Zoning and land use regulations were deemed to be legislative functions, to be exercised by and within the particular expertise of the local legislative body. Thus, with the single exception of discriminatory zoning of similarly situated parcels, in which case the obvious remedy was to treat like parcels alike, a judicial declaration that a zoning ordinance was invalid as applied to a particular piece of property was never accompanied by a declaration which actually rezoned that property or placed it within a particular use classification (see, e.g., Lusk v. Town of Eastchester, 60 A.D.2d 645; Jurgens v. Town of Huntington, 53 A.D.2d 661; Emjay Props. v Town of Brookhaven, 42 A.D.2d 907). More recently, however, court challenges to exclusionary zoning on behalf of those excluded from the community have come into being, spawned by tremendous economic and social changes and the deterioration of city life.
In their complaint the plaintiffs seek to ascribe the inaction on the developer's part to the town officials' conduct in "discouraging developers from submitting applications for rezoning * * * informally indicating to prospective developers" that rezoning applications would not be approved, and in refusing "to negotiate the required lease" for air rights above the parking lot at the Port Washington railroad station. Assuming for the purposes of argument that this court has the authority to make the directions sought with respect to the project sites referred to in the complaint (a highly questionable assumption when dealing with legislative action [see Lusk v Town of Eastchester, 60 A.D.2d 645, 646 and cases cited therein; but cf. Berenson v New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506]) such relief surely could not be based upon nonfactual allegations of the type set forth in the complaint herein.