And this court will not control the discretion of the judge in awarding temporary alimony and attorney's fees `unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion.' Webb v. Webb, 165 Ga. 305 ( 140 S.E. 872); Brown v. Brown, 159 Ga. 323 ( 125 S.E. 713); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 174 Ga. 903 ( 164 S.E. 677)." Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515) (1948); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 228 Ga. 541 (2) ( 186 S.E.2d 754) (1972). The evidence shows that the wife had been employed previously but is not presently employed and has no funds except $135 with which to support herself.

Code § 30-205 provides that "[o]n application for temporary alimony, the merits of the cause are not in issue..." This court will not control the discretion of the judge in awarding temporary alimony and attorney's fees unless there is a manifest, flagrant, gross abuse of discretion. Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515) and cit. Even if the defendant wife's contemptuous conduct would have authorized the court to refuse to award her attorneys' fees, yet, since the evidence as to her contumacy was in conflict and did not demand the finding of her guilt, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding her attorney's fees, reasonableness of which is not contested.

50 per week for twelve weeks as attorney's fees. Considering his income and the property he owns, it appears that the award of temporary alimony was liberal; nevertheless this court has no right to control the trial judge's discretion respecting the award unless there is a manifest abuse of it, and we do not think the evidence shows such an abuse; and this is especially true since the court has power to reduce the amount awarded should the circumstances render such action proper. Code § 30-204; Drake v. Drake, 182 Ga. 324 ( 185 S.E. 327); Taylor v. Taylor, 189 Ga. 110 (2b) ( 5 S.E.2d 374); Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Voluntary condonation and cohabitation subsequent to the acts complained of are matters of affirmative defense in the trial of the case upon its merits. Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515). The defendant in her answer denied all the charges of the plaintiff as to cruelty and asserted that the separation was caused by his cruel treatment and misconduct. The plaintiff in his petition alleged that there had been some five or six previous separations.

' Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286 (5), 318; Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 349 (8, a) 153 S.E. 11, 70 A.L.R. 488); Duncan v. Duncan, 184 Ga. 602 ( 192 S.E. 215); "Whether the wife condoned the alleged acts of cruelty is peculiarly a matter of defense in a trial of the case on its merits." Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312, 313 ( 49 S.E.2d 515); Johnson v. Johnson, 210 Ga. 795, 800 ( 82 S.E.2d 831); Code § 30-109. While the wife testified that, at the time her husband went to Notasulga to live, the date of the final separation, they were not living in a state of separation, and while she refused to go to Alabama with him to live, and she had testified on the hearing on temporary alimony and admitted in evidence in the trial of this case that: "About the first of March, I believe it was 1953, about the first of March, one morning at the breakfast table he said, `I have decided to go to Notasulga and stay. Are you going with me?' I said, `No, I don't think so.' He said, `What are you going to do?' I said, `I guess I will stay here and work where I can make a living.' He said, `It is not necessary for you to `work.' I said, `So I have found out,' and I got up from the table and dressed and went to work, and the next morning at just about the same time he says, `I would like a specific answer to the question I

The question of condonation is peculiarly a matter of defense in the trial of a divorce case on its merits. Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515). In our opinion the petition, as against a general demurrer, alleged sufficient facts to show that Mercer Jack Johnson had a meritorious defense to the divorce and equitable action.

1. The discretion of the trial judge in allowing or disallowing temporary alimony pending an action for divorce will not be controlled unless that discretion is shown to have been flagrantly abused. Code, § 30-205; Smith v. Smith, 125 Ga. 384 ( 53 S.E. 958); Aiken v. Aiken, 131 Ga. 578 ( 62 S.E. 820); Helton v. Helton, 146 Ga. 48 ( 90 S.E. 381); Gaskin v. Gaskin, 150 Ga. 756 ( 105 S.E. 369); Brown v. Brown, 159 Ga. 323 ( 125 S.E. 713); Cook v. Cook, 197 Ga. 703 ( 30 S.E.2d 479); Moss v. Moss, 200 Ga. 8, 12 ( 36 S.E.2d 431); Childs v. Childs, 203 Ga. 9 ( 45 S.E.2d 418); Lybrand v. Lybrand, 204 Ga. 312 ( 49 S.E.2d 515). "In a proper case, and in the exercise of a sound discretion, the court may award the use of the home and the household goods therein to the wife as temporary alimony." Lloyd v. Lloyd, 183 Ga. 751 ( 189 S.E. 903). Where, as in this case, it appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, at the invitation of the defendant, came to this country from Australia to marry the defendant; that two children were born as the issue of the marriage, who, at the time of the trial, were 3 years and 5 months, and 4 months of age, respectively; that she had no relatives in Georgia, and none in this country except a first cousin in the State of New York whom she does not remember ever having seen, no other place to live, no independent income or other means of livelihood, it cannot be said that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award to the plaintiff the use of the home owned by the defendant, as temporary alimony, or to continue in force a temporary restraining ord