

First, it is unclear whether Petitioner is currently "in custody" pursuant to the challenged conviction. A § 2254 petitioner must show that he is "in custody" pursuant to the challenged state court judgment at the time his petition is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). Although incarceration, parole and certain other restraints on a person's liberty qualify as "custody" for purposes of section 2254, a person does not remain "in custody" under a state court judgment simply because that judgment may be used to enhance sentences for later crimes. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-92; see also Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401 (2001). The instant Petition appears to challenge a 2013 conviction for which Petitioner "took a plea deal of (16) sixteen months at half time." (Petition at 7, 9-10). It therefore appears that Petitioner was not imprisoned under that conviction when he filed the Petition on July 20, 2016. It is possible, however, that other restraints on Petitioner's liberty place him "in custody" for the purpose of challenging the 2013 conviction. A First Amended Petition should identify any such restraints.

Assuming that Petitioner is "in custody," a First Amended Petition should also name a proper respondent, i.e., the state officer having custody of Petitioner, which might include his probation or parole officer and the official in charge of the parole or probation agency, or the state correctional agency, as appropriate. See Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996). The current Respondent, "Los Angeles County Courts, Compton," does not appear to be an appropriate respondent.

Relatedly, to the extent that Petitioner seeks to challenge the use of a prior conviction to enhance the sentence on his 2013 conviction, that challenge is barred and should be omitted from any First Amended Petition. See Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Attorney, 532 U.S. at 403-04 ("[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right . . . the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.").

Next, several of Petitioner's claims appear to allege violations of Petitioner's Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures. (Petition at 23-34, 36-37, 39). However, Fourth Amendment violations are not cognizable on habeas review if the petitioner had "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim." See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). The relevant inquiry is not whether Petitioner did in fact litigate his Fourth Amendment claims, or even whether his claims were correctly decided, but rather whether he had the opportunity to litigate such claims. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). California provides criminal defendants with such an opportunity through the procedures of California Penal Code § 1538.5, which permits defendants to move to suppress evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990). Absent evidence that Petitioner lacked an opportunity for "full and fair" litigation of his Fourth Amendment claims, they cannot form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief and should be omitted from any First Amended Petition.

Several of Petitioner's claims challenge the conditions of his confinement. (See Petition at 40-56). However, the exclusive remedy for conditions-of-confinement claims is a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a habeas corpus petition. See Nettles v. Grounds, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 4072465 at *9 (9th Cir. July 26, 2016) (because success on petitioner's claims would not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release, claims did not fall within "core of habeas corpus" and had to be brought under § 1983). Although a habeas corpus petition may be construed as a § 1983 complaint, Petitioner's informed consent to do so is required, and the pleading must be amenable to conversion "on its face," i.e., it must "name[] the correct defendants and seek the correct relief." Id. at *10. Moreover, the Court cannot construe a habeas corpus petition as a § 1983 complaint if it contains claims that fall within the "core of habeas corpus," i.e., claims that seek release from custody. See id. at *3 (Ninth Circuit has "long held" that habeas corpus is the "exclusive vehicle" for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas corpus, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action). If Petitioner files a First Amended Petition seeking his release from custody, it should not also include § 1983 claims that, if meritorious, would not lead to release from custody.

Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner seeks injunctive relief for his conditions-of-confinement claims, Petitioner's release from incarceration likely "extinguishes his legal interest in an injunction." McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2004).

Finally, Petitioner cites and discusses California law throughout his Petition. However, a federal court conducting habeas review is limited to deciding whether a state court decision violates the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam). Federal habeas corpus relief "does not lie for errors of state law." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) ("[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts." (emphasis in original)). Petitioner also "may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process." Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the First Amended Petition should omit claims based solely on errors of state law.

IV.

CONCLUSION

If Petitioner wishes to pursue this action, he must file a First Amended Petition within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Petitioner must use the form approved by the Central District of California, a copy of which is attached. The First Amended Petition shall be complete in itself and shall bear both the designation "First Amended Petition" and the case number assigned to this action. It shall not refer in any manner to the original Petition.

Petitioner is advised to clearly identify, to the best of his ability, the dates he filed any appeals as well as the dates of any rulings on those appeals. Similarly, Petitioner is advised to clearly identify the dates he filed any state habeas petitions as well as the dates of any rulings on those petitions. Petitioner shall also, to the extent possible, list the claims raised in each of his direct appeals and habeas petitions filed in state court. Finally, in presenting his claims in his First Amended Petition, Petitioner should assert each of his grounds for federal habeas relief as a separate "claim" by (1) identifying the constitutional right that he alleges was violated, followed by (2) a statement of all facts that support that particular claim. The First Amended Petition should avoid grouping allegations of purported violations of different constitutional rights committed by different actors based on different facts in the same "claim."

Petitioner is further cautioned that failure to timely file a First Amended Petition will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

If Petitioner no longer wishes to pursue this action , he may use the attached form Notice of Dismissal and voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice. Petitioner is advised that any dismissed claims may later be subject to the one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) , as amended by AEDPA.

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 24, 2016

/S/_________

SUZANNE H. SEGAL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


Summaries of

Lyles v. L.A. Cnty. Courts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Aug 24, 2016
Case No. CV 16-5401 DOC (SS) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016)
Case details for

Lyles v. L.A. Cnty. Courts

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH D. LYLES, Petitioner, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY COURTS, COMPTON…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Aug 24, 2016

Citations

Case No. CV 16-5401 DOC (SS) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016)