Lyle v. Waddle

50 Citing cases

  1. Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co.

    615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981)   Cited 43 times
    Addressing trespass to chattels, and citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218

    Liability does not attach, unless the wrongful detention is accompanied by actual damage to the property or deprives the owner of its use for a substantial period of time. See Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770 (1945); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 (1965). Even in the absence of damages, a trespass has occurred which is important in determining the legal relations between the parties.

  2. Doe v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.

    855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993)   Cited 37 times
    Recognizing conflict of authorities

    Quaker argued below that Doe had no action for defamation because its statements were truthful and not defamatory as a matter of law and because Doe herself published the statements to third parties. SmithKline asserted below that it was not liable for defamation because its statements were absolutely privileged as truthful or, alternatively, its statements were conditionally privileged because SmithKline owed Quaker a duty under their contract to report the test results truthfully. For an action to exist for libel or slander, the statement must be published to third parties. Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 771 (1945); Houston Belt Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743, 751 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 497, 54 L.Ed.2d 447 (1977). In this case, Doe alleges that this publication occurred when she felt compelled to explain the withdrawal of Quaker's offer to other potential employers.

  3. Smith v. Holley

    827 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 37 times
    Concluding that consent barred former employee's defamation suit, in part because, unlike in Buck, the employee knew that her former employers had unfavorable opinions about her performance

    Texas follows this general rule, and the courts have applied it when a defendant has given defamatory information in response to a plaintiff's general authorization or request for comments. "[I]f the publication of which the plaintiff complains was consented to, authorized, invited or procured by the plaintiff, he cannot recover for injuries sustained by reason of the publication." Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945) (plaintiff asked for or consented to defendant physician's writing of letter concerning her treatment). The Lyle court based this ruling on its earlier statement of the same principle.

  4. Brooks v. AAA Cooper Transportation

    781 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D. Tex. 2011)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that the Privacy Act of 1974 is applicable only to federal agencies

    Under Texas law, "it is clear that one can consent to defamation, and that consent creates an absolute bar to a defamation suit." Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 439-40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1992, writ denied); see also Lyle v. Waddle, 188 S.W. 2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1945); Oliphint v. Richards, 167 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.], 2005, pet. denied); Rouch v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 170, 172-73 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2001, pet. denied). The scope of a plaintiff's consent, however, "does not exceed what is reasonable in light of the language or circumstances that created it."

  5. Bowser v. McDonald's Corp.

    714 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Tex. 1989)   Cited 31 times
    Concluding that employment remained at will where disclaimer in "the employee handbook at issue expressly state[d] that employment [was] 'at-will'"

    Because there was no publication to a third-party, the discussion between Plaintiff and English cannot support a libel claim. Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945). Furthermore, Defendant correctly noted that internal corporate communication is not actionable when the alleged slander was solicited by Plaintiff.

  6. Coastal Oil v. Garza Energy Trust

    268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)   Cited 128 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the mineral lessor has only a royalty interest in the minerals

    In sum, Salinas does not claim damages that are recoverable. See Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 773 (1945). As already noted, this case does not involve a trespass against a possessory interest, which does not require actual injury to be actionable and may result in an award of nominal damages.

  7. Chasewood Const. Co. v. Rico

    696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 22 times
    Relying on Ake to conclude that a supervisor, as a reasonably prudent person, should have expected his defamation of the employee would be communicated to others by the employee

    A negligent communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication. The Ake case honored the holding in Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770 (1945), which holds that a plaintiff cannot recover for injuries sustained by reason of a publication which he authorized, invited or procured, but at the same time held that under the circumstances the Lyle rule was inapplicable. Those circumstances were reflected in the quoted language immediately above, as taken from the text in Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701.

  8. Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc.

    44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995)   Cited 661 times
    Holding that a showing of actual malice, which in the context of defamation refers to making a statement with knowledge that it is false, or with reckless disregard of whether it is true, defeats the qualified privilege

    The parties have argued extensively in their briefs the question whether compelled self-publication defamation is a viable cause of action in Texas. Although the general rule in Texas is that a plaintiff cannot complain of a defamation that he "consented to, authorized, invited or procured," Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945), some Texas appellate courts have recognized a limited exception when the plaintiff is compelled to repeat the statement. Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Purcell v. Seguin State Bank and Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that "Texas courts . . . recognize the narrow exception of self-compelled defamation").

  9. Purcell v. Seguin State Bank and Trust Co.

    999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that an ADEA back-pay award more than twice the amount of net lost wages was excessive because the award is not taxable and a reduction to reflect net income was therefore proper

    In the controlling Texas law, a plaintiff cannot recover for injuries from publication of defamatory material if the plaintiff consented to, authorized, invited, or procured the publication. Lyle v. Waddle, 188 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1945). The Texas courts, however, recognize the narrow exception of self-compelled defamation. For example, in Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that self-compelled defamation occurred.

  10. Vrabel v. Kagin

    Civil Action 4:20-cv-00775 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2022)

    Liability does not attach unless the wrongful detention is accompanied by actual damage to the property or deprives the owner of its use for a substantial period of time. Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770 (1945).