Opinion
Case No. 6D23-488
03-03-2023
Christopher LUSBY and Deborah Lusby, Appellants, v. Carl M. CANEVARI and C. Gene Canevari, Appellees.
Devin R. Maxwell, of Law Office of Devin R. Maxell, Okeechobee, for Appellants. William C. Davell and Meera Khan, of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.
Devin R. Maxwell, of Law Office of Devin R. Maxell, Okeechobee, for Appellants.
William C. Davell and Meera Khan, of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.
STARGEL, J. Christopher and Deborah Lusby appeal from an order granting temporary injunctive relief in favor of Carl Canevari and Gene Canevari. The Lusbys raise numerous challenges to the injunction order, two of which have merit. Because the injunction order lacks findings on one of the four necessary elements for a temporary injunction, and because the Lusbys are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the amount of the injunction bond, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023.
We reject the Lusbys’ remaining arguments without further discussion.
In 1981, a large parcel of land in Highlands County was subdivided into ten individual tracts to be known as Theo Estates. The owners who subdivided the property recorded a Declaration of Restrictions that included a provision creating a permanent nonexclusive easement for ingress and egress in favor of the owners of the individual tracts and their successors. Of the ten tracts, six are currently owned by the Lusbys and two are owned by the Canevaris. The Lusbys purchased tracts one, two, and three in 2004 and tracts eight, nine, and ten in 2016. The Canevaris purchased tract six in 1981 and tract seven in 2020.
The specific details regarding the boundaries of the individual tracts and the location of the easement, while key to the underlying dispute, are not important for the purposes of this opinion.
In February 2022, the Canevaris filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the Lusbys had been interfering with the easement by erecting locked gates and posting "No Trespassing" signs, thereby making ingress and egress impossible. The complaint alleged that after the Canevaris demanded the Lusbys stop interfering with the easement, the Lusbys replaced one of the gates with a fence, completely blocking off their access to the easement. The complaint requested a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Lusbys from interfering, impeding, or otherwise obstructing the easement.
On April 8, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the Canevaris’ request for a temporary injunction. After considering the evidence presented at the injunction hearing, the trial court stated that it would grant the temporary injunction. The trial court entered a written order finding that the requirements for a temporary injunction had been met and that the status quo should be preserved during the pendency of the litigation. The injunction order: (1) ordered the Canevaris to post a $5,000 injunction bond, (2) temporarily enjoined the Lusbys from blocking or interfering with the Canevaris’ right to use the easement, (3) ordered the Canevaris’ to replace the South fence with a gate at no cost to the Lusbys, and (4) ordered the Lusbys to furnish a "clicker" for the Canevaris to access the North gate. The Lusbys timely appealed.
We review a trial court's decision to grant a temporary injunction under a mixed standard of review. See Citizens for Sunshine, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Martin Cnty. , 125 So. 3d 184, 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). "To the extent the trial court's order is based on factual findings, we will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion; however, any legal conclusions are subject to de novo review." L. Offs. of Kravitz & Guerra, P.A. v. Brannon , 338 So. 3d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Quirch Foods LLC v. Broce , 314 So. 3d 327, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) ).
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c), every injunction must "specify the reasons for entry." Florida courts have held that the issuance of a temporary injunction requires: "(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) unavailability of an adequate legal remedy; (3) a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits; and (4) [that] considerations of the public interest support the entry of the injunction." Masters Freight, Inc. v. Servco, Inc. , 915 So. 2d 666, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Snibbe v. Napoleonic Soc'y. of Am., Inc. , 682 So. 2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), disapproved of on other grounds by Kitroser v. Hurt , 85 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2012) ); see also Bautista REO U.S., LLC v. ARR Invs., Inc. , 229 So. 3d 362, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). As several district courts have recognized, "[c]lear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of the four conclusions necessary to justify entry of a preliminary injunction." City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advert. Co. , 634 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ; see also Angelino v. Santa Barbara Enters., LLC , 2 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) ; Richard v. Behav. Healthcare Options, Inc. , 647 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
While the injunction order in this case contains sufficient findings regarding irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits, and public interest considerations, there are no findings as to the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law. Although the Canevaris make a persuasive argument that sufficient evidence was presented at the injunction hearing to establish the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, they do not dispute that the injunction order is silent on this prong of the analysis. Thus, in keeping with the requirements of rule 1.610 and longstanding case law interpreting the rule, we conclude that the failure to address this element in the injunction order necessitates reversal. See, e.g. , Phelan v. Trifactor Sols., LLC , 312 So. 3d 1036, 1038-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (reversing temporary injunction that lacked the requisite findings and observing that "[i]n some cases, procedure precedes substance").
We also conclude that the injunction order must be reversed because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the amount of the injunction bond. See id. at 1039 ("[I]t is well-established that a trial court must ‘hold[ ] an evidentiary hearing to address the appropriate amount of a[n injunction] bond.’ " (second alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Ga. Grove, LLP v. Collier County , 95 So. 3d 948, 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) )); Braswell v. Braswell , 881 So. 2d 1193, 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) ("[T]he trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the amount of the injunction bond and erred in not doing so."); Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. Sea Tow Servs. Int'l, Inc. , 778 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("[B]oth parties must be provided with the opportunity to present evidence regarding the appropriate amount of the injunction bond."). In discussing the issue with the parties during the injunction hearing, the trial court appeared to agree that an evidentiary hearing would be appropriate and noted that such a hearing should be held posthaste. Nevertheless, after announcing its oral ruling granting the temporary injunction, the trial court set the bond amount at $5,000 without giving the Lusbys the opportunity to present evidence on the issue.
The Canevaris suggest that the Lusbys failed to request an evidentiary hearing because their counsel merely "alluded" that an evidentiary hearing on the bond amount "may be in order." The hearing transcript, however, reflects that the Lusbys’ counsel expressly requested an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, we reverse the injunction order and remand with instructions for the trial court to render an order containing sufficient findings on all four of the elements necessary to support a temporary injunction and to hold an evidentiary hearing on the bond amount.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
COHEN and MIZE, JJ., concur.