Opinion
02-23-00094-CR
11-30-2023
Tawanna Lusk, Appellant v. The State of Texas
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1649366D
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dana Womack Justice
In 2021, Appellant Tawanna Lusk pleaded guilty to promoting prostitution of a person younger than eighteen and was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.03(a), (b)(2). In October 2022, the State moved to proceed to adjudication, alleging that Lusk had violated fifteen conditions of her community supervision. After the State filed a second amended petition to proceed to adjudication alleging that Lusk had violated eighteen conditions of her community supervision, Lusk pleaded not true to all eighteen allegations. But after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Lusk had violated eleven of those conditions; adjudicated her guilty of promoting prostitution of a person younger than eighteen; assessed her punishment at ten years' imprisonment; and sentenced her accordingly. Lusk appealed.
After reviewing the appellate record, Lusk's court-appointed appellate counsel has concluded that no arguable grounds for appeal exist, and he has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Although we gave Lusk the opportunity to file a pro se response to the petition, she did not do so. The State also declined to file a response.
Counsel's brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders; counsel has presented a professional evaluation of the entire record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Id., 87 S.Ct. at 1400. We have independently examined the record, as is our duty when counsel files an Anders brief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82-83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 351 (1988). After carefully reviewing the record and counsel's brief, we agree with counsel that-but for a minor typographical correction to the judgment described below-this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Our independent review of the record reveals nothing further that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The judgment incorrectly states that Lusk pleaded true to allegations one, three, seven through eleven, and fifteen through eighteen-the allegations that the trial court ultimately found true-and that Lusk made an open plea to the trial court. However, the reporter's record shows that Lusk pleaded not true to all eighteen of the allegations in the State's second amended petition to adjudicate and that Lusk did not enter into a plea bargain for the adjudication. We may modify a judgment to correct typographical errors and "make the record speak the truth." See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also Tex.R.App.P. 43.2(b). Accordingly, we modify the judgment as follows:
• Under the heading "Plea to State's Second Amended Petition to Proceed to Adjudication," the judgment should read "Not True."
• Under the heading "Terms of Plea Bargain," the judgment should read "None."
As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We also grant counsel's motion to withdraw.