Lusk's Estate

4 Citing cases

  1. Carcieri v. Salazar

    555 U.S. 379 (2009)   Cited 298 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a list following "shall include" was exhaustive where Congress "defined the term by including only three discrete definitions"

    But one could also read it to refer to the time the Secretary of the Interior exercises his authority to take land “for Indians.” § 465. Compare Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 311–312, 81 S.Ct. 1336, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (“now” refers to time of statutory enactment), with Difford v. Secretary of HHS, 910 F.2d 1316, 1320 (C.A.6 1990) (“now” refers to time of exercise of delegated authority); In re Lusk's Estate, 336 Pa. 465, 467–468, 9 A.2d 363, 365 (1939) (property “now” owned refers to property owned when a will becomes operative). I also concede that the Court owes the Interior Department the kind of interpretive respect that reflects an agency's greater knowledge of the circumstances in which a statute was enacted, cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944).

  2. Chambers Estate

    263 A.2d 746 (Pa. 1970)   Cited 14 times

    When Chambers' will was drawn, he knew that his daughter had one adopted child and no natural children, and, under our law, he is presumed to have known, when he executed his will, the mandatory requirements and provisions of the Wills Act with respect to children adopted by a person other than the testator. Cf. Mayer's Estate, 289 Pa. 407, 411, 137 A. 627; Linn Estate, 435 Pa. 598, 604, 258 A.2d 645; Lusk's Estate, 336 Pa. 465, 467, 9 A.2d 363. When, therefore, testator gave his income to his daughter's "children, if any," there is not the slightest statement, or even indication, that he intended to give it to her adopted child, "if any." This is reinforced by the fact that testator did not give his income to his daughter's "adopted child or children," or even, as every well-drawn will would have provided, to her "surviving children," or to her "then living children," or to her "children who are living at her death," but instead to her "children, if any, and for and during their lives. . . . [and] after the death of my said daughter and her children, if any . . . .

  3. Linn Estate

    258 A.2d 645 (Pa. 1969)   Cited 9 times

    " The Wills Act of 1947 (Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 89, § 14, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 180.14) provides that, in the absence of a contrary intention appearing therein, wills shall be construed in accordance with the following rules: "(1) Wills construed as if executed immediately before death. Every will shall be construed, with reference to the testator's real and personal estate, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator." In Lusk's Estate, 336 Pa. 465, 467, 9 A.2d 363 (1939), we held that a testatrix is presumed to have known that the law provides that "his [her] will would speak as of his [her] death". In the absence of any contrary intent shown in the instant will, we conclude that the law which governs the construction of her will is the law in effect when she died and that the instant life tenant occupied the status of a trustee to the remaindermen under testatrix's will.

  4. Braman Estate

    435 Pa. 573 (Pa. 1969)   Cited 8 times
    Acknowledging the lack of case law on the subject and ultimately finding that "a testator cannot dispose of property in which he lacks any interest, legal or equitable, at the time of death"

    See: Bigony Estate, supra. See: Lusk's Estate, 336 Pa. 465, 467, 9 A.2d 363 (1939); Miller v. Bower, 260 Pa. 349, 354, 355, 103 A. 727 (1918). Cf. McGlathery's Estate, 311 Pa. 351, 166 A. 886 (1933).