Opinion
No. 03-04-00674-CR
Filed: April 7, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the District Court of Bell County, 27th Judicial District, No. 53755, Honorable Joe Carroll, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PATTERSON and PURYEAR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In February 2003, the district court deferred adjudication and placed appellant George Daniel Luster, Jr., on community supervision after he pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021 (West Supp. 2004-05). In October 2004, following a hearing on the State's motion, the court adjudicated appellant guilty and sentenced him to forty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant's court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). Appellant filed a pro se brief raising four points of error. Points one, three, and four assert error at the 2003 guilty plea proceeding. The matters asserted should have been raised in an appeal from the deferred adjudication order; they cannot be raised now, following adjudication. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); see Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667-68 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). In pro se point two, appellant contends that evidence suggesting that he was incompetent to stand trial was raised at the adjudication hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b) (West Supp. 2004-05). During his own testimony at the hearing, appellant stated that he receives Social Security disability payments. Asked the basis for his disability, appellant replied, "Mental blocks and paranoid schizophrenic." Appellant went on to state that he had stopped taking his medication because, when he had pleaded guilty, "the medication kept me sedated and unable to think." Appellant's counsel asked, "So you're thinking clearly now?" Appellant answered, "Yes, sir." Appellant urges that his testimony that he was not taking his medication raised an issue as to his competence to stand trial. But at the hearing, appellant asserted that the drugs made him "sedated and unable to think." Contrary to his present assertion, appellant testified below that he was thinking clearly at the adjudication hearing. No issue of appellant's competency was raised at the adjudication hearing, nor do we find any evidence of incompetence in the hearing record. See McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Point two is overruled. We have reviewed the record, counsel's brief, and the pro se brief. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.