Opinion
No. AAN CV06-4006814S
September 8, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
The Plaintiff; Jonathan A. Luysterborghs, was a firefighter who was employed by the City of Milford for twenty-one (21) years. At the time of his retirement on July 19, 1996, he had attained the rank of Battalion Chief.
Because the plaintiff had served as a firefighter for over twenty (20) years when he retired, he received a full pension from the city.
During much of his employment with the City of Milford, the Plaintiff was married. Prior to a 1989 divorce, Luysterborghs' spouse was covered under Milford's health insurance. His three children were also covered by the City of Milford, until they attained the age of majority.
The Plaintiff was unmarried when he retired, but soon married his second wife, Deborah. During a brief marriage to Deborah, the Plaintiff sought to enroll her in his medical insurance plan, which was carried by the City of Milford. His request for insurance coverage for his wife was refined, on September 10, 1997 (Ex. 5). The City of Milford maintained that Deborah Luysterborghs was ineligible for the health insurance coverage, because she was not married to the Plaintiff on the date of his retirement.
On December 12, 2002, while the Plaintiff was on a ministry trip to The People's Republic of China, he married his current wife, Yiling Qi (Ex. 2). The couple returned from China in April of 2005.
Approximately one year after their return to the United States, Luysterborghs attempted to enroll Yiling Qi in the health insurance plan maintained by the City of Milford.
The city refused the request, advising Luysterborghs that Article XII, Section 8C of the collective bargaining agreement (Ex. 1) limited health insurance coverage to enrolled dependents, who were enrolled at the time the former employee retired. He was informed that the city's interpretation of the contract provision "has been the practice under the Language since prior to 1994." (Ex. 5.)
Article XII, Section 8C of the agreement between Local 944 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, which was in effect on the date of Luysterborghs' retirement, and has not been amended during subsequent agreements, reads:
C. The City shall provide and pay for the hospital, medical Prescription Drug Benefits, Medicare and Blue Cross Major Medical Coverage as modified for all retirees and their enrolled dependents and all survivors who were enrolled dependents of deceased employees or deceased retirees at the time of death, for which such retirees, such enrolled dependents and such survivors are eligible based on the age of such retirees, and the age of such dependents and on the age of such survivors. For purposes of this and all other affected provisions of this Contract, effective July 1968, the term "retiree" shall mean and include any employee of the Fire Department who is retired for any reason under the City retirement system covering the employees of the Fire Department and/or under Social Security.
Following the refusal of the City of Milford to enroll Yiling Qi in the health insurance plan, the Plaintiff initiated this action, returnable August 26, 2006. Named as defendants in the action were the City of Milford, and the Pension and Retirement Board of the City of Milford.
The claims against the Pension and Retirement Board were dismissed on June 6, 2007 (Esposito, J.), leaving only the City of Milford as a defendant.
The Plaintiff's Fourth Revised Complaint dated June 22, 2007, the operative pleading, consists of three counts.
In Count One, Jonathan Luysterborghs claims, pursuant to the provision of the collective bargaining agreement, that his wife is entitled to health insurance coverage. He seeks an order, in the nature of mandamus, compelling the City of Milford to enroll her in its health insurance plan.
Count Two seeks a declaratory judgment, declaring that the Plaintiff has a right to enroll his current wife, Yiling Qi, in the City of Milford's retirees' health insurance plan, while Count Three involves a claim for breach of contract, based upon the failure of the City to enroll Yiling Qi in the health insurance plan.
The Defendant City of Milford filed its answer, without any special defenses, on September 5, 2008.
The City maintains that it is not required to enroll Yiling Qi in its retirees' health insurance plan, because she was not an enrolled dependent on July 19, 1996, the date on which Jonathan A. Luysterborghs retired as a Milford firefighter.
THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE `ENROLLED DEPENDENTS' AS USED IN THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS
The City of Milford maintains that it is required to provide health insurance coverage only to those dependents of a retired firefighter who were enrolled as of the date of the firefighter's retirement. It claims to have followed the interpretation consistently, and over a long period of time, in both the fire and police union contracts.
The evidence reveals that on June 23, 1992, a memo was sent by City Attorney Marilyn Lipton to the finance director. In that opinion (Ex. F), Attorney Lipton declared that the phrase "enrolled dependents," with reference to retired police officers, applies only to those dependents who were enrolled as of the date of retirement. A March 1994 opinion, this one regarding the firefighter's agreement, specifically Article II, Section XC, reiterated the city's belief that "enrolled dependents" referred to those dependents who were enrolled as of the date of the employee's retirement (Ex. 5).
Milford's response to the Plaintiff's request to enroll his third wife in the retirees' health insurance plan, is consistent with those earlier opinions (Ex. 5).
Milford's construction of the phrase "enrolled dependents," as used in Article II of the collective bargaining agreement, has never been the subject of judicial or administrative preview. The issue was involved in an arbitration matter filed in 1997, but the Board of Mediation and Arbitration did not decide the issue. Instead, the grievance was dismissed, when the panel found that it was not arbitable, and the Board had no jurisdiction (Ex. G).
When construing the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, courts look to principles of contract law. Honulik v. Greenwich, 290 Conn. 321, 432 (2009). When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its tents. A court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. Any ambiguity must emanate from the language of the agreement itself; rather than from one party's selective perception of its terms. Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Lighthouse Landings, Inc., 279 Conn. 90, 110 (2006); Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transportation System, LP, 252 Conn. 479, 498 (2000). The mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous. United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 670 (2002).
Courts, not administrative agencies, expand and apply the governing principles of law. Connecticut Hospital Ass'n. v. Commission on Hospital Health Care, 200 Conn. 133 144 (1986); Wilson v. F.O.I.C., 181 Conn. 324, 342, 43 (1980). Ordinarily, the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court, and an agency decision is not entitled to any special deference. State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 718 (1988). No special deference is warranted where the statute has not been subject to prior judicial interpretation, or to a time-tested agency interpretation. Texaco Refining Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 599 (1987); Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Dubno, 202 Conn. 412, 423 (1987).
However, whether the issue is one of statutory construction, interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, or a provision of a municipal charter, a government agency's interpretation should be given great weight by the courts, if three specific conditions are met: 1) the agency has consistently followed its construction over a long period of time, 2) the statutory or contract language is ambiguous, and 3) the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Ass'n., 259 Conn. 251, 262 (2002); Texaco Refining Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, supra, 599; Sutton v. Lopes, 201 Conn. 115, 120 (1986).
Although Milford's interpretation of the term "enrolled dependent" has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny, or the determination of an administrative or arbitration body, the city has employed a consistent policy concerning the enrollment of the dependents of retirees in its health insurance program.
Milford has consistently refused to enroll a retiree's dependent, if that dependent was not an enrolled dependent as of the date of retirement. Furthermore, although the bargaining unit consists of active firefighters, not retirees, the collective bargaining units for Milford's firefighters and police officers appear to have acquiesced in the city's construction of the contract.
It is therefore found that Milford has followed a consistent interpretation of the contract in question, over an extended period of time.
It is therefore necessary to determine, in the context of the agreement, whether the term "enrolled dependents" is ambiguous.
The phase "enrolled dependents" is used three times in Article XII of the collective bargaining agreement (Ex. 1).
Article XII A, where the term is first used, states:
A. The City shall provide and pay for the following insurance for all active employees and their enrolled dependents:
1. Connecticut Hospital Service (Blue Cross Semi-Private Room Credit Rider, out-Patient Hospital Benefit Rider Plan, and Semi-Private Maternity Credit Rider Plan, Special Dependent Rider and Full Service Extended Plan Prescription Drug Benefits Rider with $1,000.00 per member per year benefit limit) . . .
2. Connecticut Medical Services (CMS) Century 94 Contract, with Home and Office Rider, $270.00 limit per member per year . . .
The City of Milford does not argue that the term "enrolled dependent" means only those dependents on the date of hire. Any such construction would be absurd and illogical, given the fact that the birth of a child, adoption of a child, and the marriage of an employee, often occur during the course of one's employment.
Clearly, the dependent spouse or child of an active firefighter may be enrolled at any time during the course of his or her employment.
In paragraph C of Article XII, the term "enrolled dependents" is used twice, in the same sentence. The pertinent portion reads:
C. The city shall provide and pay for the hospital, medical Prescription drug Benefits, Medicare and Blue Cross Major Medical Coverage . . . for all retirees and their enrolled dependents and all survivors who were enrolled dependents of deceased employees or deceased retirees at the time of death . . .
(Emphasis added)
The first time "enrolled dependents" is used in Paragraph C, it is used without qualification, or clarification.
The second time it is used, in the same sentence, it is qualified, and applies, by the terms of the agreement, only to those who were enrolled dependents as of the date of death.
The City of Milford asks that "enrolled dependents" be read to mean "enrolled as of the date of retirement," despite the absence of any such language in the agreement itself. This request cannot be honored.
A contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions. HLO Land Ownership Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Hartford, 248 Conn. 350, 356 (1999). It is not the province of a court to re-write an agreement, by adding words which the parties themselves have not employed.
To construe Article XII of the agreement in the fashion advocated by the City of Milford, would to give to the term "enrolled dependents" one meaning in Article XII A., and a different meaning in Article XII C.
The court declines the invitation to create in ambiguity through interpretation, combined with wishful thinking, when no ambiguity can be discovered within the language of the agreement itself.
This interpretation is consistent with the only case which has been located, in which the term "enrolled dependents" was construed. That case, Coppola v. First Fire Taxation District, West Haven, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150 (Cosgrove, J.), involved a determination of the City of West Haven to enroll spouses of active firefighters, but not those of retired firefighters, for the purposes of medical insurance benefits.
In granting a motion for summary judgment, Judge Cosgrove tested West Haven's claim that it was its "custom" to enroll only the spouses of active firefighters, while denying benefits to the spouses of retired firefighters, against the language of the agreement. In finding the language of the agreement unambiguous, Judge Cosgrove stated:
If the parties intended for there to be a difference between the duty to enroll the dependents of active firefighters and the duty to enroll the dependents of retired firefighters, the agreement could have explicitly drawn such a distinction. Since there is no such distinction made in the agreement, the court should not imply such a distinction.
The City of Milford may argue, persuasively, that its view of the contract terminology represents sound fiscal and public policy, in light of municipal budget demands. However compelling from a policy standpoint, this cannot serve as a justification for judicially amending a collective bargaining agreement, where the language is unambiguous.
In Burwell v. Board of Selectmen, 178 Conn. 509 (1979), a case cited by the City of Milford for the proposition that a consistent interpretation of a municipal charter provision over many years constitutes evidence of the intent of the drafters, the Supreme Court refused to ignore the clear wording of a municipal charter.
The charter provision stated that ". . . the inhabitants and taxable property within said City of Winsted only shall bear the expense of . . . the police and fire departments within said city . . ."
For thirty-two (32) years there had been a differential between the tax mill rate for property located in the City of Winsted, with the mill rate for property in an outlying town. In 1976, a unified mill rate was approved, applicable to both the town and the City of Winsted.
The trial court found that conditions had changed since the adoption of the charter, and that the taxing policy mandated by the charter was obsolete.
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected that result-oriented philosophy, finding that the charter provision was not ambiguous. The Court stated: "We cannot invalidate article I, S. 3 of the charter simply because it embodies a taxation policy which the defendants claim is obsolete." Burwell v. Board of Selectmen, supra, 519.
Here, the City of Milford seeks to engraft on to the collective bargaining agreement, a requirement that the dependents of retirees seeking medical coverage, must have been enrolled dependents on the date of retirement. This requirement is not found in the clear language of the agreement, and will not be supplied under the pretense of judicial interpretation.
ORDER IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS IS APPROPRIATE
The Plaintiff, Jonathan A. Luysterborghs, seeks an order in the nature of mandamus, compelling the City of Milford to enroll his wife, Yiling Qi, in its health insurance plan. At trial, it was determined that administration of the plan was the province of the Milford Finance Department, and any order should be directed to that city department.
A writ of mandamus is available only when the person seeking the writ has a clear legal duty to have done that which he seeks. Miles v. Foley, 253 Conn. 381, 391 (2000). A writ of mandamus is not appropriate, if the duty to be performed by the public official is discretionary, rather than ministerial. Babramian v. Pavandrea, 184 Conn. 1, 6 (1981); Ballas v. Woodin, 155 Conn. 283, 285 (1967).
The test for the issuance of a writ, is 1) the law imposes on the party against whom the writ would run a duty of performance which is mandatory, 2) the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right to have the act performed, and 3) there is no other adequate remedy. Avalon Bay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Commission, 270 Conn. 409, 417 (2004).
Because the Plaintiff's spouse qualified as an "enrolled dependent," pursuant to Article XII of the collective bargaining agreement (Ex. 1), she has a right to be enrolled in the medical insurance program by the Finance Department of the City of Milford.
It is therefore ordered that the City of Milford, acting through its Department of Finance, enroll Yiling Qi, the current wife of Jonathan A. Luysterborghs, in its health insurance program.
It is found that the Plaintiff; as a retired firefighter of the City of Milford, has a clear legal right to enroll his wife in the health insurance program, and that she qualified as an "enrolled dependent," based upon the testimony received at trial.
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The plaintiff claims that he sustained damages, because he was compelled to purchase health insurance benefits covering his wife, when the City of Milford refused to enroll her in its health insurance plan, in 2006.
The elements of a breach of contract claim are the formation of an agreement, performance by one of the parties to the agreement, breach of the agreement, by the other party, and damages. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn.App. 396, 411 (2004).
It is found that the City of Milford breached its agreement with Jonathan A. Luysterborghs, a retired firefighter, when it refused to enroll his wife, Yiling Qi, in the health insurance program available to enrolled dependents.
The Plaintiff was employed by Also Cornerstone for much of the time, after his return from the People's Republic of China. He was compelled to carry duplicate insurance with Also Cornerstone, because his wife could not be covered, unless he was covered by the employer.
It is therefore found that the Plaintiff did not fail to mitigate his damages, because he carried insurance with Also Cornerstone, while also being eligible as a retiree of the City of Milford for health insurance benefits.
It is found that the Plaintiff, Jonathan A. Luysterborghs, shall recover the sum of $8,132.36, representing expenses incurred for premiums for his wife, Yiling Qi, through April of 2009 (Ex. 7). It is further found that he should recover $992.28, representing twenty-four (24) weeks, at $82.69 every two weeks, subsequent to March of 2009, for a total of $9,124.64.
CONCLUSION
Judgment may enter in favor of the Plaintiff, Jonathan A. Luysterborghs, as to all counts. Costs are awarded to the Plaintiff.