Summary
In Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 227 Miss. 894, 87 So.2d 289 (1956), there was an appeal from a decree of the Chancery Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi confirming title in McKendrick to certain oil, gas and mineral leases, and cancelling certain claims of Lyle Cashion Company as clouds upon his title.
Summary of this case from Cuevas v. CuevasOpinion
No. 40124.
May 7, 1956.
1. Courts — Louisiana United States District Court — venue — jurisdiction — where interest in Mississippi lands involved.
Where action for declaratory relief in regard to rights and legal relations under a contract was brought by Delaware corporation in United States District Court in Louisiana, in which district defendant resided, venue or locality of the lawsuit was proper, and the United States District Court of Louisiana had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit which involved more than $3,000 and the parties, even though interest in Mississippi land was involved in the suit and its ownership was ultimate object of the lawsuit. Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sec. 2201.
2. Jurisdiction — Louisiana United States District Court — subject matter of suit — wherein interest in Mississippi lands involved.
In such suit, it was the power of the United States District Court of Louisiana to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the suit belonged, the nature of the suit and the relief sought or grantable under it that determined the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter, and though real property, the interests in Mississippi lands, was involved, and its ownership was the ultimate object of the lawsuit, that was not the subject matter.
3. Judgments — Federal Declaratory Judgment Act — declaratory judgment — force and effect of final judgment.
Under Federal Declaratory Judgment Act a declaratory judgment has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
4. Judgments — collateral estoppel — case in point — confirmation of title of working interest in mineral leases — declaratory judgments.
Under principle of collateral estoppel, defendant, in present suit instituted in Mississippi State Court for confirmation of title of working interests in certain oil, gas and mineral leases and for cancellation of claims in regard to the leased land, was precluded from relitigating specific questions which were actually litigated and determined in prior suit referred to in Headnote 1 for declaratory relief and which were essential to judgment in prior suit, which prior suit was brought to determine rights under contract, involving land in present case.
5. Res judicata — collateral estoppel — generally.
Under one aspect of doctrine of res judicata, there is a merger of the cause of action into judgment or the doctrine may create a bar precluding a party from maintaining another action on same cause of action irrespective of what issues were litigated or determined in former action, and other aspect of doctrine, which is theory of collateral estoppel, a party is precluded from relitigating in another action a specific question actually litigated and determined by and essential to judgment, even though different cause of action is subject of subsequent proceeding, and such principle applies to declaratory judgments the same as to any other judgment.
6. Judgments — declaratory judgment — as working collateral estoppel on specific issues again raised in State Court.
In a declaratory judgment action, in which action complainant seeks a judicial declaration of legal relations between the parties, the judgment entered operates as an absolute bar to maintaining another action only when subsequent suit again seeks declaratory relief, and otherwise collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata doctrine applies and precludes relitigating specific issues determined by and essential to declaratory judgment when those specific issues are sought to be again disputed in subsequent suit.
7. Judgments — of one State — as not determining and affecting title to land in another State.
A judgment of the courts of one state cannot directly affect and determine title to real property in another.
8. Estoppel — prior declaratory judgment in Louisiana Federal District Court determining rights of parties under contract involving lands in Mississippi — collateral estoppel — on specific issues raised in subsequent suit in Mississippi State Court — declaratory judgment as evidence of title.
Where a person selects a forum and affirmatively invokes its jurisdictional power to determine questions arising under contract involving lands situated in another state, and judgment is rendered binding on parties personally, such judgment is conclusive on questions determined so as to preclude party who invokes jurisdiction from relitigating same questions in state where property is situated and in such case judgment or decree operates directly on the party and is conclusive of legal rights under contract insofar as rights were determined and as such may be used as evidence to establish title in state where land is situated.
9. Minerals — prior declaratory judgment in Louisiana Federal District Court declaring that option to purchase working interest in Mississippi mineral leases had been exercised — conclusive of rights of parties under contract — on specific issues in confirmation suit in Mississippi State Court — evidence.
Where in prior action for declaratory relief in United States District Court in Louisiana decree entered declared that option to purchase one-half interest in oil, gas and mineral leases provided for in contract which was subject of litigation, had been exercised, such determination of that issue was conclusive of legal rights of the parties under the contract and could be used as evidence to establish right to one-half interest in the leases in subsequent action in Mississippi where land which was subject of contract was located, for confirmation of title to working interests in oil, gas and mineral leases in question.
10. Title — "muniments of title' — generally.
"Muniments of title" is a general expression having reference to deeds and other written evidence of title, but includes all means of evidence by which an owner may defend title to property.
11. Confirmation of title — to working interest in mineral leases — prior Louisiana Federal District Court declaratory judgment declaring such rights vested in complainant — perfected complainant's title.
In suit for confirmation of title of working interests in certain oil, gas and mineral leases and for cancellation of claims of an interest in the leases by defendant as clouds upon complainant's title, wherein complainant introduced prior declaratory judgment decree of the United States District Court of Louisiana declaring such rights to have vested in complainant, such evidence perfected title to the working interests in the leases in complainant in absence of proof of some other source of right in defendant not concluded by the Louisiana decree.
Headnotes as revised by Gillespie, J.
APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Jefferson County; WALTER D. COLEMAN, Chancellor.
M.J. Peterson, Jackson; Brunini, Everett, Grantham Quin, Vicksburg; Corban Corban, Fayette; Thomas J. Mallette, Jackson, for appellant.
I. Appellant's objection to the introduction in evidence of the alleged judgment of the United States District Court, the record of same filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the opinion of said United States Court of Appeals, and the mandate and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals should have been sustained under Mississippi laws and decisions.
A. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was without jurisdiction to entertain said action, adjudicate and decree the title to, or claims or interests in, real properties situated in Mississippi. Sharp v. Sharp, 166 P. 175; Wilson v. Thelen, 110 Mont. 305, 100 P.2d 923, 311 U.S. 651, 65 L.Ed. 417, 61 S.Ct. 20; Barringer v. Ray (Wyo.), 287 P.2d 629; Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1469; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 91 L.Ed. 832, 67 S.Ct. 657; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 93 L.Ed. 1524, 69 S.Ct. 1235; Regan v. Merchants Transfer Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 93 L.Ed. 1520, 69 S.Ct. 1233; Sidebottom v. Robison, 216 F.2d 816; Erwin v. Borrow, 217 F.2d 522; Butler v. Bolinger (La.), 133 So. 778; Woolgar v. LaCoste, 69 F. Supp. 571; Weaver v. Atlas Oil Co., 31 F.2d 484; Smith v. Landis, 211 F.2d 166; Tyler v. Stanolind Oil Gas Co., 77 F.2d 802; Campbell v. Brown, 7 Miss. (6 How.) 106; City of Pascagoula v. Krebs, 151 Miss. 676, 118 So. 286; Sutton v. Archer, 93 Miss. 603, 46 So. 705; Steele v. Steele, 152 Miss. 365, 118 So. 721; Dulion v. Folkes, 153 Miss. 91, 120 So. 437; Hayes v. Federal Land Bank of N.O., 162 Miss. 877, 140 So. 340; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 174 Miss. 643, 165 So. 414; Learned v. Sharp, 182 Miss. 333, 181 So. 142; American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Kincade, 219 Miss. 653, 69 So.2d 820; Duvall v. Duvall, 224 Miss. 546, 80 So.2d 752, 81 So.2d 695; A.L.I., Restatement of the Law (Judgments), pp. 21, 23, 129; Vol. I, Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 336 p. 674; Vol. III, Ibid., Secs. 1384, 1409 pp. 2858, 2905; Vol. I, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 298 p. 688.
II. Appellant's motion that the bill of complaint and amended bills of complaint exhibited against it in this cause be dismissed with prejudice and that it have a decree, for the reason that complainants have not proven either perfect legal title or perfect equitable title to the interest claimed by appellees in the oil, gas and mineral leases covering lands located in Jefferson County, Mississippi, should have been sustained under Mississippi laws and decisions.
A. Appellees failed to meet the burden of proving either a perfect legal title or a perfect equitable title to the disputed interest in the oil, gas and mineral leases, the subject matter of the case at bar, as required by Mississippi laws and decisions. Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802, 38 So. 742, 214 U.S. 196, 53 L.Ed. 965, 29 S.Ct. 635; A.W. Stevens Lbr. Co. v. Hughes (Miss.), 38 So. 769; Guarantee Trust Safe-Deposit Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 104 Fed. 5, 43 C.C.A. 396 (cert. denied, 180 U.S. 636, 45 L.Ed. 710, 215 S.Ct. 919); Handy v. Noonan, 51 Miss. 166; Griffin v. Harrison, 52 Miss. 824; Hart v. Bloomfield, 66 Miss. 100, 5 So. 620; Chiles v. Gallagher, 67 Miss. 413, 7 So. 208; Wilkinson v. Hiller, 71 Miss. 678, 14 So. 442; Goff v. Avent, 122 Miss. 86, 84 So. 134; Burnett v. Bass, 152 Miss. 517, 120 So. 456; Gaston v. Mitchell, 192 Miss. 452, 4 So.2d 892; Figeuroa v. Lemon, 222 Miss. 806, 77 So.2d 320, 78 So.2d 342; Sec. 1325, Code 1942; Griffith's Miss. Chancery Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 212 p. 198.
B. The judgment of the United States District Court, as affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, being void on its face, is subject to collateral attack, and being ineffective and without efficacy, cannot be asserted as res adjudicata. Lake v. Perry, 95 Miss. 550, 49 So. 568; Stewart v. Cybur Lbr. Co., 111 Miss. 844, 72 So. 276; Weisinger v. McGehee, 160 Miss. 424, 134 So. 148; Viator v. Stone, 201 Miss. 487, 29 So.2d 274; Bullock v. Green, 224 Miss. 278, 80 So.2d 37; Tobias v. Tobias, 225 Miss. 392, 83 So.2d 638; Vol. I, Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 322 p. 643.
III. There being no jurisdiction, the question of venue disappears. Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429; United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603; United States v. 11 Cases, More or Less, Ido-Pheno-Chon, 94 F. Supp. 925; Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp., 254 Fed. 454; Erwin v. Barrow, 217 F.2d 522; In re Sarah E. Kennedy Case, 25 Fed. 569; Rule 82, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
O.B. Triplett, Jr., Frank Mize, Forest; Laub, Adams, Forman Truly, Natchez; Teller Biedenharn, Vicksburg, for appellees.
I. The Federal Court had the power to determine and to enforce performance of the personal obligations arising out of the contract between Cashion and McKendrick. Werbe v. Holt, 98 F. Supp. 614, 617; Johnson v. McKinnon, 54 Fla. 221, 45 So. 23, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, 127 Am. St. 135, 14 Ann. Cas. 180; Duvall v. Duvall, 224 Miss. 546, 80 So.2d 752; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Le Briton, Admr. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 777, 4 P. 777; Penn. v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444; Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 28 L.Ed. 101, 3 S.Ct. 586; Brach v. Moen, 4 F.2d 786; Miller Lux v. Rickey, 127 Fed. 573; Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank, 92 F.2d 62; Sutton v. Archer, 93 Miss. 603, 46 So. 705; Art. III Sec. 2, U.S. Constitution; 28 U.S.C.A., Secs. 1332, 2201.
II. Appellant, having itself submitted the judgment to the District Court with its approval as to form endorsed thereon, is now estopped to assert its invalidity. Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 448, 24 L.Ed. 208, 209; Rule 70, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; A.L.I., Restatement of the Law (Judgments), Sec. 10; Griffith's Miss. Chancery Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 624.
III. This judgment is a declaratory judgment and not a judgment in rem directly affecting land in Mississippi. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945, 125 A.L.R. 1149; Buromin Co. v. National Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214; Watson v. Claughton, 160 Fla. 217, 34 So.2d 243; McCorliss v. McCorliss, 255 N.Y. 456, 175 N.E. 129, 82 A.L.R. 1141, 1145; Guice v. Sellers, 43 Miss. 52; Wilson v. Foster Creek Lbr. Mfg. Co., 134 Miss. 880, 99 So. 437; Alexander v. State, 210 Miss. 517, 49 So.2d 387; McCartney v. McKendrick, 226 Miss. 562, 85 So.2d 164; 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 2201; 16 Am. Jur., Declaratory Judgments, Sec. 3; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Secs. 436(a), 438, 441-42; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, pp. 13, 477, 498-560, 1043; Griffith's Miss. Chancery Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 624.
IV. The opinion of the District Court had all of the finality necessary to constitute a decision which is res judicata. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 73 Am. Dec. 565, 567; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 74 L.Ed. 365, 50 S.Ct. 299, 68 A.L.R. 441; Miller v. Simons, 59 N.W.2d 837; Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank, supra.
V. The contractual obligation having been determined by the Court, the appellant was bound by its own stipulations signed and filed in the District Court proceeding. Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 204 F.2d 609.
VI. The Federal Court having determined its jurisdiction, it cannot be questioned in this case. Finklea Bros. v. Powell, 189 Miss. 454, 198 So. 293; Alliance Trust Co. v. Armstrong, 185 Miss. 148, 186 So. 633; Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1244, 51 S.Ct. 517; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 83 L.Ed. 104, 59 S.Ct. 134; Calcote v. T. P. Coal Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216, 167 A.L.R. 413 (cert. denied, 329 U.S. 782, 91 L.Ed. 671, 67 S.Ct. 205; rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 830, 91 L.Ed. 704, 67 S.Ct. 356); Hudson v. Lewis, 188 F.2d 679; Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 50 S.Ct. 374; Iselin v. LaCoste, 139 F.2d 887, 147 F.2d 791, 321 U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 791.
VII. Appellees' objection to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court is really an objection to venue, which appellant has waived. Ravesies v. Martin, 190 Miss. 92, 199 So. 282; Iselin v. LaCoste, supra; General Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430, 77 L.Ed. 408, 53 S.Ct. 202; Valentine v. McGrath, Tweed Co., 52 Miss. 112; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 84 L.Ed. 167; Industrial Addition Assn. v. Comr. of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 310, 313, 89 L.Ed. 260, 262-63; Hudson v. Lewis, supra; Art. III Sec. 1, U.S. Constitution; 28 U.S.C.A., Chaps. 85-87, Secs. 1332, 1391(a), 1406, 2201, 2202.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Chancery Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi, confirming in appellee, McKendrick, title to a working interest in certain oil, gas and mineral leases and cancelling as clouds upon the title of appellee the claims of the appellant, Lyle Cashion Company.
Appellant and appellee entered into a written agreement on April 29, 1950 for the drilling of a test well under certain oil, gas and mineral leases situated in Jefferson County, Mississippi, which agreement contained the following provision:
"Should any party hereto acquire any leases, royalty, etc., within a radius of ten (10) miles of the well site within six months following May 1, 1950, the other party hereto may have an option of purchasing, within said six month's period, one-half (1/2) of the other party's purchase, at its net cash cost (exclusive of traveling, meals, or hotel expenses)."
The oil well was drilled. Within the six month's period provided in the contract the leases involved in this litigation were acquired in the name of appellant, and a well drilled on one of these leases was productive.
A dispute arose between appellant and appellee as to whether the latter had exercised his option to acquire a one-half interest in the leases acquired by appellant.
Shortly after the expiration of the six month's period, and on October 13, 1950, appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which district appellee lived, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the rights and other legal relations under the agreement of April 29, 1950, as between appellant and appellee, and for judgment that appellee had no interest in the leases acquired by appellant within six months following March 1, 1950, within a radius of ten miles of the well site mentioned in the agreement of April 29, 1950. Appellant alleged that the value of the matter involved in the litigation was in excess of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and diversity of citizenship between appellant, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Deleware, and appellee, a resident of New Orleans, Louisiana. Appellee answered and admitted that an actual controversy existed between the parties and that both parties were entitled to have the court declare their rights and other legal relations under the agreement. Appellee contended in his pleadings that he had exercised his option under the contract and was entitled to participate therein as part of a join venture between appellant and appellee, and under his counterclaim, appellee contended he should be adjudged the owner of an undivided one-half of the leases acquired by appellant within a ten-mile radius of the well site mentioned in the contract of April 29, 1950.
A full hearing was held in the United States District Court and the judge rendered a written opinion sustaining the contentions of appellee's counterclaim, and specifically held that appellee had exercised the option under the April 29, 1950 contract, and on August 17, 1951, entered a judgment declaring appellee to be the owner of an undivided one-half of the right, title and interest of appellant under various oil, gas and mineral leases acquired in the name of appellant within the six-month's period provided in the contract dated April 29, 1950.
Stipulations were entered during the course of the trial as to the percentage of working interests in dispute and for certain drilling operations to be carried on by appellant pending the litigation. The judgment was "approved as to form as being in conformity with reasons for judgment rendered herein," by appellant's attorney.
Appellant appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 204 F.2d 609.
The present suit was brought by appellee for confirmation of title of the working interests above referred to, and for the cancellation of any claims of appellant, and it was alleged that appellant had refused to recognize the rights of appellee declared by the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of Louisiana, in the oil, gas and mineral leases involved. Attached to the bill was the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of Louisiana. At the trial, the entire record and proceedings of the suit in the District Court was introduced over the objection of appellant. No other evidence was received.
The substance of appellant's answer was that the proceedings in the prior Federal Court case were ineffectual and the judgment void for lack of jurisdiction over the property. He made his answer a crossbill seeking confirmation of his title and cancellation of the claims of appellee.
The question for our decision is whether a declaratory judgment of Louisiana Federal District Court declaring the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a contract involving interests in land in this State is effective and binding on the parties and their privies so as to preclude relitigation in a subsequent suit in this State of the specific question actually litigated and determined by and essential to the prior judgment.
To arrive at answer to the question, we must consider (1) whether the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the suit; (2) whether the question sought to be litigated in the Chancery Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi, was litigated and determined by the Federal Court in the prior suit; (3) the conclusiveness of a judgment under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act; (4) whether the judgment of the Louisiana Federal Court was void under the rule that a decree of a foreign court cannot directly operate upon land in another State; and (5) sufficiency of the evidence to establish title in appellee. (Hn 1) The venue, or locality of the lawsuit, was proper; the federal venue statute provides that suits between citizens of different states may be brought in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant. The value of the matter involved exceeded $3,000. That the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana had jurisdiction of the parties is not open to question. Appellant filed the suit and invoked the jurisdiction of the court, and appellee was a resident of the district and acquiesced in the jurisdiction by filing a counterclaim.
(Hn 2) In that suit, the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the suit belonged, the nature of the suit and the relief sought or grantable under it, determined the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Duvall v. Duvall, 80 So.2d 752; Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, 2nd ed., Section 104. The property, the interests in Mississippi lands, was involved, and its ownership was the ultimate object of the law suit, but it was not the subject matter. The power to adjudicate and declare rights and other legal relations of the litigants in cases of actual controversies was granted the Federal Courts by Congress. U.S.C.A. Title 28, Section 2201. Every jurisdictional requirement was present.
The specific question litigated and determined by the Federal Court, and essential to the judgment rendered, was whether appellee had exercised the option under the ten-mile radius paragraph contained in the contract of April 29, 1950. The Federal Court found that appellee had exercised his option within the time and manner provided in the contract, and the determination of that specific question was the crux of the law suit. That specific question, in the final analysis, was the question before the chancery court in the present case. In its answer in the present suit, appellant disputed the validity of the Federal Court judgment, and in so doing, disputed the questions determined by and essential to that judgment, including whether appellee exercised the option under the contract of April 29, 1950; and even if that specific issue did not appear in the pleadings in the present suit in so many words, it inhered in the position assumed by appellant.
There were numerous parties to the suit in the lower court, and some of the issues between them have not been determined, but the determination of the question whether the Federal Court judgment was valid, as between appellant and appellee, and those in privity with him, was a single issue and was finally determined by the lower court. Therefore, the issue in the two suits, the declaratory judgment suit in the Eastern District of the United States of Louisiana, and the present suit seeking an adjudication of appellee's ownership of his claimed interests and the cancellation of the claims of appellant thereto, turned on the same specific question.
(Hn 3) The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a declaratory judgment "shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree."
(Hn 4) Under the principle of collateral estoppel appellant is precluded from relitigating in the present suit specific questions actually litigated and determined by and essential to the judgment in the prior suit, even though a different cause of action is the subject of the present suit. (Hn 5) The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: (1) Merger of the cause of action into the judgment or as a bar precluding a party from maintaining another action on the same cause of action irrespective of what issues were litigated or determined in the former action, and (2) the principle of collateral estoppel which precludes relitigation in another action of a specific question actually litigated and determined by and essential to the judgment, even though a different cause of action is the subject of the subsequent proceeding. This principle applies to declaratory judgments the same as to any other judgment. Anno. 10 A.L.R. 782. Cf. Etheredge v. Webb, 210 Miss. 729, 50 So.2d 603. (Hn 6) The collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata finds particular application to declaratory judgments. In such suits, the plaintiff is not seeking to enforce a claim against the defendant, but rather a judicial declaration of legal relations between the parties. Therefore, a declaratory judgment operates as an absolute bar only when the subsequent suit again seeks declaratory relief. Otherwise, the collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata applies and precludes relitigating the specific issues determined by and essential to the declaratory judgment when those specific issues are sought to be again disputed in a subsequent suit.
(Hn 7) It is a universal rule that a judgment of the courts of one State cannot directly affect and determine the title to real property located in another State. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 889(2).
(Hn 8) It is equally well settled that one who selects a forum and affirmatively invokes its jurisdictional power to determine questions arising under a contract involving real estate situated in another state and a judgment is rendered binding on the parties personally, such judgment is conclusive of the questions determined so as to preclude the party who invokes the jurisdiction from relitigating the same questions in the state where the property is situated. Baughan v. Goodwin, 162 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.); Hall v. Jones, 54 S.W.2d 835, (Tex.); Dunlap v. Byers, 67 N.W. 1067 (Mich.); Niles v. Lee, 135 N.W. 274, 169 Mich. 474; Idaho Gold Mining Co. v. Winchell, 59 P. 533 (Idaho); Hicks v. Corbett, 278 P.2d 77 (Cal.); Milner v. Schaefer, 211 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.); Anno. 145 A.L.R. 583. In such case, the judgment or decree does not operate directly on the property, but on the party; it does not vest or divest title, but is conclusive of the legal rights under the contract, insofar as those rights were determined, and as such may be used as evidence to establish title in the State where the land is situated.
It should be observed that many cases hold that the rule stated in the preceding paragraph is not limited to the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the foreign court, but is binding on all parties to the suit where the suit is not one merely involving title. Anno. 145 A.L.R. 583. But we are concerned only with the conclusive effect on the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
(Hn 9) Appellant had its day in court in a forum of its own selection. The federal suit ran its full course to final judgment and was affirmed on appeal. Under these circumstances appellant cannot be heard to repudiate the judgment and thus be allowed to again run the course of litigating the same issues.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in overruling its motion to dismiss appellee's bill and amended bills of complaint on the grounds that appellee failed to prove either (1) a perfect legal title, or (2) a perfect equitable title to the claimed interests in the mineral leases, and that the judgment of the Louisiana Federal Court did not constitute muniment of title to interests in Mississippi lands.
(Hn 10) The record of the Federal Court case contained the contract between appellant and appellee dated April 29, 1950, stipulations as to the identity of the leases and appellee's claimed working interests therein, the testimony, the findings of the court, and the judgment. These constituted muniments establishing title in appellee to the working interests in the leases. Muniments of title is a general expression often having reference to deeds and other written evidence of title, but includes all means of evidence by which an owner may defend title to real property. 64 C.J.S., Section 1079. (Hn 11) The evidence perfected title in appellee to the working interests in the leases in the absence of some other source of right in appellant not concluded by the Louisiana suit. No such other right was asserted by appellant and the lower court properly confirmed title in appellee and cancelled the claims of appellant.
The decree of the lower court is affirmed and the case remanded to the lower court for any further necessary proceeding not inconsistent with our mandate and this opinion.
Affirmed and remanded.
McGehee, C.J., and Hall, Kyle and Arrington, JJ., concur.