The mere fact that he suffered pain and took sedatives during his stay in the hospital affords no excuse for the failure to give notice. The undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff could at least call or write a lawyer or ask someone else to do that for him. Hastings v. Foxworthy, 45 Neb. 676, 63 N.W. 955, 34 L.R.A. 321; Saunders v. City of Boston, 167 Mass. 595, 46 N.E. 98; Townsend v. City of Boston, 232 Mass. 451, 122 N.E. 395; Ehrhardt v. Seattle, 40 Wn. 221, 82 P. 296; May v. City of Boston, 150 Mass. 517, 23 N.E. 220; Ray v. St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340, 46 N.W. 675; Egan v. Township of Saltfleet, 29 Ont. L. Rep. 116; Goodwin v. Fall River, 228 Mass. 529, 117 N.E. 796; Hall v. City of Spokane, 79 Wn. 303, 140 P. 348; O'Connor v. City of Hamilton, 10 Ont. L. Rep. 529, reversing 8 Ont. L. Rep. 391. (2) The plaintiff's own statements that he was "half crazy" with pain and "didn't keep track of nothing hardly to know whether I was living or not" and that he did not know what he was doing, were mere conclusions, self-serving in nature, offered without further explanation or relation to any fact by which the jury could judge his capacity to hire a lawyer, and contradicted by other testimony of plaintiff himself and the hospital records. As such conclusions they had no probative force.

Massachusetts courts have found interests in the land in far more tenuous cases. See, e.g., Luo v. City of Boston, 96 Mass.App.Ct. 1102, 2019 WL 4309063, at *2 (Sep. 12, 2019) (Rule 1:28 decision) (defendant had interest in the property “both as the original grantor of the property and as the benefited party”); Gottlieb v. Girl Scouts of E. Massachusetts, Inc., No. 16-misc-000072-RBF, 2016 WL 3523859, at *7 (Mass. Land Ct. June 23, 2016) (plaintiff had interest as third-party beneficiary of the agreement at issue); Venuto v. DiClemente, No. 9904974F, 2001 WL 1174143, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 31, 2001) (enforcer of covenant not to sell building had interest given that he resided in an adjoining building). BLT nevertheless argues that Dairy Farmers “paid no consideration at all for the Option and did not even assign it any value in its bankruptcy bid.

"In determining the market value of the various tracts of land sought to be appropriated, the jury is precluded from considering their enhanced value, if any they may have, on account of the contemplated improvement in the water-works by the city." See: Smith v. Commonwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 N.E. 666; St. Louis Elec. Terminal Ry. Co. v. MacAdaras, 257 Mo., 448, 166 S.W. 307; Dorgan v. City of Boston, 94 Mass. 223; United States v. Certain Lands in Town of Narragansett, 180 F., 260; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 57 L. Ed., 1063, 33 S. Ct., 667; Mowry v. City of Boston, 173 Mass. 425, 53 N.E. 885; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 304, 37 L. Ed., 170, 13 S. Ct., 361; In re Water Commissioners, 3 Ed. C. R. (N. Y.), 552; Northern Pacific P. S. S. R. R. Co. v. Coleman, 3 Wn. 228, 28 P. 514; May v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 21, 32 N.E. 902. The reverse of such a situation — the depreciation in value of a parcel of property at the time appropriated where the property is included in a general plan of condemnation to carry out a specific program of the condemnor — is analogous in principle and should, we believe, invoke the application of a parallel rule of law.

If the expected improvement involves the taking of the land by the right of eminent domain, the value of the land taken will never be enhanced by the improvement, for the taking precludes the probability of ever using it under improved conditions.' May v. City of Boston, [158 Mass. 21], 32 N.E. 902.' When property is taken for a public purpose by condemnation the condemnor should not be required to pay for an increased value due to the public improvement.

In Massachusetts a statute of 1877 required such notices to be given within thirty days, unless from physical or mental incapacity it is impossible for the person injured to give such notice, in which case he may give such notice within ten days after such incapacity is removed, and it is there held that this notice, given within the time required, is a condition precedent to the right of recovery, and in a case where the notice was not given with thirty days the court say: "No liability ever attached against the city, and it was not within the power of the city council, or of its committee, to create a liability by any agreement or waiver." Gay v. City of Cambridge, 128 Mass. 387; May v. City of Boston, 150 Mass. 517. And in Harris v. Newbury, 128 Massachusetts, 325, the court say: "The requirement that the notice be given thus early (thirty days) after the injury is for the protection of the municipality, to prevent the bringing of actions on fictitious claims, and to enable towns and cities to investigate all claims for injury from defects in the highway soon after the injury is said to have been sustained, and while all important evidence, both as to the condition of the way and as to the fact of the injury, is likely to be within reach of diligent inquiry."

" Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain, p. 259, citing as exceptions Mayor of Baltimore v. Park Corporation, 126 Md. 358, 361; Hilcoat v. Bird, 10 C.B. 327, 138 Eng. Rep. 132; Stebbing v. Metropolitan Bd. of Works, L.R. 6 Q.B., 37; Robb v. Maysville Mt. Sterling Turnpike Road Co., 3 Metc. [Ky.], 117; Henderson Nashville R.R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. [Ky.], 173, 178; Producers' Wood Preserving Co. v. Comrs. of Sewerage, 227 Ky. 159; Virginia Truckee R.R. Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165; Beale v. City of Boston, 166 Mass. 53, 55; May v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 21, 29; Guyandot Valley Ry. Co. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 424; Durham Northern R.R. v. Trustees of Bullock Church, 104 N.C. 525, 531; Matter of Bd. of Supervisors, Herkimer County, 140 Misc. 894, 899, supra; Hall v. City of Providence, 45 R.I. 167; San Diego Land Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 67; Chicago Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Chicago Evanston R.R. Co., 112 Ill. 589, 607; City of Chicago v. Farwell, 286 Ill. 415. In New York, in the ascertainment of just compensation, the old rule which did not permit evidence of sales on direct examination has been changed by statute, and evidence of sales prices is now admitted on direct examination, and not limited to cross or redirect examination, and undue delay and surprise in the trial is now avoided.