Indeed, we have previously held that writ actions cannot be used to decide damages issues and must be brought separately. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 114, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). Finally, nothing in the subsequent action for damages destroyed or impaired any right established in the action for judicial review.
The Court of Appeals also relied for its holding on a series of cases in which the immunity of government employees was extended to the government. Savage v. State, 72 Wn. App. 483, 488-89, 491, 864 P.2d 1009, review granted, 124 Wn.2d 1017 (1994) (citing Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wn.2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966)); Plotkin v. Department of Corrections, 64 Wn. App. 373, 826 P.2d 221, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1022 (1992); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1044 (1993); Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wn.2d 669, 724 P.2d 1017 (1986); Guffey v. State, 103 Wn.2d 144, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984). The appellate court's analysis in this case resembles that recently rejected by this court in Lutheran.
In Hayes v. City of Seattle, 76 Wn. App. 877, 880, 888 P.2d 1227, review granted, 127 Wn.2d 1009 (1995), this court ruled that res judicata did not bar a civil rights claim which was not brought and joined with a permit applicant's writ action in a land use case. Although the permit applicant could have combined his writ and damages claims into a single action, see Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 95, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993), writ applications are subject to very short statutes of limitation. Section 1983 claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.
"The fact that the disjunctive `or' is used in the first part of the statute shows that acting either arbitrarily and capriciously or unlawfully or in excess of lawful authority will create a cause of action." Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 112, 829 P.2d 746 (1992) (emphasis in original). "Arbitrary and capricious" acts are "willful" acts. Brell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wn.2d 518, 526, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (defining "arbitrary and capricious" as involving "willful and unreasonable action without consideration, and [in] disregard of facts or circumstances").
A county is an agency for the purpose of this statute. RCW 64.40.010(1); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 117, 119, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079, 113 S. Ct. 1044, 122 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993). "[C]onclusory action taken without regard to the surrounding facts and circumstances is arbitrary and capricious.
Quasi-judicial immunity attaches to persons or entities who perform functions so comparable to those performed by judges that the persons should share the judge's absolute immunity while performing those functions. Savage v. State, 127 Wn.2d 434, 441, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995); Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 99, 829 P.2d 746 (1992). When quasi-judicial immunity applies, an absolute bar precludes civil liability.
Application for a writ of review and a claim for damages under RCW 64.40 should be brought as a single action. See Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cy., 119 Wn.2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1044 (1993). Even where the separate claims are disposed of sequentially, this approach makes clear to all parties what is at stake in the review process and efficiently disposes of all claims.
¶20 Law of the case is a doctrine that derives from both RAP 2.5(c)(2) and common law. This multifaceted doctrine means different things in different circumstances, Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 113, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), and is often confused with other closely related doctrines, including collateral estoppel, res judicata, and stare decisis. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first one.
This court recently held that the Legislature, in enacting RCW 64.40, intended to abrogate the rule of vicarious municipal immunity for the quasi-judicial acts of its officials. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cy., 119 Wn.2d 91, 103, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 122 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The court held that under RCW 64.40.020 an "agency", which includes cities, can be liable for the quasi-judicial acts of its land use officials.
Manna reasons that a site-specific rezone application involves quasi-judicial decisionmaking, thus subjecting an agency to liability under RCW 64.40.020. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash.2d 91, 103–05, 111, 829 P.2d 746 (1992). This is in contrast to area-wide rezones, which are legislative in nature and subject to a different review procedure under the Growth Management Act, chapter 36.70A RCW.